Issues: (i) Whether an appellant disputing only interest, after payment of the entire tax, must make a percentage-based pre-deposit under Section 112(8)(b) of the Central Goods and Services Tax Act, 2017; (ii) Whether recovery of disputed interest through bank notices under Section 79(1)(c) may continue despite the deemed stay under Section 112(9) pending disposal of the Tribunal appeal.

Issue (i): Whether an appellant disputing only interest, after payment of the entire tax, must make a percentage-based pre-deposit under Section 112(8)(b) of the Central Goods and Services Tax Act, 2017.

Analysis: Sections 107(6) and 112(8) require payment in full of admitted amounts, while the percentage-based deposit is confined to the remaining amount of tax in dispute. Neither provision requires a percentage-based deposit of disputed interest where the entire tax has already been paid. The Tribunal appeal was accepted without an interest pre-deposit.

Conclusion: No percentage-based pre-deposit is required for disputed interest alone once the entire tax has been paid.

Issue (ii): Whether recovery of disputed interest through bank notices under Section 79(1)(c) may continue despite the deemed stay under Section 112(9) pending disposal of the Tribunal appeal.

Analysis: Upon compliance with the applicable requirements of Section 112(8), Section 112(9) deems recovery of the balance demand to be stayed until disposal of the appeal. The disputed interest demand forms part of that balance and cannot be recovered through notices issued to banks under Section 79(1)(c) during the statutory stay.

Conclusion: Recovery of the disputed interest was barred during the pendency of the Tribunal appeals; the recovery communications and consequential bank notices were set aside.

Final Conclusion: The statutory stay protects the disputed interest demands until the Tribunal determines the appeals on merits.

Ratio Decidendi: Where an appeal disputes only interest after full payment of tax, Section 112(8)(b) does not mandate a percentage-based pre-deposit, and the deemed stay under Section 112(9) bars recovery until disposal of that appeal.

Issues: Whether a show-cause notice internally generated before the limitation deadline, but made available on the common portal after that deadline due to a technical glitch, was validly issued under Section 73(2) of the Central Goods and Services Tax Act, 2017, and whether the consequential adjudication order could survive.

Analysis: Notification No. 56/2023-Central Tax dated 28.12.2023 extended the outer limit under Section 73(10) for financial year 2019-20 until 31.08.2024; consequently, Section 73(2) required issuance of the notice by 31.05.2024. The notice became available on the common portal only on 08.08.2024. Its prior presence on an internal system, with GSTN confirmation pending and without a common reference number, did not amount to issuance or service under Section 169. Re-uploading the notice acknowledged that the earlier upload had not become effective; no statutory power permitted retrospective validation or extension of the limitation except through a notification under Section 168A. Alternative statutory modes of service were also not used. Scrutiny communications under Section 61 and personal-hearing opportunities could not substitute the foundational show-cause notice required for adjudication under Section 73.

Conclusion: The show-cause notice was barred by limitation, and the consequential order-in-original lacked legal sustainability.

Issues: Whether the appellate authority could reject the application for condonation of delay and the statutory appeal without considering the stated grounds for the delay.

Analysis: Section 107 of the Uttar Pradesh Goods and Services Tax Act, 2017 governs the limitation for filing an appeal. The explanation that the appeal was delayed because of inadequate advice and non-communication by the accountant was specifically pleaded, but the appellate order invoked the limitation provision without addressing that explanation. Grounds advanced for condonation are required to be considered in their proper perspective, irrespective of whether they are ultimately found acceptable.

Conclusion: The rejection of the delay-condonation application and appeal was unsustainable for non-consideration of the stated grounds; the delay was condoned and the appeal was restored for adjudication on merits, subject to payment of costs.

Issues: Whether refund of unutilised input tax credit accumulated under an inverted duty structure before 18 July 2022 can be denied merely because a fresh refund application, following withdrawal of an earlier application, was filed after that date.

Analysis: Section 54(1) and Section 54(3) of the Central Goods and Services Tax Act, 2017 permit a timely claim for refund of unutilised input tax credit accumulated due to an inverted duty structure, subject to statutory restrictions. Notification No. 09/2022-Central Tax (Rate), dated 13.07.2022, took effect prospectively from 18.07.2022. The application-date restriction in Circular No. 181/13/2022-GST, dated 10.11.2022, had been invalidated to the extent it denied refund of credit accumulated before that date merely because the application was subsequently filed. Input tax credit accrues when eligible inward supplies are received and cannot be retrospectively curtailed by an executive circular without statutory authority. The claim related entirely to the period before 18.07.2022 and was filed within the prescribed limitation period.

Conclusion: Refund of input tax credit accumulated before 18.07.2022 cannot be denied solely because the subsequent refund application was filed after that date; the restriction in the circular is inapplicable to such pre-notification credit.

Issues: Whether unpaid excise duty on uncleared closing stock, neither paid nor debited or claimed as an expense, could be added to taxable income under Sections 43B and 145A of the Income-tax Act, 1961.

Analysis: Section 43B of the Income-tax Act, 1961 governs allowance of statutory expenditure on the actual payment basis, including payment made before the return-filing date. Section 145A of the Income-tax Act, 1961 concerns stock valuation. The closing stock remained in the assessee's bonded warehouse, contrary to the premise that the goods had been removed and excise duty had become payable. The assessee followed the exclusive method of accounting, had not routed the disputed amount through its profit and loss account, and had not claimed it as an allowable expense. The Revenue did not establish that the amount had been claimed as an allowance or that its non-inclusion adversely affected taxable income.

Conclusion: Disallowance and addition of the unpaid excise-duty amount under Sections 43B and 145A of the Income-tax Act, 1961 were impermissible.

Issues: (i) Whether limitation for filing an appeal against an Income Tax Appellate Tribunal order commences upon receipt of the communicated order or from knowledge of its pronouncement; and (ii) whether sufficient cause was shown for condonation of the 88-day delay.

Issue (i): Whether limitation for filing an appeal against an Income Tax Appellate Tribunal order commences upon receipt of the communicated order or from knowledge of its pronouncement.

Analysis: Section 254(3) of the Income-tax Act, 1961 and Rule 35 of the Income-Tax (Appellate Tribunal) Rules, 1963 require the Tribunal to communicate its signed order to the assessee and the Commissioner. The statutory and procedural scheme does not require a party to apply for a certified copy before pursuing an appeal. Mere knowledge of the result on pronouncement does not provide the reasons and findings necessary to formulate an effective appeal.

Conclusion: Limitation commences from receipt of the Tribunal's communicated order and not from mere knowledge of its pronouncement. In favour of the assessee.

Issue (ii): Whether sufficient cause was shown for condonation of the 88-day delay.

Analysis: A stage-wise explanation covered the period from receipt of the order until filing of the appeal. In applying Section 5 of the Limitation Act, a liberal and justice-oriented approach is warranted where the delay is not deliberate or mala fide, the explanation is bona fide, and no irreparable prejudice to the opposite side is demonstrated.

Conclusion: The explanation established sufficient cause, and the 88-day delay was condoned. In favour of the assessee.

Final Conclusion: The accompanying appeal may proceed for admission after removal of office objections.

Ratio Decidendi: Where the Tribunal is statutorily required to communicate its order to the parties, the limitation for an appeal runs from the date on which the aggrieved party receives that order, rather than from the date of pronouncement.

Issues: (i) Whether the Adjudicating Authority had jurisdiction under Section 60(5) of the Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code, 2016 to entertain the Liquidator's application for recovery of dues under the Business Purchase Agreement; (ii) Whether the unpaid consideration under the Business Purchase Agreement constituted a receivable and asset of the Corporate Debtor recoverable in liquidation; (iii) Whether the buyer-company and the appellants were personally liable for the amount due under the Business Purchase Agreement.

Issue (i): Whether the Adjudicating Authority had jurisdiction under Section 60(5) of the Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code, 2016 to entertain the Liquidator's application for recovery of dues under the Business Purchase Agreement.

Analysis: Section 35(1)(d) of the Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code, 2016 and Regulation 39 of the IBBI (Liquidation Process) Regulations, 2016 require the Liquidator to protect, realise and recover assets and dues of the Corporate Debtor. Recovery of unpaid contractual consideration forming part of the liquidation estate has a direct nexus with liquidation and falls within the wide jurisdiction under Section 60(5)(c). The claim was not treated as an independent contractual dispute between unrelated third parties requiring separate civil or arbitral adjudication.

Conclusion: The jurisdictional issue was answered in the affirmative.

Issue (ii): Whether the unpaid consideration under the Business Purchase Agreement constituted a receivable and asset of the Corporate Debtor recoverable in liquidation.

Analysis: The payment clause prescribing discharge of specified liabilities from business income was construed as a commercial mechanism for payment, not as extinguishing the buyer's primary obligation to pay the agreed consideration. A business efficacy interpretation was required because the buyer-side persons had assumed control, accepted the assets on an as-is-where-is basis after due diligence, and obtained the transaction's commercial benefits. They could not rely on inadequate revenue during their control to avoid the unpaid consideration.

Conclusion: The unpaid consideration was held to be a receivable and asset of the Corporate Debtor recoverable for the liquidation estate.

Issue (iii): Whether the buyer-company and the appellants were personally liable for the amount due under the Business Purchase Agreement.

Analysis: The buyer-company was initially the contractual purchaser, but the documentary record established that three appellants, as its directors, immediately assumed managerial, financial and operational control of the Corporate Debtor, acquired its shareholding, dealt with its assets and business, and later simultaneously exited the corporate structure. The buyer-company functioned as their alter ego and corporate fac ade. In these circumstances, privity of contract and separate corporate personality could not be used to avoid responsibility for acts personally undertaken by the controlling minds. A formal pleading for lifting the corporate veil was not necessary where the evidence itself established the buyer-company as the instrumentality through which those individuals acquired and controlled the Corporate Debtor.

Conclusion: Recovery liability was sustained against the buyer-company and the three appellants who were its directors and controlling minds, but not against the remaining appellants.

Final Conclusion: The amount due under the Business Purchase Agreement, together with applicable interest, remains recoverable for the liquidation estate from the buyer-company and the three controlling director-appellants.

Ratio Decidendi: Section 60(5) permits recovery in liquidation of contractual consideration constituting a Corporate Debtor's receivable, and separate corporate personality and privity of contract do not shield persons who use the purchaser-company as a fac ade while exercising real control and deriving the transaction's benefits.

Issues: (i) Whether the Committee of Creditors could resolve to issue a fresh Form G after remand of a resolution plan and failure of the revised plan and settlement proposal; (ii) Whether assignments of homebuyer claims invalidated the voting on the fresh Form G; (iii) Whether the intervention applications could raise matters outside the impugned order.

Issue (i): Whether the Committee of Creditors could resolve to issue a fresh Form G after remand of a resolution plan and failure of the revised plan and settlement proposal.

Analysis: The earlier plan, although approved by the Committee of Creditors, had not received approval under Section 31 of the Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code, 2016 and was remitted for reconsideration. The revised plan involved substantially increased commitments and was assessed for its funding, performance guarantee, financial capacity, feasibility and viability. It failed to obtain the statutory 66% voting threshold under Section 30(4). The settlement proposal likewise failed to receive the 90% approval required under Section 12A. Thereafter, the Committee of Creditors unanimously chose to invite fresh expressions of interest. Neither the Code nor Regulation 36A imposed an absolute prohibition on a fresh Form G in these circumstances, and commercial assessment could not be substituted by judicial review absent a legal infirmity.

Conclusion: The resolution to invite fresh expressions of interest was within the Committee of Creditors' commercial decision-making and was not shown to contravene the Code or the Regulations.

Issue (ii): Whether assignments of homebuyer claims invalidated the voting on the fresh Form G.

Analysis: Under Regulation 28, changes arising from assignment of debt are notified and reflected through the prescribed process. The original allottees remained creditors on record when the relevant decisions and voting were undertaken. Subsequent recognition of the assignments and consequential reconstitution of the Committee of Creditors could not retrospectively alter the validity of earlier voting. The alleged assignment-related votes would, in any event, not have affected the overall approval of the fresh Form G.

Conclusion: The assignments did not retrospectively invalidate the prior voting, and no fraud or material irregularity in that process was established.

Issue (iii): Whether the intervention applications could raise matters outside the impugned order.

Analysis: An intervenor may assist on the controversy arising in the appeal but cannot introduce an independent cause of action or seek relief beyond the subject matter of the impugned order. The proposed issues concerning a separate insolvency process, consolidation, development rights and treatment under a future plan did not arise from the order permitting publication of the fresh Form G.

Conclusion: The intervention applications were not maintainable to introduce independent issues beyond the appeal's subject matter.

Final Conclusion: The permission for a fresh market process remained legally sustainable after the remitted revised plan and the settlement alternative failed to obtain their respective statutory voting thresholds.

Ratio Decidendi: Where a remitted resolution plan has not received approval under Section 31, and the revised plan and settlement proposal fail to obtain the prescribed voting thresholds, the Committee of Creditors may invite fresh expressions of interest absent a statutory prohibition, and its commercial assessment is not open to substitution by judicial review.

Issues: Whether, in an appeal confined to directions issued for cooperation in the corporate insolvency resolution process, inherent powers could be invoked to permit deposit of the admitted debt, defer the resolution-plan process, and effectively secure closure of the process despite a pending similar application and the prescribed statutory withdrawal mechanism.

Analysis: The appeal was confined to the validity of directions under Section 19(2) of the Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code concerning non-cooperation with the resolution professional. A substantially similar request for closure of the corporate insolvency resolution process and stay of further steps was already pending before the Adjudicating Authority. Section 12A of the Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code and Regulation 30A of the Insolvency Resolution Process for Corporate Persons Regulations, 2016 prescribe the mechanism for withdrawal; a financial creditor cannot be compelled to accept a settlement or close the process. Invocation of Rule 11 of the National Company Law Appellate Tribunal Rules, 2016 could not circumvent that statutory procedure. Pursuit of the same relief before a different forum, in an appeal having a limited subject matter, amounted to forum shopping and abuse of process; the insolvency proceedings were also in rem.

Conclusion: Inherent jurisdiction could not be used to obtain a deposit-based stay or closure of the corporate insolvency resolution process outside the statutory withdrawal procedure and the scope of the appeal.

Issues: Whether the arrest under Section 19(1) of the Prevention of Money Laundering Act, 2002 and the consequential remand orders were lawful where the Enforcement Directorate had invoked Section 50 proceedings on the basis of existing material and no fresh incriminating material or supervening circumstance existed before the arrest.

Analysis: Section 19(1) makes arrest a discretionary and extreme measure, exercisable only upon the authorised officer recording reasons to believe, founded on material in possession, that the person is guilty of an offence under the Act. Sections 50(2) and 50(3) separately empower the authority to summon, question and obtain records; such proceedings are deemed judicial proceedings under Section 50(4).

Analysis: The petitioner had participated in repeated examinations and furnished information. The material relied on for arrest was already available to the Enforcement Directorate, which had sought judicial permission to confront the petitioner with that material and record a further statement. The absence of fresh incriminating material or a supervening exigency between the last examination and arrest negated any demonstrated necessity for arrest. Arrest could not be used to bypass the ongoing statutory process of examination or merely to facilitate investigation.

Conclusion: The arrest was unlawful under Section 19(1) of the Prevention of Money Laundering Act, 2002, and the consequential remand orders were invalid.

Issues: Whether Rule 8(3A) of the Central Excise Rules, 2002, validly prohibited utilisation of CENVAT credit during the period of default and sustained the consequential duty demand and penalty.

Analysis: Rule 8(3A) of the Central Excise Rules, 2002, had already been declared ultra vires in binding decisions, including a decision affirmed by the jurisdictional High Court. The restriction on payment of duty through CENVAT credit during default could therefore not support the demand.

Conclusion: Rule 8(3A) of the Central Excise Rules, 2002, is ultra vires; the duty demand and penalty founded on that rule are unsustainable. The issue is decided in favour of the assessee.

Issues: (i) Whether the admitted execution and delivery of the cheques, the subsequent monetary settlement, and the defence of Security Cheque rebutted the statutory presumptions and sustained the conviction under Section 138 of the Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881; (ii) Whether cheque No. 315387 was void for Material Alteration or could not attract Section 138 of the Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881 for want of proved presentment to the drawee bank; (iii) Whether refusal to admit Additional Evidence and summon further witnesses disclosed a material irregularity; (iv) Whether the compensation and substantive sentence required interference.

Issue (i): Whether the admitted execution and delivery of the cheques, the subsequent monetary settlement, and the defence of Security Cheque rebutted the statutory presumptions and sustained the conviction under Section 138 of the Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881.

Analysis: Revisional Jurisdiction over concurrent factual findings is confined to perversity, material illegality, arbitrariness, or disregard of relevant evidence; it does not permit reappreciation merely because another view is possible. Upon admitted signatures and delivery of the cheques, the Statutory Presumptions under Sections 118(a) and 139 of the Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881 operated in favour of consideration and a legally enforceable liability. Those presumptions required rebuttal through a probable defence on a Preponderance of Probabilities. The written settlement, attesting testimony, and delivery of three cheques supported a settled monetary obligation. The unsubstantiated Security Cheque defence, allegations of incomplete construction, and proposed adjustment of contractual dues did not displace that obligation.

Conclusion: The statutory presumptions were not rebutted, and the conviction under Section 138 of the Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881 was rightly sustained against the Petitioner.

Issue (ii): Whether cheque No. 315387 was void for Material Alteration or could not attract Section 138 of the Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881 for want of proved presentment to the drawee bank.

Analysis: Section 87 of the Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881 invalidates an instrument only upon proof of an unauthorised material change to an existing entry. The Petitioner admitted signing and delivering the cheque but did not establish when or how an amount already entered was altered without consent. The corresponding numerical and written amounts, together with the absence of supporting evidence, did not prove Material Alteration. The collecting bank's endorsement referring to alteration was insufficient by itself to establish that the instrument was void. Further, the record did not prove the factual assertion that the cheque had not been presented to the drawee bank.

Conclusion: The objections based on Material Alteration and alleged non-presentment failed, and cheque No. 315387 continued to support the conviction against the Petitioner.

Issue (iii): Whether refusal to admit Additional Evidence and summon further witnesses disclosed a material irregularity.

Analysis: Additional Evidence under Section 391 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 may be received where necessary, but the provision does not confer an unrestricted right to introduce material not relied upon at trial. The proposed affidavit had not been invoked during cross-examination or earlier stages of the defence, contained an erased paragraph, and was reasonably treated as an afterthought. The request under Section 311 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 to summon further witnesses at final arguments lacked sufficient justification; the construction-related evidence was already on record and did not displace the distinct liability arising from the settlement.

Conclusion: Refusal to admit the proposed evidence and summon further witnesses disclosed no material irregularity and was sustained against the Petitioner.

Issue (iv): Whether the compensation and substantive sentence required interference.

Analysis: The compensation amount, comprising the cheque amount and an additional sum reflecting prolonged deprivation of payment, was practical and reasonable. The liability remained unpaid despite deposits made during proceedings. Sentencing Proportionality nevertheless required consideration of the property-development context, family circumstances, partial deposits, and the substantial compensation continuing to be payable.

Conclusion: The compensation and default sentence were affirmed, but the substantive sentence was reduced from ten months to six months' simple imprisonment, partly in favour of the Petitioner.

Final Conclusion: The conviction, compensatory liability, and default penalty remain operative, while the custodial sentence stands recalibrated to six months' simple imprisonment.

Ratio Decidendi: An accused who admits signing and delivering a cheque must rebut the presumptions of consideration and legally enforceable liability on a preponderance of probabilities; an unsupported Security Cheque defence or bank endorsement of alteration does not establish such rebuttal.

Issues: Whether an adjudication order may confirm a GST demand exceeding the amount proposed in the show-cause notice.

Analysis: Section 75(7) of the Uttar Pradesh Goods and Services Tax Act, 2017 and the Central Goods and Services Tax Act, 2017 prohibits confirmation of a demand exceeding that proposed in the show-cause notice. The notice proposed tax, interest and penalty at specified amounts, whereas the adjudication order confirmed a substantially higher tax demand and penalty. Such confirmation exceeded the statutory authority conferred on the adjudicating authority.

Conclusion: An adjudicating authority cannot confirm tax, interest or penalty beyond the amount proposed in the show-cause notice; an order doing so is without jurisdiction.

Issues: (i) Whether the tax demand could be sustained when the show-cause notice did not disclose the material factual and legal basis for treating the February 2020 entry as wrongful input tax credit and the orders gave no reasoned answer to the restoration explanation; (ii) Whether a payment of IGST under the wrong tax head could be corrected by unilateral recredit in GSTR-3B, and how the correct-head payments must be treated; and (iii) Whether the consequential interest and penalty were sustainable.

Issue (i): Whether the tax demand could be sustained when the show-cause notice did not disclose the material factual and legal basis for treating the February 2020 entry as wrongful input tax credit and the orders gave no reasoned answer to the restoration explanation.

Analysis: Section 73(1) of the Central Goods and Services Tax Act, 2017, read with Sections 75(6) and 75(7), requires the notice to disclose the factual and legal basis of the proposed demand and confines confirmation to the stated grounds. Although the notice identified the amount and month, it did not specify which condition under Section 16(2) failed or distinguish a fresh claim of credit on inward supplies from restoration of credit earlier used for output-tax payment under a wrong head. The subsequent reliance on supplier-related defaults and the refund-procedure objection did not cure this omission. The adjudication and appellate orders also did not reconcile the original IGST debit with the correct-head payments or give a reasoned answer to the explanation. This denied natural justice and resulted in non-speaking orders on material issues.

Conclusion: The demand founded on the deficient show-cause notice and unsupported by reasoned findings was unsustainable, in favour of the assessee.

Issue (ii): Whether a payment of IGST under the wrong tax head could be corrected by unilateral recredit in GSTR-3B, and how the correct-head payments must be treated.

Analysis: Section 19(1) of the Integrated Goods and Services Tax Act, 2017 and Rule 89(1A) of the Central Goods and Services Tax Rules prescribe refund as the statutory mechanism for IGST paid on a supply subsequently found to be intra-State; Section 77(2) of the Central Goods and Services Tax Act, 2017 excludes interest on the correct Central and State tax liability. Output tax paid under the wrong head does not automatically become fresh input tax credit under Section 16 merely through a GSTR-3B entry. However, the payments made under the correct Central and State tax heads through DRC-03 were established and had to be recognised. The framework required reconciliation of the original IGST payment, the correct-head payments and any benefit obtained through recredit, so as to give effect to revenue neutrality and avoid double taxation without permitting duplicate credit or refund.

Conclusion: Unilateral recredit through GSTR-3B was not automatically lawful; nevertheless, the correct-head tax payments had to be recognised and fiscally reconciled without any duplicate credit or refund, partly in favour of the assessee.

Issue (iii): Whether the consequential interest and penalty were sustainable.

Analysis: Interest under Section 50(3) and Rule 88B of the Central Goods and Services Tax Rules requires findings on wrongful availment and utilisation of input tax credit, including the relevant ledger balance, utilisation and period of benefit. Section 77(2) also protected the correct Central and State tax payment from interest. Penalty under Section 73(11) could not independently survive once the finding of wrongful credit and the underlying demand failed.

Conclusion: The consequential interest and penalty were unsustainable, in favour of the assessee.

Final Conclusion: A correction involving payment of tax under a wrong head must follow the statutory refund framework, but the Department must recognise tax actually paid under the correct heads and cannot sustain recovery on an inadequately disclosed charge or an unreasoned rejection of the taxpayer's explanation.

Ratio Decidendi: Where a GST demand treats a recredit as wrongly availed input tax credit, the show-cause notice must disclose the factual and legal basis of that charge and adjudication must address the taxpayer's actual explanation; the prescribed refund process for a wrong-head payment does not permit disregard of tax already paid under the correct heads.

Issues: (i) Whether a corporate guarantor's liability is a financial debt despite the guarantee not having been invoked before commencement of CIRP; (ii) Whether an individual homebuyer may object to inclusion of creditors in the CoC without proceeding through the authorised representative; (iii) Whether the lender, debenture trustee, and a recent assignee were related parties barred from CoC participation.

Issue (i): Whether a corporate guarantor's liability is a financial debt despite the guarantee not having been invoked before commencement of CIRP.

Analysis: Section 5(8) encompasses liability under a corporate guarantee. A financial creditor under Section 5(7) is a person to whom financial debt is owed and need not establish an existing default for lodging a claim in CIRP. Default under Section 3(12) is material to commencement of CIRP under Section 7(1), not to the existence of financial debt.

Conclusion: A corporate guarantor's liability is a financial debt even where the guarantee was not invoked before CIRP commenced, and the claims could be lodged. In favour of the appellants.

Issue (ii): Whether an individual homebuyer may object to inclusion of creditors in the CoC without proceeding through the authorised representative.

Analysis: The authorised representative of creditors in a class has a limited statutory role of attending CoC meetings and voting on their behalf. That role does not prevent an individual homebuyer from challenging the inclusion of a related party in the CoC. An earlier direction permitting resubmission of claims without hearing other financial creditors does not operate as res judicata against their subsequent objection.

Conclusion: An individual homebuyer had locus to raise the related-party objection; representation through the authorised representative was unnecessary for that purpose. In favour of the respondents.

Issue (iii): Whether the lender, debenture trustee, and a recent assignee were related parties barred from CoC participation.

Analysis: Section 5(24)(m)(i) requires association through participation in the corporate debtor's policy-making processes. This enquiry is less exacting than the positive and proactive control required for disqualification under Section 29A. The contractual rights to appoint a nominee director, resolve deadlocks, approve and modify construction budgets, regulate key managerial personnel, oversee project implementation, appoint sales agents, and control project revenues and escrow accounts established pervasive participation in policy-making and business supervision. The post-CIRP assignment was not a bona fide assignment and could not be used to defeat the related-party exclusion.

Conclusion: The lender was a related party; it, the debenture trustee acting for its debenture interest, and the recent assignee could not be represented, participate, or vote in the CoC. In favour of the respondents.

Final Conclusion: Although the corporate-guarantee claims constituted financial debt, the related-party exclusion precluded the lender, trustee, and assignee from CoC rights, and the individual homebuyer's objection was maintainable.

Ratio Decidendi: A financial creditor whose contractual rights enable participation in a corporate debtor's policy-making processes is a related party and cannot obtain CoC representation through a post-CIRP assignment that is not bona fide.

Issues: (i) Whether the application under Section 95(1) of the Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code, 2016 against the personal guarantor was filed within the applicable limitation period; and (ii) Whether admission of a creditor's claim by a resolution professional constitutes an acknowledgment extending limitation under Section 18 of the Limitation Act, 1963.

Issue (i): Whether the application under Section 95(1) of the Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code, 2016 against the personal guarantor was filed within the applicable limitation period.

Analysis: Article 137 of the Limitation Act, 1963 prescribed a three-year period. The limitation period commenced upon expiry of the period specified in the demand invoking the personal guarantee. After excluding the period directed to be excluded during the COVID-19 pandemic, the limitation period expired before the application was instituted.

Conclusion: The application was barred by limitation and was not maintainable, in favour of the appellant.

Issue (ii): Whether admission of a creditor's claim by a resolution professional constitutes an acknowledgment extending limitation under Section 18 of the Limitation Act, 1963.

Analysis: A valid acknowledgment under Section 18 must be made by the person against whom the right is claimed, or an authorised person, before expiry of limitation, and must consciously and unequivocally admit the subsisting liability. Admission of a claim by a resolution professional is an administrative act of collating and recording claims, not an adjudicatory admission of liability by the corporate debtor.

Conclusion: Admission of the claim by the resolution professional did not amount to an acknowledgment and could not extend or renew limitation, in favour of the appellant.

Final Conclusion: The limitation objection prevailed because no valid acknowledgment existed to preserve the claim beyond the applicable limitation period for initiating the personal-guarantor insolvency process.

Ratio Decidendi: A resolution professional's administrative admission of a claim is not an acknowledgment of debt capable of extending a subsisting limitation period under Section 18 of the Limitation Act, 1963.

Issues: (i) Whether the consequential assessment was liable to be annulled because the original assessment was alleged to be invalid. (ii) Whether the addition under Section 68 in an unabated assessment was supported by incriminating material found during search. (iii) Whether the cash credits described as land advances were unexplained under Section 68. (iv) Whether the addition was eligible for telescoping against income considered in settlement proceedings.

Issue (i): Whether the consequential assessment was liable to be annulled because the original assessment was alleged to be invalid.

Analysis: The revision order under Section 263 directing examination of the impugned credits remained operative. No specific statutory defect establishing invalidity of the consequential assessment, or material showing that the revision order had been set aside or had ceased to operate, was established.

Conclusion: The consequential assessment was not liable to be annulled; against the assessee.

Issue (ii): Whether the addition under Section 68 in an unabated assessment was supported by incriminating material found during search.

Analysis: In an unabated assessment, an addition under Section 153A requires incriminating material found in search. The seized Tally data, Annexure III, bank-ledger entries, and corroborative statements specifically identified the cash receipts, linked them to the assessee, and indicated that they represented unaccounted cash. The addition was therefore based on search material rather than merely on entries in the regular books.

Conclusion: The addition was supported by incriminating material and was permissible in the unabated assessment; against the assessee.

Issue (iii): Whether the cash credits described as land advances were unexplained under Section 68.

Analysis: Section 68 requires a satisfactory explanation of the nature and source of credits. The assessee did not provide the identities and addresses of the alleged payers, confirmations, land-transaction agreements, or other evidence substantiating the source of the cash receipts. Recording the receipts in the books and audited financial statements did not discharge this burden.

Conclusion: The cash credits were rightly treated as unexplained under Section 68; against the assessee.

Issue (iv): Whether the addition was eligible for telescoping against income considered in settlement proceedings.

Analysis: Telescoping required proof that the specific unexplained credits had already been included in income considered in the settlement proceedings. No factual nexus was established between the impugned receipts and the additional income of another group entity or the relief already granted for other cash transactions.

Conclusion: Telescoping was not available; against the assessee.

Final Conclusion: The consequential assessments and the additions for unexplained cash credits in the connected matters remain legally sustained.

Ratio Decidendi: In an unabated assessment, an addition under Section 153A may be sustained where seized evidence directly links the assessee to unexplained cash credits and the assessee fails to establish their nature and source.

Issues: Whether the omission of Rule 96(10) of the Central Goods and Services Tax Rules, 2017, without a saving clause, applies to pending claims for refund of integrated tax paid on exports.

Analysis: The Supreme Court ruling, accepted by the revenue authorities, was applied. Omission of Rule 96(10) without a saving or sunset clause extinguishes the restriction for pending proceedings; Section 6 of the General Clauses Act, 1897 does not preserve proceedings under an omitted rule. The recommendation that the omission operate prospectively was advisory and could not preserve the omitted restriction.

Conclusion: Rule 96(10) cannot be applied to pending export refund proceedings. Refund applications are to be considered afresh in accordance with law without prejudice from the earlier orders.

Issues: Whether the bail condition requiring deposit of the passport and prior permission for every foreign journey should be modified.

Analysis: Bail restrictions are intended to secure the accused's participation in trial. The applicant had complied with the existing condition, obtained permission for overseas travel on previous occasions, and redeposited the passport after each visit. The recurring requirement of obtaining release of the passport was found to hinder foreign travel, while advance intimation to the trial court adequately protected the purpose of the bail condition.

Conclusion: The passport-deposit requirement was dispensed with. The applicant must notify the trial court in writing thirty days before leaving India, specifying the foreign-travel schedule, and must inform the trial court in writing upon return.