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Issues: Whether the cancellation of bail under Section 43D(5) of the Unlawful Activities (Prevention) Act, 1967 was justified, and whether the trial court's view on the prima facie case was perverse or impossible so as to warrant appellate interference.
Analysis: The statutory bar under Section 43D(5) requires the prosecution to be heard and the court to be satisfied that there are reasonable grounds for believing that the accusation is prima facie true. In considering offences under Sections 39 and 40 of the Act, the relevant inquiry is whether the alleged acts were done with the intention of furthering the activities of a terrorist organisation. The material relied upon by the prosecution, including the charge-sheet, supplementary charge-sheet, and forensic report, did not render the trial court's distinction between persons who voluntarily fund outlawed organisations and those who are compelled to pay under threat as unreasonable. The trial court's view that the appellants were not shown to be voluntary contributors or sympathisers, and that they were cooperating with the investigation, was not shown to be perverse or impossible.
Conclusion: The cancellation of bail was not sustainable, and interference with the trial court's grant of bail was unwarranted.