Inherent criminal court powers survive the second revision bar, allowing intervention to prevent abuse of process and secure justice.

Section 397(3) bars the same person from pursuing a second revision after choosing one revisional forum, but that restriction is confined to revision and does not, by itself, extinguish the High Court's inherent power under Section 482. The High Court may still intervene where necessary to prevent abuse of process or secure the ends of justice, subject to strict threshold scrutiny. The same principle applies to suo motu revisional intervention: Section 397(3) does not take away the High Court's power to call for records and act on its own motion, though that power must be used sparingly and only in appropriate cases.

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Issues: (i) Whether a party barred from filing a second revision under Section 397(3) of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 can invoke Section 482 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973; (ii) Whether Section 397(3) of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 takes away the High Court's power to exercise revisional jurisdiction suo motu after the Sessions Judge has already exercised revision under that provision.

Issue (i): Whether a party barred from filing a second revision under Section 397(3) of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 can invoke Section 482 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973.

Analysis: Section 397(3) bars the same person from approaching the other revisional forum after having chosen one forum under Section 397(1). That bar is confined to the remedy of revision and does not expressly curtail the High Court's inherent power. The inherent power under Section 482 remains available where its exercise is necessary to prevent abuse of process or to secure the ends of justice, subject to careful scrutiny at the threshold.

Conclusion: Yes. A party barred from filing a second revision may still invoke Section 482, but the High Court must be prima facie satisfied that the case discloses abuse of process or requires interference in the interests of justice.

Issue (ii): Whether Section 397(3) of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 takes away the High Court's power to exercise revisional jurisdiction suo motu after the Sessions Judge has already exercised revision under that provision.

Analysis: The statutory bar in Section 397(3) is directed only against the same person who has already chosen the revisional remedy before one forum. It does not curtail the High Court's own power to call for records and act suo motu where intervention is needed to prevent abuse of process or to secure the ends of justice. The revisional and inherent powers must therefore be read harmoniously.

Conclusion: No. Section 397(3) does not take away the High Court's suo motu revisional power, though such power must be exercised sparingly and only in appropriate cases.

Final Conclusion: The referred questions were answered by holding that the statutory bar against a second revision does not exclude the High Court's inherent power, and that the High Court may also act suo motu where the circumstances justify intervention in aid of justice.

Ratio Decidendi: A statutory bar on a further revision by the same party does not, by itself, curtail the High Court's inherent power under Section 482 or its suo motu revisional authority, which survives to prevent abuse of process and secure the ends of justice.

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