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Issues: Whether the complaint and summoning order in a prosecution under Section 138 of the Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881 could be quashed in exercise of inherent jurisdiction under Section 482 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 on the petitioner's plea that she was neither a signatory nor responsible for the company's affairs, and whether such defence could be examined only at trial.
Analysis: The allegations in the complaint specifically attributed to the petitioner a role in handling finance and accounts and in the day-to-day affairs of the company. The Court held that in a prosecution under Section 138 of the Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881, defences such as absence of role, non-participation in negotiations, or non-signature of the cheque are matters for trial and cannot be adjudicated at the threshold in proceedings under Section 482 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973. The Court further noted that the special procedure under Sections 143 to 147 of the Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881 is intended to expedite trial, that the accused can raise the plea of defence before the trial court, and that disputed questions of fact cannot be examined in quashing jurisdiction. The Court also relied on the principle that where allegations require proof, inherent powers should not be exercised to short-circuit the trial.
Conclusion: The petition was not fit for quashing at the threshold, and the petitioner's defence was left to be established before the trial court.