Mere acknowledgment cannot revive limitation or create liability unless it is a written, signed promise supported by contract law.

A mere acknowledgment does not, by itself, create an enforceable contractual promise or save a time-barred claim unless it satisfies the requirements of a written and signed promise to pay a debt otherwise enforceable but for limitation. The Court rejected the attempt to treat the document as an independent account stated or as a valid contract unsupported by consideration. It also held that novation and a fresh plea based on an alleged unproduced letter could not be raised for the first time in second appeal, as no proper foundation existed in the pleadings or evidence. The lower appellate decree was therefore set aside and the suit dismissed.

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Issues: (i) Whether the suit on the acknowledgment was barred by limitation and whether the acknowledgment could be supported under the law of contract; (ii) Whether the plea of novation or a plea based on an unproduced letter under the law of contract could be raised for the first time in second appeal.

Issue (i): Whether the suit on the acknowledgment was barred by limitation and whether the acknowledgment could be supported under the law of contract.

Analysis: The earlier view that limitation could be saved by combining the provisions corresponding to exclusion or extension of time with the acknowledgment provision was rejected as inconsistent with later authority. The Court held that the time-bar must be computed according to the acknowledgment itself, and that a mere acknowledgment does not become an enforceable promise unless it satisfies the requirement of a written and signed promise to pay a debt otherwise enforceable only but for limitation. The document relied upon was treated as an implied promise contained in an acknowledgment, not as an independent account stated or a valid promise supported by consideration.

Conclusion: The suit, being founded on a mere acknowledgment unsupported by the necessary contractual basis, was barred by limitation and could not be sustained under the contract provision invoked.

Issue (ii): Whether the plea of novation or a plea based on an unproduced letter under the law of contract could be raised for the first time in second appeal.

Analysis: The Court found no proper foundation for novation in the pleadings or in the evidence relied upon. The defendants had not admitted an unconditional substituted contract, and the respondent's case had throughout proceeded on the acknowledgment itself. The argument based on an alleged letter was treated as a new plea, not raised at the proper stage, and therefore not entertainable in second appeal.

Conclusion: The pleas of novation and of a contractual postponement based on the alleged letter were rejected as unavailable at the appellate stage.

Final Conclusion: The decree of the lower appellate Court was set aside and the plaintiff's suit was dismissed with costs, the defendants' appeal succeeding on the limitation and contract issues.

Ratio Decidendi: A mere acknowledgment cannot defeat limitation or create an enforceable liability unless it satisfies the statutory requirements of a written and signed promise supported by the law governing consideration, and a wholly new contractual plea not pleaded or proved cannot be raised for the first time in second appeal.

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