Legal professional privilege bars disclosure of client communications to counsel; privileged evidence taints appellate findings and warrants rehearing.

Communications made by a client to his pleader during the course and for the purpose of employment are protected by legal professional privilege under Section 126 of the Indian Evidence Act and cannot be disclosed without consent. A pleader's evidence repeating the client's statement that he was a benamdar was therefore inadmissible and ought not to have been received. Because the appellate court appears to have been materially influenced by that privileged evidence, the appellate judgment and decree were set aside and the matter was directed to be reheard after excluding the protected statements.

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Issues: Whether communications made by a client to his pleader in the course of employment were inadmissible in evidence under Section 126 of the Indian Evidence Act, and whether the appellate decree could stand when it appeared to have been influenced by such evidence.

Analysis: Communications made to a pleader during the course and for the purpose of his employment are protected from disclosure without the client's consent. Evidence by the pleader that his client had stated he was a benamdar fell within that protection and ought not to have been received. As the appellate court appears to have been materially influenced by that evidence, it was not possible to say how far the conclusion reached had been affected. The proper course was to set aside the appellate decree and direct a rehearing after excluding the privileged statements from consideration.

Conclusion: The evidence was inadmissible, and the appellate judgment and decree were set aside with a direction for rehearing.

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