De facto officer authority and corruption FIR rules upheld: collateral challenge, preliminary inquiry and sanction objections failed.

A de facto officer acting under colour of lawful authority can validly authorise investigation, and such acts cannot be collaterally attacked merely because of an alleged defect in re-employment or appointment; the challenge under Section 482 CrPC was therefore unsustainable. In corruption matters, a preliminary inquiry is not mandatory in every case, and where the information discloses a cognizable offence, registration of an FIR is required. The absence of sanction did not justify quashing at the threshold, and the objection that the informant and investigator were the same person was also rejected. The prosecution was allowed to proceed.

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Issues: (i) Whether the criminal proceedings could be quashed on the ground that the authorisation for investigation was issued by a re-employed officer and the investigating officer was competent to act; (ii) Whether the FIR and consequent proceedings were liable to be quashed for want of a preliminary inquiry, sanction, or on the ground that the informant and investigator were the same person.

Issue (i): Whether the criminal proceedings could be quashed on the ground that the authorisation for investigation was issued by a re-employed officer and the investigating officer was competent to act.

Analysis: The re-employment of the officer was held to be within the executive power of the State under the Constitution and consistent with the State's authority over police administration. The officer, while acting under colour of lawful authority in public interest, was treated as a de facto officer. Acts done by such an officer, including the authorisation issued for investigation, were not open to collateral challenge merely because of an alleged defect in appointment or re-employment. The Court also held that the High Court exceeded the scope of a petition under Section 482 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 by entering into questions about the nature of such employment.

Conclusion: The authorisation and investigation were valid, and the quashing on this ground was unsustainable.

Issue (ii): Whether the FIR and consequent proceedings were liable to be quashed for want of a preliminary inquiry, sanction, or on the ground that the informant and investigator were the same person.

Analysis: Preliminary inquiry is not mandatory in every corruption case; it depends on the facts and is meant only to screen frivolous complaints. Where the information discloses a cognizable offence, registration of the FIR is mandatory and investigation may follow. The Court further held that the alleged absence of sanction did not justify quashing at the threshold, since the question of sanction may arise during trial. The objection that the informant and investigator were the same person was rejected because the governing principle in the cited precedent was prospective and, in any event, did not warrant quashing on the facts of this case.

Conclusion: The proceedings were not liable to be quashed on these grounds.

Final Conclusion: The order of the High Court quashing the prosecution was set aside, the State's appeal was allowed, and the accused officer's appeal was dismissed, leaving the matter to proceed before the trial court in accordance with law.

Ratio Decidendi: A de facto public officer acting under colour of lawful authority can validly perform official acts, and in corruption cases an FIR may be registered on credible information disclosing a cognizable offence without a mandatory preliminary inquiry.

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