Issues: Whether an adjudication order under the Uttar Pradesh GST law could be sustained where no personal hearing was afforded after the originally fixed hearing date.

Analysis: Section 75(4) requires that a personal hearing be provided in the circumstances contemplated by the provision, while Section 75(5) regulates adjournments of such hearing. No hearing occurred on the date originally fixed, no subsequent hearing date was intimated, and the adjudication order was passed over nine months later. As no adjournment had been sought by the assessee, the absence of a fresh hearing opportunity constituted a complete breach of the statutory hearing requirement and of natural justice.

Conclusion: The adjudication was invalid for denial of a reasonable opportunity of personal hearing.

Issues: Whether the Assessing Officer could reopen, under Sections 147 and 148, the deduction claim that formed part of a final settlement order under Section 245D(4).

Analysis: Chapter XIX-A creates a distinct settlement mechanism. Once a settlement application is allowed to proceed, exclusive jurisdiction vests in the Settlement Commission; the settlement process concerns the return for the relevant assessment year, including statutory deductions reflected in the computation of total income. A final order under Section 245D(4) carries statutory finality under Section 245I in respect of matters stated in it. The Revenue participates in the settlement process and may place material before the Settlement Commission. Where fraud or misrepresentation is alleged, the prescribed route is an application under Section 245D(6), not reassessment by the Assessing Officer. The Revenue had invoked that remedy, and its application was rejected.

Conclusion: The Assessing Officer lacks jurisdiction to initiate reassessment of a matter covered by a final settlement order under Section 245D(4); reopening is permissible only through the statutory mechanism under Section 245D(6) where fraud or misrepresentation is established.

Ratio Decidendi: Statutory finality attaching to a settlement order excludes reassessment jurisdiction over matters covered by that order, subject only to the fraud-or-misrepresentation mechanism provided in the settlement scheme.

Issues: (i) Whether the Trial Court could modify its earlier direction under Section 91 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 and decline production of the Satisfaction Note, authorisation warrant and panchnama connected with the income-tax search; (ii) Whether recall of PW-15 for further cross-examination under Section 311 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 was essential to the just decision of the criminal case.

Issue (i): Whether the Trial Court could modify its earlier direction under Section 91 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 and decline production of the Satisfaction Note, authorisation warrant and panchnama connected with the income-tax search.

Analysis: Section 91 requires the document sought to be necessary or desirable at the relevant stage of the proceeding; its existence alone does not warrant compulsory production. The earlier direction was procedural and interlocutory, and did not finally determine substantive rights, admissibility, recovery, or any defence. A prior Division Bench ruling had specifically scrutinised the validity of the warrant and search on the underlying confidential material and addressed the procedural objections concerning the search. Consequently, the continued necessity of calling for the same foundational record could validly be reassessed. The statutory restriction on disclosure of reasons to believe did not preclude limited judicial scrutiny where validity of an authorisation was directly challenged, but did not create a general entitlement to disclosure or require repeated production after the prior scrutiny.

Conclusion: The refusal to compel further production of the documents was valid; the issue is decided against the Petitioner.

Issue (ii): Whether recall of PW-15 for further cross-examination under Section 311 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 was essential to the just decision of the criminal case.

Analysis: Recall under Section 311 is not automatic and depends upon whether the proposed evidence is essential to a just decision. The stated object of recall was to confront PW-15 with the Satisfaction Note, but that document was not on record and its production had been declined. PW-15 had already been substantially cross-examined on the preliminary inquiry, authorisation, search of the premises, recovery, and allegation of planting. No independent purpose showing that further examination was essential survived beyond the unavailable proposed confrontation.

Conclusion: Recall of PW-15 was not essential to the just decision of the case; the issue is decided against the Petitioner.

Final Conclusion: The challenged procedural orders remain undisturbed, without any expression on the merits of the criminal charges, which remain for determination in accordance with law.

Ratio Decidendi: Production under Section 91 and recall under Section 311 require a continuing showing of necessity or essentiality; neither power is attracted where the intended evidentiary purpose no longer survives and the relevant matters have already been adequately addressed.

Issues: Whether a voluntary deposit made during investigation could be appropriated towards differential customs duty relating to imports beyond the limitation period under Section 28 of the Customs Act, 1962, in settlement proceedings.

Analysis: The amount had been voluntarily deposited during investigation, and the proprietor had admitted the total differential duty liability and requested adjustment of that deposit towards the relevant import period. The statements and the purpose of the deposit were neither retracted nor controverted by material placed before the Court. The appropriation was not a fresh statutory demand or recovery under Section 28, but concerned adjustment of an amount already voluntarily paid. In judicial review, the factual findings of the Settlement Commission could not be re-appreciated absent jurisdictional error, breach of natural justice, manifest legal error, or lack of evidentiary support.

Conclusion: Appropriation of the voluntary deposit towards the differential duty relating to imports beyond the limitation period was valid and did not amount to enforcement of a time-barred demand under Section 28 of the Customs Act, 1962.

Issues: Whether the writ petition challenging the customs adjudication and the rejection of the statutory appeal for non-compliance with pre-deposit should be entertained despite an efficacious appellate remedy.

Analysis: Article 226 jurisdiction is ordinarily not exercised where the statute provides an efficacious redressal mechanism, particularly where the challenge requires examination of disputed facts and merits. The Customs Act, 1962 provides appellate remedies, and the prescribed pre-deposit under Section 129E is a mandatory condition for entertaining an appeal. Financial hardship did not justify bypassing that statutory condition. The objections concerning cross-examination, evidentiary value and retraction of statements, confiscation, and penalty were merits issues for the competent statutory forum.

Conclusion: Exercise of writ jurisdiction was not warranted; the petitioner must pursue the available statutory appellate remedy. All merits issues were left open for independent determination by the appellate forum.

Issues: Whether the demand under Rule 6(3) of the Cenvat Credit Rules, 2004, in relation to electricity generated using bagasse and the related demand concerning press-mud, was sustainable.

Analysis: Bagasse is agricultural waste or residue and does not result from a process of manufacture within Section 2(f) of the Central Excise Act, 1944. The deeming provision concerning marketability under Section 2(d) cannot apply where no process amounting to manufacture is established. Consequently, Rule 6 of the Cenvat Credit Rules, 2004, is inapplicable to bagasse. The demand in relation to electricity was founded on the contrary premise. The Revenue also could not compel adoption of the payment option under Rule 6(3), and reversal of proportionate Cenvat credit was equivalent to non-availment of such credit.

Conclusion: The Rule 6(3) demand, with consequential interest and penalty, was unsustainable and the impugned order was set aside.

Issues: (i) Whether Article 11 of the loan agreement, authorising repossession and sale of the hypothecated vehicle, conformed to RBI recovery safeguards and the Indian Contract Act, 1872; (ii) Whether the Company's repossession and sale of the vehicle were unlawful and warranted compensation; and (iii) Whether the writ petition could be dismissed on the ground of delay.

Issue (i): Whether Article 11 of the loan agreement, authorising repossession and sale of the hypothecated vehicle, conformed to RBI recovery safeguards and the Indian Contract Act, 1872.

Analysis: Section 35-A of the Banking Regulation Act, 1949 gives statutory force to RBI directions. The applicable fair-practice framework prohibits harassment and use of force in recovery, requires lawful seizure, and requires a repossession clause to provide adequate notice, a fair procedure for possession, an opportunity to cure default, and a transparent sale process. Article 11 purported to terminate the borrower's rights without notice, authorised entry wherever the vehicle might be located, did not prescribe a possession or sale procedure, and allowed the Company unilaterally to waive notice.

Conclusion: Article 11 does not conform to the RBI safeguards or the requirement of contractual fairness under the Indian Contract Act, 1872, and does not meet the legal standard of a valid repossession clause to that extent.

Issue (ii): Whether the Company's repossession and sale of the vehicle were unlawful and warranted compensation.

Analysis: No seven-day pre-repossession notice was issued, despite such notice being a contractual precondition to repossession. Possession was taken at night by breaking the steering lock and without a memorandum signed by the borrower, contrary to the requirement of peaceful and lawful recovery. The conduct breached the RBI fair-recovery safeguards and arbitrarily deprived the borrower of the vehicle used for livelihood, attracting Articles 14 and 21 of the Constitution of India.

Conclusion: The repossession and consequent sale were unauthorised and arbitrary; the borrower is entitled to restitution and compensation, although the completed sale is not set aside.

Issue (iii): Whether the writ petition could be dismissed on the ground of delay.

Analysis: The borrower promptly reported the incident as theft and pursued remedial proceedings in that bona fide belief. Continuing traffic challans relating to the vehicle after its alleged sale also required explanation. No prejudice from the alleged delay was established.

Conclusion: The writ petition was not liable to be dismissed on the ground of delay.

Final Conclusion: The loan accounts are to be closed, the sale proceeds refunded with interest, and compensation and costs paid to the borrower, while the sale of the vehicle remains undisturbed.

Ratio Decidendi: A financier's contractual right of self-help repossession is enforceable only through a fair and lawful process complying with binding RBI recovery safeguards, including prior notice, an opportunity to cure, peaceful possession, and a transparent sale procedure.

Issues: (i) Whether alleged non-consideration of the reply and supporting documents justified writ interference despite the statutory appellate remedy; (ii) Whether DGGI and the Additional Commissioner, CGST Delhi North, had jurisdiction to issue and adjudicate the common notice; (iii) Whether reliance on Circular No. 171/03/2022-GST rendered the demand under Section 74 amenable to writ interference.

Issue (i): Whether alleged non-consideration of the reply and supporting documents justified writ interference despite the statutory appellate remedy.

Analysis: Article 226 jurisdiction need not be exercised where Section 107 provides an effective appellate remedy capable of undertaking factual scrutiny. The impugned order recorded the personal hearing and disclosed its reasons for rejecting input tax credit, notwithstanding an erroneous reference to the date of written submissions and the absence of separate discussion of every document. Verification of work orders, subcontracts, invoices, payments and evidence of execution requires factual appraisal available in appeal.

Conclusion: The alleged inadequacy in consideration of the reply and documents does not warrant writ intervention and is to be pursued in statutory appeal, against the assessee.

Issue (ii): Whether DGGI and the Additional Commissioner, CGST Delhi North, had jurisdiction to issue and adjudicate the common notice.

Analysis: Notification No. 14/2017-Central Tax vested specified DGGI officers with the powers of Central tax officers throughout India. Administrative allocation to State tax authorities does not exclude intelligence-based enforcement by DGGI. The applicable adjudication allocation instruments designated Delhi North for the common notice because the noticee with the highest tax demand was located in Delhi, and the revised allocation likewise retained Delhi North as the designated authority.

Conclusion: DGGI and the Additional Commissioner, CGST Delhi North, had jurisdiction over the common notice and its adjudication. The jurisdictional objection fails, against the assessee.

Issue (iii): Whether reliance on Circular No. 171/03/2022-GST rendered the demand under Section 74 amenable to writ interference.

Analysis: The Circular differentiates between ineligible input tax credit used for genuine outward supplies and cases where both inward and outward invoices lack underlying supplies. Determination of the applicable situation, the validity of recovery under Section 74, and the resulting consequences for penalties depends upon characterization of the underlying transactions and examination of the evidentiary record. Section 107(11) enables the appellate authority to undertake that inquiry and confirm, modify or annul the adjudication.

Conclusion: Invocation of the Circular does not by itself justify writ interference. Its applicability and consequences remain open for appellate determination, against the assessee.

Final Conclusion: The enforcement and adjudicatory jurisdiction challenge stands conclusively rejected, while the factual and substantive challenges concerning input tax credit, demand, interest, penalties and applicability of the Circular remain for determination in the statutory appellate forum.

Issues: (i) Whether the Common Adjudicating Authority had jurisdiction to adjudicate a composite show-cause notice and whether the impugned circulars validly selected that authority. (ii) Whether the highest-demand criterion for selection of the Common Adjudicating Authority is arbitrary or violative of Article 14 of the Constitution of India. (iii) Whether writ jurisdiction could be invoked to challenge the merits of the adjudication despite the statutory appellate remedy.

Issue (i): Whether the Common Adjudicating Authority had jurisdiction to adjudicate a composite show-cause notice and whether the impugned circulars validly selected that authority.

Analysis: Sections 3, 5(3) and 167 of the Central Goods and Services Tax Act, 2017 require jurisdiction-conferring or function-transferring measures to be made through notification, whereas Section 168 permits administrative directions for uniform implementation of an existing jurisdiction. Notification No. 2/2017-Central Tax, as amended by Notification No. 2/2022-Central Tax, vested specified Additional and Joint Commissioners with pan-India jurisdiction over notices issued by the investigative authority. The circulars did not enlarge that jurisdiction or appoint an officer outside the notified class; they provided an administrative method for choosing one among officers already competent to decide a composite notice. The absence of an express recital of approval did not invalidate the circulars without material showing absence of authority. The notified appellate hierarchy remained available in the Commissionerate where the Common Adjudicating Authority was posted.

Conclusion: The Common Adjudicating Authority was lawfully vested with jurisdiction, and the impugned circulars validly operated as an administrative allocation mechanism.

Issue (ii): Whether the highest-demand criterion for selection of the Common Adjudicating Authority is arbitrary or violative of Article 14 of the Constitution of India.

Analysis: The criterion is objective, quantifiable and uniformly applicable. It bears a rational nexus to securing a single, consistent adjudication of a common investigation and avoiding conflicting factual findings. Its application involves no discretionary choice by the issuing officer and does not amount to impermissible sub-delegation of adjudicatory power.

Conclusion: The highest-demand criterion is constitutionally valid and does not offend Article 14 of the Constitution of India.

Issue (iii): Whether writ jurisdiction could be invoked to challenge the merits of the adjudication despite the statutory appellate remedy.

Analysis: The jurisdictional challenge was entertained as a recognised exception to the rule requiring exhaustion of an efficacious statutory remedy. Once the jurisdictional foundation of the order was sustained, the remaining challenges concerning the demand, evidence and natural justice fell within the appellate remedy under Section 107 of the Central Goods and Services Tax Act, 2017.

Conclusion: Challenges on merits are to be pursued before the statutory Appellate Authority and are not amenable to determination in the writ proceedings.

Final Conclusion: The notified pan-India adjudication framework and the administrative mechanism for common adjudication are legally sustained, while all unresolved challenges to the tax demand remain available before the statutory appellate forum.

Ratio Decidendi: Where a notification has already vested a defined class of officers with jurisdiction, an administrative circular may validly select one competent officer for common adjudication of a composite notice without independently conferring or transferring jurisdiction.

Issues: Whether processed milk, captively consumed or sent to job workers in the continuous manufacture of sugar-boiled confectionery, constitutes an exempted final product for the purposes of Rule 6 of the CENVAT Credit Rules, 2004.

Analysis: Rules 3 and 6 of the CENVAT Credit Rules, 2004 operate in relation to inputs or input services used for manufacture of final products. An intermediate product arising as an integral part of an integrated manufacturing process, and used captively or through job workers for manufacture of the dutiable ultimate product, cannot be separately equated with an exempted final product merely because it is not independently cleared. The nature of the manufacturing operation must be assessed as a whole; technological or unavoidable intermediate products do not attract the Rule 6 obligation on the premise that they are exempted goods.

Conclusion: Processed milk is an intermediate product and not an exempted final product for Rule 6 purposes; the demand founded on the contrary premise is unsustainable, in favour of the assessee.

Issues: Whether GST reimbursement claims concerning contracts executed after 1 July 2017 could be denied by applying paragraph 3(iv), instead of paragraph 4, of Notification No. 5050-F(Y) dated August 16, 2017.

Analysis: A plain-meaning interpretation of the Notification distinguishes pre-GST contracts from post-GST contracts. Paragraph 3(iv) is confined to pre-GST contracts, whereas paragraph 4 applies to post-GST contracts and ongoing projects covered by its terms. Reliance on paragraph 3(iv) to reject a post-GST reimbursement claim was therefore based on a misconstruction of the Notification. The factual entitlement and quantification of the reimbursement claim were not adjudicated.

Conclusion: Paragraph 3(iv) cannot be invoked to deny GST reimbursement in respect of contracts executed after 1 July 2017; such claims fall for consideration under paragraph 4 of Notification No. 5050-F(Y) dated August 16, 2017.

Issues: (i) Whether the statutory minimum penalty under Section 73(9) could be interfered with on the plea that the breach was minor, absent a constitutional challenge; and (ii) Whether the assessment order required intervention because it was issued without affording a hearing.

Issue (i): Whether the statutory minimum penalty under Section 73(9) could be interfered with on the plea that the breach was minor, absent a constitutional challenge.

Analysis: The applicable GST provisions draw a distinction between Section 74(1), which does not prescribe a minimum amount, and Section 73(9), which prescribes a minimum penalty. Although that distinction may furnish a basis to challenge the validity of the provisions, no such challenge was made.

Conclusion: Interference with the statutory minimum penalty was not warranted in the absence of a constitutional challenge, against the assessee.

Issue (ii): Whether the assessment order required intervention because it was issued without affording a hearing.

Analysis: The order had been issued without giving the petitioner an opportunity of hearing. The alleged breach also appeared prima facie to be minor. Fair adjudication required an opportunity to contest the tax proposals on merits, upon remittance of the tax demand within the stipulated period.

Conclusion: The denial of hearing vitiated the assessment order, and the assessee was entitled to a reasonable opportunity to contest the tax proposals on merits upon payment of the tax demand, in favour of the assessee.

Final Conclusion: A challenge to the statutory penalty provision cannot succeed without directly questioning its validity, whereas an assessment made in breach of natural justice requires a fresh merits determination after affording a reasonable hearing.

Issues: Whether regular bail should be granted in a prosecution alleging fraudulent availment and transfer of input tax credit through bogus firms.

Analysis: The applicant had remained in custody since 23.06.2026, the investigation had culminated in filing of the charge-sheet, and the material was documentary in nature. Bail granted in similar matters and bail extended to another accused in a comparable case supported parity.

Conclusion: Regular bail was warranted on the recorded circumstances.

Outcome: The recalled writ petition was disposed of with liberty to approach the Court afresh on the same cause of action and to challenge the subsequently introduced provision, if so advised.

Outcome: The recall application was allowed, and the revived writ petition was closed with liberty to institute fresh proceedings on the same cause of action, including a challenge to Section 147A; the earlier protection was continued for 90 days.

Issues: Whether deletion of additions for alleged unexplained investments, loans and advances under Section 69 read with Section 115BBE of the Income-tax Act, 1961, based on the assessee's bank records and audited financial statements, was perverse and gave rise to a substantial question of law.

Analysis: Section 69 applies where investments are not recorded in the books and the assessee fails to provide a satisfactory explanation of their nature and source. Section 115BBE governs taxation of income brought to tax under Section 69. The investments, loans and advances had been disclosed in the books and were explained through the bank accounts and audited balance sheets, including balances carried forward from an earlier year. The Tribunal, as the final fact-finding authority, had evaluated those materials before directing deletion of the additions; its factual findings disclosed neither perversity nor illegality.

Conclusion: The additions under Section 69 read with Section 115BBE were not sustainable, and no substantial question of law arose from the Tribunal's deletion of those additions, in favour of the assessee.

Issues: Whether the Revisionary Authority could revise an assessment order that had accepted Form-F declarations under Section 6A(2) of the Central Sales Tax Act, 1956.

Analysis: The revisionary jurisdiction in respect of the assessment year in question involved the same issue already decided for subsequent assessment years. The decision in those years, accepted without further challenge, had found that an assessment accepting Form-F declarations under Section 6A(2) was not amenable to such revision. The finality of that adjudication required consistent application to the present assessment year.

Conclusion: The Revisionary Authority lacked power to revise the assessment accepting the Form-F declarations; the revision order was set aside in favour of the assessee.

Issues: (i) Whether writ jurisdiction should be exercised despite the statutory appellate remedy where non-service of the show-cause notice and denial of personal hearing are alleged; (ii) Whether the absence of remand power with the Appellate Authority permits bypassing the statutory appeal.

Issue (i): Whether writ jurisdiction should be exercised despite the statutory appellate remedy where non-service of the show-cause notice and denial of personal hearing are alleged.

Analysis: Article 226 of the Constitution of India may be invoked notwithstanding an alternative remedy in exceptional cases involving jurisdictional error or breach of natural justice. The alleged non-service of the notice and denial of an effective personal hearing depended upon verification of the notices, their mode of service, receipt, and allied record. These were disputed factual matters suitable for determination in the statutory appeal under Section 107 of the Central Goods and Services Tax Act, 2017. Any hearing-related infirmity was curable and did not establish a jurisdictional defect.

Conclusion: The alleged defects in service and hearing do not justify writ intervention and must be raised before the Appellate Authority.

Issue (ii): Whether the absence of remand power with the Appellate Authority permits bypassing the statutory appeal.

Analysis: The power to decide an appeal on merits through a fresh and independent appraisal of the record is distinct from the power to remand. The lack of remand power does not impair the Appellate Authority's jurisdiction to entertain the appeal and determine the objections on merits.

Conclusion: Absence of remand power does not permit bypassing the statutory appellate remedy.

Final Conclusion: The factual and procedural objections remain open for independent adjudication on their merits in the statutory appellate process.

Ratio Decidendi: A statutory appeal should not be bypassed for fact-dependent and curable allegations of defective service or breach of natural justice, and the absence of remand power does not diminish the appellate authority's power to decide the appeal on merits.

Issues: Whether refunds arising from TDS assessment and appellate give-effect orders may be withheld for want of financial-year particulars or furnishing of Form 26B, in the absence of an order for refund adjustment, and whether interest is payable on the refundable amounts.

Analysis: Section 201 governs assessment of tax deducted at source, whereas Section 200A and Rule 31A provide for processing and adjustment of TDS statements prior to assessment. A refund arising upon assessment or an appellate order constitutes a vested and crystallised right and is not made subordinate to the procedural mechanism under Section 200A or Form 26B. The give-effect orders forming the basis of the refund were already in the departmental records, and no order under Section 245 authorising withholding or adjustment of the refund was shown.

Conclusion: The issue is decided in favour of the assessee: refunds arising from the give-effect orders cannot be withheld on the stated technical ground and must be processed with applicable interest under Section 244A(1) and Section 244A(1A) of the Income-tax Act, 1961 until payment.