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Issues: (i) Whether process in a criminal defamation complaint could be sustained when the verification statement under oath did not specifically refer to the applicants' role or the alleged publication. (ii) Whether the application under section 482 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 was barred by section 397(3) of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 because the applicants had already pursued revision.
Issue (i): Whether process in a criminal defamation complaint could be sustained when the verification statement under oath did not specifically refer to the applicants' role or the alleged publication.
Analysis: The complaint itself was not on oath, so the verification statement under section 200 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 was the only sworn material available at the stage of cognizance. That statement reproduced the alleged utterances of the principal accused, but it contained no assertion linking the applicants to the publication or indicating how they were responsible for the offence. For issue of process, the Magistrate had to have some sworn material showing sufficient ground to proceed against the accused; a bare complaint unsupported by an effective verification statement against the applicants was insufficient.
Conclusion: The issue is answered in favour of the applicants. The order issuing process against them was unsustainable and liable to be set aside.
Issue (ii): Whether the application under section 482 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 was barred by section 397(3) of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 because the applicants had already pursued revision.
Analysis: The bar against a second revision did not exclude the High Court's inherent jurisdiction. The inherent power preserved by section 482 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 could still be invoked where interference was otherwise justified, notwithstanding the existence of section 397(3) of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973.
Conclusion: The issue is answered in favour of the applicants. The objection based on the bar of section 397(3) failed.
Final Conclusion: The criminal application succeeded, and the process order was quashed as against the applicants, while the proceedings against the other accused were left to continue according to law.
Ratio Decidendi: At the stage of taking cognizance and issuing process, the sworn verification statement must disclose a factual basis connecting each accused to the alleged offence; in the absence of such material, process cannot be issued, and the High Court may still exercise inherent power under section 482 notwithstanding the revision bar in section 397(3).