Lawful eviction required before resuming leased premises; writ relief may still fail where delay and third-party rights intervene.

A statutory board cannot resume possession of leased plots by forcible self-help merely because the lease contains a re-entry clause; eviction must follow lawful procedure, and the expression "re-enter" does not authorise extra-judicial dispossession. Contractual disputes over breach, termination, or forfeiture are ordinarily not fit for writ adjudication, but an ex facie illegal dispossession without authority of law may be challenged under Article 226. Even so, discretionary writ relief may be refused where the challenge is delayed and third-party rights have intervened, as laches can bar restoration of possession.

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Issues: (i) Whether the Board could resume possession of leased plots from allottees without recourse to eviction proceedings or a civil suit; (ii) whether the validity of termination of the lease and resumption of possession arising out of the contract could be examined in writ proceedings; (iii) whether delay in approaching the Court disentitled the petitioners to relief.

Issue (i): Whether the Board could resume possession of leased plots from allottees without recourse to eviction proceedings or a civil suit.

Analysis: The Board's power under the Act and the lease deed did not authorise extra-judicial or forcible dispossession. Section 14(f)(ii) only contemplated eviction of allottees in accordance with law, and the expression "re-enter" in the agreement could not be read as permission to resume possession by force. The Act contained a specific mechanism for application of the Public Premises Act to premises of the Board, and in the absence of an express statutory power to dispossess without legal , possession could be taken only through the procedure known to law.

Conclusion: The Board could not lawfully take forcible possession without recourse to eviction proceedings or a civil suit.

Issue (ii): Whether the validity of termination of the lease and resumption of possession arising out of the contract could be examined in writ proceedings.

Analysis: Disputes relating to breach of covenants, justification for non-performance, and validity of forfeiture or termination were contractual questions involving factual controversy and were not fit for adjudication in writ jurisdiction. However, a challenge to an ex facie arbitrary and illegal dispossession without authority of law was maintainable under Article 226 because such action implicated Article 14 and did not depend on disputed facts.

Conclusion: The Court declined to examine the contractual dispute on breach and termination, but held that illegal forcible dispossession could be questioned in writ proceedings.

Issue (iii): Whether delay in approaching the Court disentitled the petitioners to relief.

Analysis: The petitioners approached the Court long after possession had been resumed and after the plots had been re-allotted and possession had passed to a third party. The delay affected the merits and restoration would have unsettled rights that had meanwhile accrued to the subsequent allottee. In such circumstances, the discretionary relief under writ jurisdiction was not available.

Conclusion: The delay and intervening third-party rights disentitled the petitioners to relief.

Final Conclusion: The Court held that the resumption was not authorised as a forcible self-help remedy, but the belated challenge could not succeed in view of laches and the accrued rights of the third party.

Ratio Decidendi: A lessor or statutory authority cannot resume possession of leased premises by force merely because a re-entry clause exists in the contract; eviction must be in accordance with law, though discretionary writ relief may be refused where the challenge is delayed and third-party rights have intervened.

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