Juridical possession cannot be disturbed by self-help; summary restoration lies without inquiry into title or ownership.

A landlord could not use self-help to dispossess a tenant whose possession was protected by law, because extinction of rights for arrears did not authorise automatic eviction without the statutory procedure. The summary remedy under Section 326 of Qanoon Mal, read with Section 163 of Qanoon Ryotwari, operated like Section 9 of the Specific Relief Act, so "disturbed unlawfully" covered disturbance otherwise than in due course of law and "trespass" included forcible entry and dispossession. Title was therefore irrelevant in the summary proceeding, and possession could not be displaced by inquiry into ownership or alleged wrongful possession.

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Issues: Whether a landlord could forcibly dispossess a tenant whose rights were alleged to have been extinguished for arrears of land revenue, and whether a suit under Section 326 of Qanoon Mal read with Section 163 of Qanoon Ryotwari could be defeated by inquiry into title or the supposed wrongful character of possession.

Analysis: Section 82 of Qanoon Ryotwari provided for extinction of a khatedar's right on arrears, but the scheme of Section 137 showed that dispossession was not automatic and that resort had to be had to the statutory procedure. Section 163 incorporated the summary remedy under Section 326 of Qanoon Mal, which was treated as analogous to Section 9 of the Specific Relief Act, 1877. On that footing, the expression "disturbed unlawfully" was understood to mean disturbance otherwise than in due course of law, and the word "trespass" was read broadly enough to include forcible entry and dispossession by the landlord. The question of title was therefore irrelevant to the summary remedy, and possession protected by law could not be displaced by self-help.

Conclusion: The landlord could not lawfully take forcible possession, and the summary claim for restoration of possession was maintainable without going into title.

Final Conclusion: The order of the Board of Revenue was restored and the High Court's contrary view was set aside, leaving the appellant successful on the central issue of unlawful dispossession.

Ratio Decidendi: A person in juridical possession cannot be dispossessed except in due course of law, and in a summary possession proceeding analogous to Section 9 of the Specific Relief Act, title is irrelevant while forcible dispossession is impermissible.

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