Presumed service of demand notice under cheque dishonour law upheld where notice was sent to the correct address.

Dispatch of a demand notice to the drawer's correct address satisfies the notice requirement under Section 138 of the Negotiable Instruments Act when the cheque, dishonour, and proper dispatch are proved; actual receipt is not indispensable if the statutory presumption of service is not rebutted. Applying Section 27 of the General Clauses Act and the presumption under Section 139 of the Negotiable Instruments Act, the Court held that a bare denial of receipt was insufficient and the acquittal was unsustainable. The finding on non-service was set aside and the accused was convicted under Section 138.

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Issues: Whether the acquittal under Section 138 of the Negotiable Instruments Act could be sustained when the cheque, dishonour, and dispatch of notice to the correct business address were proved, but the accused disputed actual service of notice.

Analysis: The complaint and evidence established issuance of the cheque, dishonour, and dispatch of demand notice to the accused's correct business address. The Court applied the settled principle that for the purposes of Section 138, 'giving of notice' is satisfied when the payee duly dispatches the notice to the correct address, and actual receipt is not indispensable if the notice was properly sent. The Court also relied on the statutory presumption under Section 27 of the General Clauses Act, 1897 and the presumption under Section 139 of the Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881, holding that the accused did not rebut the evidence of service or payment liability.

Conclusion: The finding that notice was not proved to have been served was held unsustainable, the acquittal was set aside, and the accused was convicted under Section 138 of the Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881.

Ratio Decidendi: In proceedings under Section 138 of the Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881, dispatch of the demand notice to the correct address raises a presumption of service, and the drawer cannot defeat liability by a bare denial of actual receipt without rebutting that presumption.

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