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Issues: (i) whether the petitioners were entitled to bail on parity with co-accused who had been granted bail by the Supreme Court, notwithstanding the omission in that order to specifically mention Section 409 IPC and life imprisonment; (ii) whether bail could be refused on the ground of likelihood of absconding or tampering with evidence; and (iii) whether additional grounds, including the petitioners' status as a woman accused and the medical condition of one accused, justified grant of bail.
Issue (i): whether the petitioners were entitled to bail on parity with co-accused who had been granted bail by the Supreme Court, notwithstanding the omission in that order to specifically mention Section 409 IPC and life imprisonment;
Analysis: The Court held that the Supreme Court had considered the accusations as a whole, the gravity of the case and the quantum of punishment, and that the omission to expressly refer to Section 409 IPC in the bail order could not be treated as a basis to deny the petitioners the benefit of parity. The Court further held that the binding force of the Supreme Court's order under Article 141 required the High Court to follow it loyally and not to distinguish it by artificial hair-splitting. It also noted that the petitioners faced comparatively lesser punishment than the co-accused who had been enlarged on bail.
Conclusion: The petitioners were entitled to bail on parity and the omission in the Supreme Court's order did not justify denial of bail.
Issue (ii): whether bail could be refused on the ground of likelihood of absconding or tampering with evidence;
Analysis: The Court found no material showing a real apprehension that the petitioners would flee from justice. It further held that the evidence was largely documentary, that there was no prima facie basis to infer misuse of liberty, and that the prosecuting agency itself stated that it had no objection to grant of bail and did not apprehend tampering. The Court applied the principles that pre-trial detention is not to be used as punishment and that denial of bail requires cogent reasons and extraordinary circumstances.
Conclusion: Bail could not be refused on the grounds of absconding or tampering with evidence.
Issue (iii): whether additional grounds, including the petitioners' status as a woman accused and the medical condition of one accused, justified grant of bail.
Analysis: The Court held that the statutory protection available to a woman accused under the proviso to Section 437 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 had to be applied liberally in the absence of other adverse factors. It also found that the medical condition of one accused, though not immediately critical, was a relevant additional circumstance supporting release on bail during what was likely to be a lengthy trial.
Conclusion: These additional grounds supported grant of bail.
Final Conclusion: The common bail applications were allowed and the accused were directed to be released on bail subject to conditions imposed by the Court.
Ratio Decidendi: In a bail matter, a Supreme Court order granting bail to similarly situated co-accused on a holistic assessment cannot be narrowly distinguished to deny parity, and bail should not be refused in the absence of concrete material showing flight risk or a real likelihood of tampering with evidence.
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