Implied receiver powers under civil procedure can include property management, but prior court leave remains necessary for significant expenditure.

A receiver appointed under Order 40 Rule 1 CPC may, by necessary implication, have authority to manage and preserve property where the appointment orders and surrounding directions show that scope. In the stated facts, the receiver's role covered preservation as well as rent collection and account maintenance, and the earlier functions of a person who was both mutwalli and receiver were treated as merged into the receivership. Because the property was in custodia legis, prior leave of court was required for important management acts and related expenditure, even if the power was implied. However, failure to obtain prior leave, by itself, was not enough to justify removal from office.

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Issues: Whether the powers of a receiver appointed under Order 40 Rule 1 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908, could include management of the property by necessary implication in the facts of the case, and whether the receiver's failure to obtain prior leave of the court before incurring expenditure justified his removal.

Analysis: The order appointing the receiver, read with the earlier and subsequent orders, showed that the receiver was entrusted not merely with collection of rent and maintenance of accounts but also with preservation of the property. In the special facts, where the same person was both mutwalli and receiver, the earlier functions as mutwalli were held to have merged into the receiver's role. The property being in custodia legis, the receiver was required to seek the court's prior leave for important acts and expenditure connected with management, even where such power was implied rather than express. At the same time, omission to obtain leave did not, by itself, warrant removal from office.

Conclusion: The receiver had implied authority to manage and preserve the property, but he ought to have obtained prior leave of the court before incurring the disputed expenditure; nevertheless, the omission alone was not sufficient to justify his removal.

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