Personal incapacity under Court of Wards law follows the proprietor and can invalidate transactions affecting ward property wherever situated.

A disability imposed on a proprietor under Court of Wards legislation was treated as a personal incapacity, so it continued to affect transactions relating to ward property even where the property lay outside the local limits of the enactment. Applying that principle, the contract concerning the Cawnpore house was held incompetent. The estate of a ward was also held to vest as a whole in the Court of Wards unless specific property was reserved, and the absence of a separate listing did not prevent vesting. On the facts, the house in suit formed part of the ward estate and remained under the Court's superintendence.

---

---

Issues: (i) Whether a proprietor placed under the superintendence of the Court of Wards was personally incompetent to enter into a contract relating to ward property, although the property was situated outside the local limits of the enactment; (ii) whether the house in suit formed part of the estate vested in and under the superintendence of the Court of Wards.

Issue (i): Whether a proprietor placed under the superintendence of the Court of Wards was personally incompetent to enter into a contract relating to ward property, although the property was situated outside the local limits of the enactment.

Analysis: The legal incapacity created by the Court of Wards legislation was treated as a personal disability attaching to the proprietor. The reasoning relied on the object of the wardship laws, which was to protect incapable proprietors by transferring management and control of their property to the Court of Wards. The Court applied the principle that capacity to contract follows the law of domicile and does not cease merely because the particular property is situated beyond the territorial limits of the enactment. The incapacity was therefore held to extend to transactions concerning ward property wherever situated, especially where the same protective regime existed in the relevant provinces.

Conclusion: The proprietor was incompetent to enter into the contract, and the disability operated against the contract relating to the Cawnpore house.

Issue (ii): Whether the house in suit formed part of the estate vested in and under the superintendence of the Court of Wards.

Analysis: The estate of a ward was held to vest as a whole in the Court of Wards when management was assumed, unless some property was specifically reserved. The fact that the house was not separately listed did not prevent it from vesting if it belonged to the proprietor at the relevant time. On the facts found, the house formed part of the property under wardship and therefore came within the Court's control.

Conclusion: The house in suit vested in and remained under the superintendence of the Court of Wards.

Final Conclusion: The contract could not be enforced and the appeal failed, as both the personal incapacity of the proprietor and the vesting of the house in the Court of Wards were upheld.

Ratio Decidendi: A disability imposed upon a warded proprietor is a personal incapacity that follows the person and operates upon transactions concerning ward property wherever situated, and the whole estate vests in the Court of Wards unless expressly reserved.

---