Specific performance can require a vendor to seek statutory sanction where transfer of sir rights depends on it.

Agreements for transfer were construed as covering both the village share and the cultivating rights in sir land, because the recitals, operative terms and matching consideration showed that the parties intended to include the attached sir and khudkast rights. Where transfer of such rights required Revenue Officer sanction, the promisor was impliedly bound to do all acts necessary to complete the transfer, including making the statutory application for sanction. The court treated specific performance as competent to enforce that obligation under the Specific Relief Act, and recognised that the decree could require steps needed to secure the sanction.

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Issues: (i) Whether the agreements of 4 September 1914 covered the cultivating rights in the sir land as well as the village share; (ii) Whether a decree for specific performance could direct the vendor to apply for Revenue Officer sanction to transfer the sir rights.

Issue (i): Whether the agreements of 4 September 1914 covered the cultivating rights in the sir land as well as the village share.

Analysis: The recitals and operative terms showed that the arrangement corresponded to the earlier sale transaction, the consideration matched the total purchase price, and the subject-matter described in the agreements was intended to include the sir and khudkast rights attached to the share. The language of the agreement therefore had to be read as embracing the cultivating rights in the sir land.

Conclusion: The agreements included the cultivating rights in the sir land.

Issue (ii): Whether a decree for specific performance could direct the vendor to apply for Revenue Officer sanction to transfer the sir rights.

Analysis: On the true construction of the agreement, the vendor had undertaken to transfer the sir rights, and that undertaking carried an implied obligation to do everything necessary to effect the transfer, including making the statutory application for sanction. The relevant tenancy law permitted the transfer subject to sanction, and the court had jurisdiction under the Specific Relief Act to enforce that obligation. Order 21, Rule 32(4) of the Code of Civil Procedure was sufficient to carry out the decree.

Conclusion: The court could validly require the vendor to seek the necessary sanction, and the decree for specific performance was competent.

Final Conclusion: The appeal failed in entirety, and the decree for specific performance in favour of the respondent stood confirmed.

Ratio Decidendi: Where a contract for transfer necessarily includes rights whose transfer requires statutory sanction, the promisor is impliedly bound to perform all acts necessary to obtain that sanction, and specific performance may be decreed accordingly.

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