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Issues: (i) Whether the declaration that the petitioner's partner was an evacuee and the petitioner and others were intending evacuees under the Administration of Evacuee Property Ordinance, 1949, could be quashed on the facts found by the Custodian; (ii) Whether the provisions of the Ordinance relating to evacuee property offended Articles 14 and 31 of the Constitution of India; (iii) Whether the provisions relating to intending evacuees, especially Sections 20 and 21, infringed Articles 15 and 19(1)(f) of the Constitution of India.
Issue (i): Whether the declaration that the petitioner's partner was an evacuee and the petitioner and others were intending evacuees under the Administration of Evacuee Property Ordinance, 1949, could be quashed on the facts found by the Custodian.
Analysis: The findings that the partner had migrated to Pakistan after 1 March 1947 and that the alleged dissolution of partnership was not genuine were accepted. On those findings, the purchase of the Karachi business was treated as made with partnership funds and the transfer of assets to Pakistan was established. The custodian was therefore justified in treating the partner as an evacuee and the petitioner and the other partners as intending evacuees within the statutory definition.
Conclusion: The declaration against the evacuee and the intending evacuees was upheld.
Issue (ii): Whether the provisions of the Ordinance relating to evacuee property offended Articles 14 and 31 of the Constitution of India.
Analysis: The scheme of the Ordinance was treated as one of custody and administration, not confiscation. The evacuee's title was not destroyed, the property could be managed and restored, and the custodian functioned in the nature of a statutory manager. Persons who had migrated to Pakistan were treated as not being in a position to complain of discrimination in the same manner as resident citizens. For Article 31, there was held to be no deprivation of property in law and no acquisition by the State in the constitutional sense.
Conclusion: The evacuee-property provisions were held not to violate Articles 14 or 31.
Issue (iii): Whether the provisions relating to intending evacuees, especially Sections 20 and 21, infringed Articles 15 and 19(1)(f) of the Constitution of India.
Analysis: Article 15 was found inapplicable because the Ordinance was not discriminatory in terms of religion and applied to all persons within its definition. Section 21 was upheld as a reasonable restriction in the interests of the general public. However, Section 20, which enabled the Custodian to withhold approval for transfers without any guiding criteria, was regarded as an unreasonable restriction on the right to hold and dispose of property. That said, no relief was granted on that ground because no actual refused transfer was shown in the case.
Conclusion: The challenge under Article 15 failed, Section 21 was upheld, and the objection to Section 20 was noted but did not alter the result.
Final Conclusion: The application failed because the impugned declarations were sustained and no operative constitutional invalidity was shown so as to warrant quashing them.
Ratio Decidendi: A law placing evacuee property under statutory custody and administration, without extinguishing title, does not amount to unconstitutional deprivation of property; and restrictions on intending evacuees may be sustained if they are reasonable and in the public interest, though unguided discretionary restraints may be constitutionally suspect.