Unguided exemption and allocation powers under textile control provisions are unconstitutional when they permit arbitrary discrimination.

The Madras HC article explains that a delegated exemption power affecting fundamental rights is invalid if it is left to unguided and arbitrary administrative choice without objective standards, because such discretion creates discrimination and offends Article 14. It further states that an absolute prohibition on acquiring or installing power looms cannot be sustained as a reasonable restriction on property and trade rights when it operates as part of an unconstitutional control scheme. The discussion also concludes that yarn-distribution powers are likewise impermissible where they permit discriminatory allocation without ascertainable criteria, and that applications must be reconsidered on fair and non-discriminatory principles.

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Issues: (i) whether the power conferred on the Textile Commissioner to exempt or relax the prohibition on acquisition and installation of power looms was an arbitrary and discriminatory delegation violating Article 14; (ii) whether the absolute prohibition on acquiring or installing power looms was saved as a reasonable restriction under Article 19(1)(f) and 19(1)(g) read with Article 19(5) and 19(6); (iii) whether the power to regulate the distribution of yarn under the impugned clause was valid or suffered from the same vice of unguided discretion and discrimination.

Issue (i): whether the power conferred on the Textile Commissioner to exempt or relax the prohibition on acquisition and installation of power looms was an arbitrary and discriminatory delegation violating Article 14.

Analysis: The exemption provision conferred a wide discretion without prescribing any principles, standards, or controlling rules for its exercise. The validity of the provision was not saved by the fact that it was administered in a particular manner in individual cases, because the defect lay in the structure of the power itself. A power left to the unregulated personal choice of an necessarily created scope for unequal treatment and discrimination. A provision authorising exemptions from a fundamental-right restriction must therefore be confined by objective criteria, otherwise it offends the constitutional guarantee of equality.

Conclusion: The exemption power was invalid and void as offending Article 14.

Issue (ii): whether the absolute prohibition on acquiring or installing power looms was saved as a reasonable restriction under Article 19(1)(f) and 19(1)(g) read with Article 19(5) and 19(6).

Analysis: A total prohibition on the exercise of the protected rights was held to stand on a different footing from an ordinary regulatory restriction. Although emergency and temporary control legislation may justify strong measures in proper circumstances, the impugned prohibition could not be treated as reasonable if it operated as an absolute ban. The clause was also read as part of a composite control scheme together with the exemption provision, and once the exemption provision was unconstitutional the scheme could not be sustained as a valid restriction on fundamental rights.

Conclusion: The prohibition was not sustainable as a valid restriction and failed when read with the invalid exemption power.

Issue (iii): whether the power to regulate the distribution of yarn under the impugned clause was valid or suffered from the same vice of unguided discretion and discrimination.

Analysis: The clause authorised directions for distribution but laid down no standards governing allocation among similarly situated manufacturers. The absence of any stated principles or scheme made arbitrary differentiation possible and left the exercise of power dependent on unguided administrative choice. In the absence of a fair and ascertainable basis of distribution, the clause and the actual allotment made under it could not be reconciled with equality before law and equal protection, nor with reasonable regulation of the right to carry on trade.

Conclusion: The yarn-distribution power was invalid to the extent it conferred unguided and discriminatory discretion, and the petitioner was entitled to reconsideration of his application on non-discriminatory principles.

Final Conclusion: The impugned control provisions were not upheld as unconditional delegations of power; the petitioner did not obtain the specific allotment or blanket immunity sought, but was entitled to have his applications dealt with afresh on fair, non-discriminatory principles consistent with the Constitution.

Ratio Decidendi: A control measure affecting fundamental rights is valid only if the delegated discretion is guided by ascertainable standards and is not left to arbitrary or discriminatory choice; an unguided exemption or allocation power is unconstitutional.

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