Retrospective writs and statutory limitation: pre-Constitution orders were beyond Article 226, and time ran from the order date.

Article 226 writ jurisdiction was held unavailable to challenge an order completed before 26 January 1950 because the Constitution's writ power had no retrospective operation. On limitation under Section 33A(2) of the Income-tax Act, the one-year period was construed as running from the date of the order itself, since the statutory wording fixed time from that date and the Court declined to read in receipt, service, or knowledge of the order. The contrasting view was rejected as inconsistent with the plain language of the provision. The result was that the challenge to the Commissioner's refusal was not sustained.

---

---

Issues: (i) Whether a writ under Article 226 could be issued to challenge an order made before the Constitution came into force. (ii) Whether the one-year period in Section 33A(2) of the Income-tax Act ran from the date of the order or from the date on which the assessee received notice or knowledge of the order.

Issue (i): Whether a writ under Article 226 could be issued to challenge an order made before the Constitution came into force.

Analysis: The power to issue writs under the Constitution came into force only on 26 January 1950. Article 13 was treated as having no retrospective effect, so it could not affect acts or orders completed before the Constitution became operative. On that footing, Article 226 could not be used to interfere with an order already passed before 26 January 1950.

Conclusion: The writ jurisdiction could not be invoked against the pre-Constitution order.

Issue (ii): Whether the one-year period in Section 33A(2) of the Income-tax Act ran from the date of the order or from the date on which the assessee received notice or knowledge of the order.

Analysis: The statutory language used the expression "made within one year from the date of the order". The provision was contrasted with other sections of the Act where limitation was tied to communication or service of the order, showing that the legislature deliberately used different language. The rule against casus omissus did not permit the Court to add words making limitation depend on communication or knowledge. The contrary Madras view was declined, and the plain words of the section were given effect.

Conclusion: Limitation under Section 33A(2) ran from the date of the order, not from the date of communication or knowledge.

Final Conclusion: The petition failed both on jurisdictional grounds and on merits, and the challenge to the Commissioner's refusal was not sustained.

Ratio Decidendi: Where the statute fixes limitation from the date of an order, the Court cannot read in receipt or knowledge of the order, and constitutional writ jurisdiction will not operate retrospectively to impeach orders completed before the Constitution came into force.

---