https://www.taxtmi.com/caselaws?id=290110 The court addressed whether the one year limitation in Section 33A(2) begins from the date of the order or from its communication, holding that where the statute expressly refers to the date of the order the limitation runs from that date and courts must not read in words to postpone commencement to communication; the petitioner's claim was time barred. The court also held that constitutional writ jurisdiction is prospective and cannot be used to set aside orders made before the Constitution came into force, so mandamus under Article 226 is unavailable for the pre constitutional order. en-us Mon, 17 Mar 1952 00:00:00 +0530 Mon, 19 Jul 2021 14:17:00 +0530 TaxTMI RSS Generator https://www.taxtmi.com/caselaws?id=290110 The court addressed whether the one year limitation in Section 33A(2) begins from the date of the order or from its communication, holding that where the statute expressly refers to the date of the order the limitation runs from that date and courts must not read in words to postpone commencement to communication; the petitioner's claim was time barred. The court also held that constitutional writ jurisdiction is prospective and cannot be used to set aside orders made before the Constitution came into force, so mandamus under Article 226 is unavailable for the pre constitutional order. Case-Laws Income Tax Mon, 17 Mar 1952 00:00:00 +0530 https://www.taxtmi.com/caselaws?id=290110