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Issues: (i) Whether an application under Section 99B of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1898 to set aside a forfeiture order passed by a State Government lies only in the High Court exercising jurisdiction over that State, and whether republication of the forfeiture notification by another State Government confers jurisdiction; (ii) whether Section 99A of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1898 and Section 153A of the Indian Penal Code, 1860 are unconstitutional as imposing unreasonable restrictions on fundamental rights; and (iii) whether the impugned forfeiture order was sustainable on merits under Article 226 of the Constitution of India.
Issue (i): Whether an application under Section 99B of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1898 to set aside a forfeiture order passed by a State Government lies only in the High Court exercising jurisdiction over that State, and whether republication of the forfeiture notification by another State Government confers jurisdiction.
Analysis: Section 99A empowers the State Government to forfeit objectionable matter, while Section 99B provides the remedy of an application to "the High Court". Read with the scheme of Sections 99A to 99G and the definition of "High Court" in Section 4(i), the remedy is confined to the High Court having jurisdiction in relation to the State whose Government made the forfeiture order. A wider construction would create conflicting forums and jurisdictional confusion. Republication of the notification by another State Government is only for information and does not amount to adoption of the order as its own, nor does it create a fresh order capable of challenge under Section 99B.
Conclusion: The application under Section 99B lay only in the High Court of Delhi, and not in the Bombay High Court; the preliminary objection on this point was upheld.
Issue (ii): Whether Section 99A of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1898 and Section 153A of the Indian Penal Code, 1860 are unconstitutional as imposing unreasonable restrictions on fundamental rights.
Analysis: The restrictions were tested on the touchstone of reasonableness. Section 99A aims to prevent circulation of matter punishable under Sections 124A, 153A and 295A of the Penal Code, all of which concern public order and communal harmony. The absence of prior hearing was mitigated by the availability of a post-decisional judicial remedy under Sections 99B and 99D. The limitation period and the breadth of the forfeiture power were not held excessive or arbitrary, and the subjective satisfaction of the State Government was not fatal because it was subject to judicial review. For similar reasons, Section 153A was held to be a valid restriction in the interests of public order.
Conclusion: Section 99A and Section 153A were upheld as constitutionally valid.
Issue (iii): Whether the impugned forfeiture order was sustainable on merits under Article 226 of the Constitution of India.
Analysis: The book had to be read as a whole and not by isolating selected passages. On that reading, the Court found that the work was a historical and political account of Gandhi's assassination and its aftermath, and that the passages relied upon by the Government did not reasonably promote feelings of enmity or hatred between Hindus and Muslims. The alleged objectionable passages, the theme of the book, its language, and the context of the references to communal events did not justify the conclusion recorded in the forfeiture order. Since the order infringed fundamental rights, relief could be granted under Article 226 notwithstanding the failure of the Section 99B remedy.
Conclusion: The forfeiture order dated 26 September 1968 was quashed as unsustainable on merits.
Final Conclusion: The statutory challenge under Section 99B failed on jurisdiction, but the writ petition succeeded because the forfeiture order was found to be unjustified and violative of fundamental rights, resulting in quashing of the order and consequential relief.
Ratio Decidendi: A forfeiture order under Section 99A can be sustained only if the impugned publication, read as a whole and in its proper context, reasonably falls within the mischief of Section 153A; the statutory post-decisional remedy is confined to the High Court of the State whose Government made the order.