Second appeal procedure and readiness for specific performance must be assessed in substance, not by formal wording alone.

Section 100 CPC requires the High Court in second appeal to identify and hear the matter on substantial questions of law at admission, and departure from that mandatory procedure renders the appellate process unsustainable. In a suit for specific performance, Section 16(c) of the Specific Relief Act is satisfied when the pleadings and conduct show continuous readiness and willingness in substance; exact statutory wording is not essential. On the record, the plaintiffs' notices, replies, tender of consideration, and pursuit of performance showed such readiness and willingness, so denial of specific performance on that ground was not justified. The concurrent decree in favour of specific performance was restored.

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Issues: (i) Whether the High Court could reverse the concurrent decrees in second appeal without properly formulating and hearing the appeal on substantial questions of law; (ii) Whether the plaintiffs had pleaded and proved the readiness and willingness necessary for a decree of specific performance.

Issue (i): Whether the High Court could reverse the concurrent decrees in second appeal without properly formulating and hearing the appeal on substantial questions of law.

Analysis: Section 100 of the Code of Civil Procedure requires the High Court, at the stage of admission, to identify the substantial question of law involved and to hear the appeal on the question so formulated, subject to the limited power to consider an additional substantial question for recorded reasons. The record showed that no such question was formulated when the second appeal was admitted, and the appeal was heard in that form. This was a departure from the mandatory procedure governing second appeals.

Conclusion: The High Court acted contrary to the mandatory requirements governing second appeals.

Issue (ii): Whether the plaintiffs had pleaded and proved the readiness and willingness necessary for a decree of specific performance.

Analysis: In a suit for specific performance, Section 16(c) of the Specific Relief Act requires continuous readiness and willingness to perform the contract in substance, though not necessarily in exact statutory words. The surrounding documents, notices, replies, and conduct showed that the plaintiffs had repeatedly sought performance, tendered the consideration, and pursued reconveyance in terms of the agreement. The facts established a continuing willingness and ability to perform their part of the bargain, and the absence of a mechanically worded averment was not fatal.

Conclusion: The requirement of readiness and willingness was satisfied in substance and the decree for specific performance could not be denied on that ground.

Final Conclusion: The judgment of the High Court was unsustainable, and the concurrent decree in favour of specific performance was restored.

Ratio Decidendi: In a second appeal, the High Court must first formulate and hear the case on substantial questions of law, and in a suit for specific performance, readiness and willingness is satisfied when the plaintiff's conduct and pleadings show continuous performance in substance, even without formalistic words.

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