District Court jurisdiction and Charity Commissioner notice were required for trust committee appointment, but no revisional interference followed.

A scheme referring to the "District Court," read with surrounding clauses, was construed to vest appointment power in the court as a judicial authority, not in the District Judge as persona designata, so revision under Section 115 of the Code of Civil Procedure was available. A proceeding to appoint a trustee or committee member of a public trust was treated as a legal proceeding affecting a public religious or charitable purpose, so notice to the Charity Commissioner was mandatory under Section 56B of the Bombay Public Trusts Act, 1950. Even so, where no real prejudice was shown and the Commissioner did not oppose the appointment, the omission of notice did not justify revisional interference.

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Issues: (i) whether the power to appoint a member of the temple committee under the scheme was vested in the District Court as a court of law or in the District Judge as a persona designata so as to attract revisional jurisdiction under Section 115 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908; (ii) whether notice to the Charity Commissioner was mandatory under Section 56B of the Bombay Public Trusts Act, 1950 before deciding the question of appointment; and (iii) whether, even if notice was required, the absence of notice warranted interference in revision.

Issue (i): whether the power to appoint a member of the temple committee under the scheme was vested in the District Court as a court of law or in the District Judge as a persona designata so as to attract revisional jurisdiction under Section 115 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908.

Analysis: The expression used in the scheme was "District Court" and not "District Judge". The surrounding clauses showed that the same expression was intended to denote the civil court exercising judicial power, since the District Court was also empowered to determine whether Sevak representation should continue and to sanction sale of immovable property. The scheme language, read in context, therefore indicated an intention to vest the powers in the District Court as a court of law and not in the District Judge personally. The contrary view that the scheme enlarged jurisdiction was rejected.

Conclusion: The power was vested in the District Court as a court of law, and the order was revisable under Section 115 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908.

Issue (ii): whether notice to the Charity Commissioner was mandatory under Section 56B of the Bombay Public Trusts Act, 1950 before deciding the question of appointment.

Analysis: Section 56B applies whenever in any suit or legal proceeding a question affecting a public religious or charitable purpose is involved. The words "legal proceeding" were given their full natural meaning; they were not confined by ejusdem generis to proceedings of an original nature. The appointment of a trustee or committee member directly and proximately affects the administration and execution of the public religious or charitable purpose of the trust. The proceeding for appointment under the scheme was therefore within Section 56B, and notice to the Charity Commissioner was required.

Conclusion: Notice under Section 56B was required before the District Court proceeded with the appointment.

Issue (iii): whether, even if notice was required, the absence of notice warranted interference in revision.

Analysis: Revisional power is discretionary and is exercised in aid of justice, not to set aside orders on a mere technicality. The Charity Commissioner did not oppose the appointment made by the District Court, and the petitioners showed no real prejudice from the omission to issue notice. Since the result would not have differed had notice been given, interference would have been futile and would not advance justice.

Conclusion: No interference in revision was warranted despite the procedural irregularity.

Final Conclusion: The revision applications failed. The Court upheld the maintainability of revision jurisdiction but declined to interfere with the appointment order because the procedural lapse caused no prejudice and did not justify revision relief.

Ratio Decidendi: Where a scheme vests powers in the "District Court" and the context shows the court itself is intended, the authority acts as a court of law and not as a persona designata; and a question concerning appointment of a trustee or committee member of a public trust is a question affecting a public religious or charitable purpose within Section 56B of the Bombay Public Trusts Act, 1950.

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