TaxTMI 
TaxTMI 
1962 (11) TMI 83
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....ed. It is rather important to note that in the Scheme a originally framed there were various functions assigned to the District Court of Ahmedabad but when the Scheme was modified by the High Court a department was made in that reference as to the District Judge of Ahmedabad were deleted and instead in relation to some of the functions under the modified Scheme, the District Court of Ahmedabad was substituted for the District Judge of Ahmedabad. What significance must attach to this change of expression is a matter which I shall discuss a little later; but suffice it to state for the present that while modifying the Scheme, the High Court made a change and used the expression "District Court of Ahmedabad" in substitution of the expression "District Judge of Ahmedabad" which was used in the Scheme as originally framed by the District Court. From the decision of the High Court, the matter was carried in appeal to the Judicial Committee of the Privy Council; but the Judicial Committee of the Privy Council refused to interfere with the Scheme as sanctioned by the High Court and affirmed the Scheme subject to a few minor modifications which were suggested by Their Lo....
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.... this or in any other manner shall be file up by the District Court of Ahmedabad subject to the reservation mentioned below: When the Tambekar member vacates his seat, his place will be occupied by another representative from the Tambekar family subject to the proviso 4 in Clause 4. When the nominee of the Sevaks vacates his seat, his place will (subject to the reservation contained in Clause 6) be occupied by another nominee of the Sevaks". Clause 12 of the Scheme enumerated the powers of the Committee and sub- clauses (7) and (16) of Clause 12 which are material for the purpose of the present Revision Applications provided that the Committee shall have power: "(7). To have all the rules framed by them sanctioned by the District Court of Ahmedabad to the intent the rule, when sanctioned shall have the same force of as if they were part of this Scheme". "(16). To sell any immovable property belonging to the Temple after obtaining sanction therefore from the District Court of Ahemedbad ". Liberty to apply for alteration, modification or addition in resects of the Scheme was also reserved under Clause 20 which declared that ". "20. The pr....
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....on on 13th August 1961, the purport of which was that since Shri. Ramanlal G. Saraiya had declined to be a member, the name of Shri Navanitlal Ranchhoddas be mentioned to the District Court for appointment as a member of the Committee to the District Court for appointment as a member of the Committee. Pursuant to this resolution opponent No. 1 who is the Manager of the Temple, filed an application being Civil Miscellaneous Application No. 50 of 1961 in District Court of Kaira at Nadiad for appointment of the Committee in the vacancy caused by the death of Parshottamdas Thakoredas. The application was admittedly made under Clause 7 of the Scheme. On the application public notices were issued by the District Court and s a result of the public notice various persons including certain Sevaks appeared either to support or to oppose the appointment of Shri Navnitlal Ranchhoddas as a member of the Committee. The petitioners, one of whom is a Sevak, opposed the appointment and contended that instead of Shri Navnitlal Ranchhoddas, Shrimati Sumatiben Morarji should be appointed to fill the vacancy for reasons set out in their written statement. This suggestion was however opposed by opponent....
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....aving and not as a Court of Law, no Revision Application could be lie against such order under Section 115 of the Code of Civil Procedure and that the Revision Applications preferred by the petitioners and the Charity Commissioner were, therefore, not maintainable. Mr. A.D. Desai, however, resisted this conclusion and contended that the power to a point a member of the Committee was conferred in terms clear and explicit on the "District Court" and the "District Court" could mean only the District Court as a court of law and not the District Judge acting as a persona designata. Mr. A.D.Desai pointed out that there might have been some scope for doubt or equivocation if the Judge had been having been conferred in clear and unambiguous language on the District Court and not on the District Judge, it was clear that it was the District Court as a Court of law and not the District Court as a Court of Law and not the District Judge as a persona designata who was entrusted with the exercise of the power. The District Court making the appointment of Shri Navnitlal Ranchhdoss, therefore, argued Mr.A.D.Desai, acted a Court of law and no as a persona designata and the order....
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....is official designation - and not as constituting the Court though even in such a case the manner would not have been free from doubt and there might have been considerable debate on it. But the expression used is "District Court" and not "District Judge". The clause in terms clear and explicit entrusts the exercise of the power to appoint or remove a member of the committee to the District Court and not the District Judge and reading the clause in its natural and ordinary sense it is clear that the "District Court" referred to in the clause must mean the District Court as a court of Law and not the presiding officer of District Court, namely the District Judge as a persona designata. There is well-known principal of interoperation which also guides me to the same conclusion and it is that the Legislature uses words which have well recognized legal meanings, it must be assumed that the words are used in the sense which they bear according to the well - recognised meaning and that it always requires the strong compulsion of other words in a statute to induce the Court to alter the well-known the meaning of a legal term. The principle though enunciated i....
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....o same conclusion. Even if it be assumed that both the expressions "District Court" and "District Judge" are used to convey the intention that the power to appoint or remove members of the Committee should be vested in the District Judge as a persona designata, the expression "District Judge" would convey that intention more clearly than the expression "District Court" and it would, therefore, be legitimate to hold that since the High Court used the expression "District Court" which would convey the intention less clearly, the High Court did not intend to convey that intention at all and the intention of High Court was to vest the power not in the District Judge as a persona designata but in the District Court as a Court of Law. This argument of course proceeds on the assumption that the intention to vest the power in the District Judge as a persona designata could be conveyed by the use of the expression "District Court". But, I have pointed out the above, in my opinion, the expression "District Court" as used by the High Court can only mean the District Court as a Court of Law and not the District Judge as a pe....
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....ued, the scheme would continue without any modification or change. But if the District Court determines that the representation of the Sevaks should not be continued but that some other arrangement should be made for keeping the number of members to five, the District Court would modify the Scheme by incorporating such arrangement. This function clearly could not be entrusted to the District Judge a persona designata for it involved the power to modify the Scheme which could be done by a Court of Law. Mr.I.M.Nanavati when faced with this clause had to concede that the District Court in this clause must mean the District Court a Court of Law and not the District Judge as a persona designata. The same is the position in regard to the provision contained in sub- clause (16) of clause 12 which empowers the Committee to sell any immovable belonging to the Temple after obtaining sanction therefore from the District Court. Obviously he District Court granting sanction to the Committee to sell any immovable property belonging to the Temple would act as a Court of Law and not as a persona designata. It is difficult to conceive how any power to grant sanction to the Committee to sell any imm....
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....d on all hands that the Scheme as framed by the District Court was not satisfactory and so it arranged as a first step towards arriving at a workable Scheme that a draft should, as far as possible, be settled by the pleaders representing the several litigants before the High Court and Mr. Ratanlal, who represented the Advocate General was accordingly requested to draft a Scheme in consultation with the other pleaders in the case, so as to secure the largest measure of agreement between the parties. Mr.Ratanlal accordingly drafted a Scheme in consultation with the other advocates appearing in the appeals and the Scheme so drafted was placed before the High Court for its consideration when the appeals next came up for hearing. it was found that the main points of difference had been reduced to three and the parties were heard on those points of difference and the Scheme as framed by Mr.Ratanlal was ultimately sanctioned by High Court with certain modifications. In the Scheme as sanctioned by the High Court the reference to the District Judge were deleted and certain functions under the Scheme were entrusted not to the District Judge but to the District Court. The High Court thus made....
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....ming the Scheme conferred any power on the District Court, argued Mr. I.M.Nanavati, the intention could only be to confer such power on the District Judge as a persona designata, for any other view, would involve the assumption of a power in the Court framing the Scheme to enlarge the existing jurisdiction of the District Court as a Court of Law which power manifestly pertains to the Legislature and not to the Court. Mr.I.M.Nanavati, therefore, urged following this line of reasoning that the only view which the Court could take consistently with the legal position was that the power was conferred on the presiding officer of the District Court as a persona designata and not the District Court as a Court of Law. This contention of Mr. I.M.Nanavati, though at first blush attractive and plausible, is on a close analysis defective in that ignores various material and relevant considerations which must weigh with the Court in determining the importance question. It is no doubt true - and this proposition was not disputed - that the Legislature alone can enlarge or diminish the existing jurisdiction of the District Court as a Court of Law and that it is not competent to the Court framing ....
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....is approached for the purpose of appointing or removing trustees, the Court certainly acts as a persona designata. Same would be the position in case off other matters relating to the administration of the charity. It would thus appear that when the Court framing the Scheme reserves to itself any power in regard to the matter arising in the course of the administration of the charity or for the purpose of effectively administering the charity, there is no enlargement of its judicial power by the provision reserving such power. If the District Court frames a scheme the District Court can on this reasoning reserve to itself the power to appoint or remove trustees or to do any other act in relation the administration of the charity as a part of the Scheme. The District Court would under the code of Civil Procedure be in the original Court in regard to the framing of Schemes and if the District Court re serves to itself any of these powers, it cannot be contended that in exercising such power as and when occasion arises, the District Court is acting otherwise as a Court of Law. But the District Court being an original Court an appeal would lie to the High Court from the Scheme framed b....
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....inistration of the charity for all time to time to come - which by its very nature may be impossible or at any rate imprudent - the court reserves to itself the power as a part of the Scheme to provide for contingencies which may arise from time to time in the course of the administration of the charity. There is, therefore, in my opinion, no substance in the argument that if Clause 7 be construed as conferring a power on the District Court as a Court of Law, such construction would have the effect of enlarging the jurisdiction of the District Court as a Court of Law which it would not be open to the High Court to do by a decree framing the Scheme. This argument, as I have pointed out above, proceeds upon a misconception of the true nature and character of the provision made in the scheme of course the judgment of Tyabji J., in (supra) support this argument. But for the reasons mentioned above I cannot regard this decision as laying down the correct law, Now ordinarily a decision of a single Judge of the High Court of Bombay would be binding on me having regard to the decision of a Full Bench of this Court in State of Gujarat v. Gordhandas Keshavji AIR1962Guj128 but it is open to m....
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....ecs. 7 and 8 shall hold office for life unless removed for misconduct or unfitness, and no such member shall be removed except by order of the Civil Court. Surely in such a question a the removal of an officer from his office for misconduct or unfitness, the Court which makes the order removing him is exercising judicial functions?" But apart altogether from this answer, there is another anger which is equally fatal to the contention of Mr.I.M.Nanavati and that answer is provided by the very terms of Sec. 92 of the Code of Civil Procedure. That section provides that in the circumstances specified there, a suit can be filed in the principal Civil Court of original jurisdiction to obtain a decree removing any trustee or appointing a new trustee. The function of appointing and removing trustees is thus a judicial function properly exercisable by a Court of law. It is, therefore, futile on the part of Mr.I.M.Nanavati to contend that because the power to appoint or remove trustees is an administrative power and not a judicial power, the reference to the District Court in Clause 7 must be regarded as reference to the presiding officer of the District Court as a persona designata an....
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....owing observation which were strongly relied on by Mr.I.M.anavati: "......The High Court at Bombay had power conferred upon it by Clause 20 of the Scheme conferred by His Majesty's Order in Council upon an application made to it with that object to alter, modify or add to the rules sanctioned by the District Judge, but it has no other power, and that power it did not exercise; it may, however, still be exercised upon application properly made to it". Mr.I.M.Nanavati contended that it was clear from the aforesaid observations that according to the Privy Council the only power which the High Court had was under Clause 20 of the Scheme and that it had no other power which would mean, according to Mr.I.M.Nanavati, that it had also no revisional power. This construction sought to be put by Mr.I.M.Nanavati on the aforesaid observations of the Privy Council is, in my opinion. Not justified. The words "but it had no other power " in the context meant only this much namely, that the High Court had no power apart from Clause 20, to alter, modify or add to the rules. Obviously no alteration, modification or addition to the rules could be made by the High Court in rev....
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....ed the District Judge of Poona to appoint a trustee of the Committee of Management. The learned District Judge appointed one of the twelve candidates as a trustee and thereupon three of the disappointed candidates filed appeals in the High Court. An objection was raised to the maintainability of the appeals and the question was also considered where, if no appeal lay, at least a Revision Application could lie against the impugned order. A Division Bench of the High Court consisting of Macleod C. J. and Madgavkar J., took the view that the District Judge appointing a trustee under clauses 2.3 and 5 of the Scheme was acting a persona designata and not as a Court. The application for appointment of a trustee could not, therefore, be treated as an application in execution and if the order of appointment could not be regard as an order in execution, no appeal could lie against it. Equally Section 100 of the Code of Civil Procedure also could not avail the appellants since the District Judge in appointing a trustee was a persona designata and not a Court. For the same reasons no revision application could also lie against an order made by the District Judge appointing a trustee. This con....
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....ion of merits - the High Court would have had to consider a revision application lay against the order and in the consideration of that question the High Court would have had to determine whether the District Judge in fixing the proportion acted as a persona designata or as a Court of law. That question, however, did not arise since to use the words of Fawcett J., "In the present case no legal point arises. The only question is whether the decision of the District Judge is justified on its merits.....". On the merits it was clear that since no appeal lay. The decision of the District Judge was final - whether the decision of the District Judge as a persona designata or of the District Judge as a Court of Law. This decision, therefore, does not throw any light on the question as to what circumstances a District Judge entrusted with certain functions under a Scheme can be said to be acting as a persona designata or as a Court of law. (15) The next decision to which my attention was drawn by Mr.I.M.Nanavati was a decision of a Division Bench of the High Court of Bombay consisting of Batchelor and Shah JJ. in Municipality of Belgaum v. Rudrappa, 18 Bom LR 340 : (AIR 1916 Bom....
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....egarded as laying down any rule of law as regards the construction of Clause 7 of the Scheme which could be binding on me as an authoritative precedent. This decision cannot, therefore, be invoked in aid of the argument urged by Mr. I.M.Nanavati on behalf of opponents 1 and 5 to 8 . (16) That takes me to the next decision which was relied on by Mr. I.M. Nanavati and that was a decision again of a Division Bench of the High Court of Bombay in Jagmohan v. Venkatesh, The Division Bench of the High Court of Bombay held in that a District Judge acting under Section 15 of the Bombay Municipalities Act, 1925, is not a Court but a persona designata and the High Court has, therefore no jurisdiction to revise his order under Section 115 of the Code of Civil Procedure. The argument which was rejected by the High Court in coming to this conclusion was that the making of an application to the District Court whereas under the corresponding Section of the Bombay Municipalities Act, 1901, the application was required to be made to the District Judge and that this change of language while enacting the Bombay city Municipalities Act, 1925, clearly indicated that the District Judge acting under sect....
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....the learned District Judge. The matter was thereupon carried in appeal to the Privy Council and the Privy Council held that neither the Madras Religious Endowments Act, 1863, nor the general law gave any right of appeal against the order of the learned District Judge under section 10 and that there was, therefore, no right of appeal against such order and the High Court had consequently no jurisdiction to hear the appeal. The Privy Council accordingly allowed the appeal; and reversed the judgment of the High Court. Sir Richard Baaggallay delivering the judgment of the Privy Council made certain observations which are strongly relied on by Mr. I.M.Nanavati. those observation are: ".... In the opinion of their Lordships the tenth section places the right of appointing a member of the Committee in the Civil Court not as a matter of ordinary civil jurisdiction. but because the officer who constitutes the Civil Court is sure to be one of weight and authority, and with the best means of knowing the movements of local opinion and feelings, and one can hardly imagine a case in which it would be more desirable that the discretion should be exercise by a person acquaintance with the d....
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....ation of the relevant provisions of the Madras Religious Endowments Act, 1863, that it was to the District Court and not to an individual Judge who may preside over or constitute the District Court, that jurisdiction was given under Section 10. The Privy Council examined the other Sections of the Act and observed that if in these Sections the District Court was referred to as a Court of law and not as a persona designata, equally in Section 10 must the District Court be regarded as a Court of Law and not as a persona designata. The Privy Council distinguished the earlier decision in 11 Bom LR 26 (PC) on the ground that in that case no question of jurisdiction was involved. The only question was whether the appellant was unfit for the post by reason of his religious belief. The Privy Council held that the appeal was not maintainable because no right of appeal was conferred by any statute and the appeal was, therefore, dismissed and the order of the High Court was set aside. The Privy Council did not affect to uphold the order of the High Court by reference to its revisional jurisdiction for the conditions for the exercise of the revisional jurisdiction being absent, the revisional j....
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....sional jurisdiction of the High Court. If the powers sought to be exercised by the District Judge in making the order had been conferred on him under the Scheme - if his authority to make the order had been derived from the Scheme-the question would have arisen whether the powers has been conferred on him as a persona designata or as a Court of Law. This question did not arise and was, therefore, not decided, since in the view taken by the learned Judge the authority of the District Judge to make the order was not derived from the Scheme and the District Judge could not, therefore, have acted otherwise than as a Court of Law in making the order. This decision cannot, therefore, assist in the solution of the present problem. It is no doubt true that the learned Judge observed that "In the consideration of the question whether a presiding officer of a Court is acting as a persona designata or as a Court, the important point to be investigated is what is the source of his authority and that it might also be relevant to consider the nature of the proceeding and the action taken therein". But this observation must be read in the context of the question which was being consider....
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....aking the order was acting as a Court of Law and not as a persona designata. There was thus according to Mr. A.D.Desai implicit in this decision the view that the District Judge in making the order act as a Court of Law and not as a persona designata and that I should also therefore, likewise hold that the District Court acting under Clause 7 of the Scheme is a Court of Law and not a persona designata. This contention of Mr. A.D.Desai is, in my opinion not well-founded. No point was raised before the Division Bench in this case that the order of the District Judge could not be revised under Section 115 of the Code of Civil Procedure on the ground that the District Judge in making the order acted as a persona designata nor was the point either present to the mind of the Division Bench or decided by the Division Bench took the view that none of the conditions of Section 115 of the Code of Civil Procedure was satisfied and it was, therefore, not necessary for them to consider the question whether even if the conditions of Section 115 of had been satisfied the order of the District Judge could be revised. If the Division Bench had revised the order of the District Judge, then an argume....
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....could only be on the footing that the District Court was acting as a Court of Law and not as a persona designata, Patkar J., in terms stated: "I would, however, treat the order passed by the lower Court as subject to revision by this Court under Section 15 of the Code of Civil Procedure. The learned District Judge had jurisdiction to entertain the application and failed to exercise the jurisdiction vested in him by law". To the same effect observed Broomfield J., when he stated: "A question of jurisdiction is involved, however, and if the District Judge was wrong in holding that he had no jurisdiction to entertain the application". Then the learned Judge said immediately after referring to the prayer for removal of the trustees which clearly shows that the observation which he made related not only to the prayer for modification of the Scheme but also to the prayer for removal of the trustees. It is, therefore, apparent that he also regarded the District Court entertaining an application for removal of the trustees as a Court of Law and not as a persona designata. Mr.A.D.Desai contended that this decision must, therefore, be regarded as laying down that in ....
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....e said to be offered by this decision. (21) For thee reasons I am of the opinion that the District Court referred to in Clause 7 of the scheme is the District Court acting as a Court of Law and not the District Judge acting as a persona designata. It must, therefore, follow that the District Court in making the order appointing Shri Navnitlal Ranchhodoss as a member of the Committee acted a as Court of Law and that the order is, therefore, subject to the revisional jurisdiction of the High Court. In this view of the matter the Revisional Application would have to be heard on the merits and it would have to be decide by me whether any of the conditions specified in Section 15 of Code of Civil Procedure is fulfilled so a to warrant interference with the order made by the District Court. The hearing of the Revision Applications on the merits will be fixed on 28th July 1962. (The Revision Petition was then heard on merits and the Court delivered the following---) JUDGMENT (22) On 24th July 1962 I delivered judgment rejecting the preliminary objection urged by Mr.I.M.Nanavati on behalf of opponents Nos.1 and 5 to 8 against the maintainability of the Revision Applications. I took the....
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....legal proceeding. it is only where the public trust is not registered that the Charity Commissioner may not have notice that such question is involved and such question may be determined by the Court in the absence of the Charity Commissioner to protect the interest of the charity and that is why, Mr. I.M.Nanavati, Section 56B was enacted providing for giving of notice to the Charity Commissioner. Mr. I.M.Nanavati thus attempted to limit the applicability of Section 56B to cases in which a question affecting a public religious or charitable purpose arises in relation to a public trust not registered under the provisions of the Bombay Public Trusts Act, 1950. Now if this contention were correct it is obvious that he public trust in the resent case being registered under the provisions of the Bombay Public Trusts Act, 1950, Section 56B would not apply and not notice would be necessary to be given to the Charity Commissioner even if all the conditions of the Section were otherwise satisfied. But this contention is clearly well-founded. To accede to this contention would involve writing words in Section 56B that are not there. Section 56B in terms clear and explicit provides that if in....
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....des certain other institutions which it is not necessary to enumerate for the purpose of the present discussion. This definition clearly brings out the distinction between the two expressions "public trust" and "public religious or charitable purpose". The former connotes the trust whether express or constructive while the latter constitutes the purpose for which the public trust exists. Every question which affects a public religious or charitable purpose would not necessarily affect a public trust unless the public religious or charitable purpose affected by the question is a purpose of a public trust. But every question affecting a public trust would necessarily be a question which would affect the public religious or charitable purpose of such public trust. I shall presently discuss this question in some detail but it is sufficient to state for the tine being in answer to the contention of Mr.A.D.Desai that both the expression were known to the Legislature and yet the Legislature used the expression "public religious or charitable purpose" and not the expression "public trust". The content of the two expressions is different and to equate....
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....ended that there was no warrant for restricting the plain and natural meaning of the words "legal proceedings" and that the words "legal proceedings" being words of sufficient width and amplitude must be regarded as including the proceeding before the District Court. Mr.A.D.Desai disputed the applicability of the principle of interpretation which requires general words preceded by particular words to be construed ejusdem generis and contended that there was no scope for the application of this principle of interpretation and that in any event the intention of the Legislature as appearing from the language used in Sec. 56B clearly excluded the applicability of this principle of interpretation. These rival contentions bearing upon the true interpretations to be put on the words "legal proceedings" occurring in Sec. 56B raised an interesting question of construction and I will now proceed to examine the same. (26) One salutary rule interpretation founded on the principle of assumed intention of the law-maker is that general words, though when they stand by themselves are to be accorded their full meaning, must, when they follow particular and specific wo....
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....er but to something which can be called a class or kind of objects. Where this is lacking, the rule cannot apply. 'Unless you can find a category; said Farwell, L.J. (in Tillmans and Co. v. S. S. Kuntsford, (1908) 2 KB 385 (403): 1908 AC 207 'there is no room for the application of the ejusdem generis doctrine, where the words are clearly wide in their meaning they ought not to be qualified on the ground of their association with other words. For instance, where local Act required that 'theatres and other places of public entertainment' should be licensed, the question rose whether a 'fun-fair' for which no fee was charged for admission was within the Act. It was held to be so, and that the ejusdem generis rule did not apply to confine the words 'other places' to place of the same kind as theatres. So the insertion of such words as 'or things of what ever description' would exclude the rule". This passage clearly shows that the modern tendency of the law is to attenuate the application of the rule of ejusdem generis and unless a genus can be constituted by the species enumerated, the rule of ejusdem generis cannot apply. (27) In the le....
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....ring the judgment of the Privy Council in United Towns Elec Co. v. A. G. New foundland, (1939) 1 ER 423, which support the view that the ejusdem generis doctrine cannot be applied where there is enumeration of online specie preceding the general words. Those observations are to be found at page 428 of the report and are as follows: ".......In their opinion, there is no room for the application of the principle of ejusdem generis in the absence of any mention of a genus, since the mention of a single species - for example, water rates - does not constitute a genus ... . I may also mention in this connection another decision of a Divisional Court of the Kings Bench Division in England where I find the same view has been taken The words which came up fir construction in this case were "any quay or other place" occurring in Section 3, sub-section (1) of the Import, Export and Customs Powers (Defence) Act, 1939. This section of the English statute imposed penalties on the exporter or his agent of any goods were "brought to any quay or other place" for the purpose of being contravention of an order made under that statute. A grocer delivered to the residence of....
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....rly restrictive in their intendment, it is requisite that there must be a distinct genus, which must comprise more than one species, before the rule can be applied'. If the words 'any other public purposes' in the statute in question have been used only to mean a State purposes, they would become mere surplusage; courts should lean against such a construction as far as possible". The words underlined (here in ' ') by me in the aforesaid passage clearly show that general words even if they are produced by particular and specific words must ordinarily receive their full and natural meaning unless they are clearly restrictive in their intendment and their full and natural meaning must not be confined within narrow limits by application of the rule of ejusdem generis unless there is a distinct genus comprising more than one species. (29) On this ground alone the contention of Mr.I.M.Nanavati based on the applicability of the rule of construction ejusdem generis must fall, since in the present case it is apparent that there is enumeration of only one object or species namely "suit" preceding the general words "legal proceedings" and from the....
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.... circumstances which clearly indicate that these words are not intended to have any limited or restrictive meaning. (31) In the first place the word "any" preceding the words "suit or legal proceeding" is a word of expansion indicative of width and amplitude sufficient to bring within the scope and ambit of the words it governs, all that can possibly be included in them. The word "any" is intended to remove any limitative or restrictive inhibition which might otherwise affect the full and natural content of the words it governs and since according to the ordinary rules of grammar the word "any" governs not only the word "suit" but also the words "legal proceedings" it is clear that the Legislature meant to include within the coverage of Sec. 56B all legal proceedings and did not intend that any legal proceeding should be left out of the operation of the Section. (32) The second circumstance which must weigh with the Court in coming to the conclusion that full and natural meaning must be given to the words "legal proceedings" and their meaning should not cut down is the absence of the qualifying word "other....
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....rity. The Charity Commissioner is there to see that religious or charitable purposes are properly and effectively carried out. The fasciculus of Sections commencing with section 9 and ending with Section 13 clearly shows that the Legislature has made ample provision to secure that public religious or charitable purposes are not defeated by reason if any defect or deficiency in the trusts which are merely the instruments to carry out such public religious or charitable purposes. It is really in furtherance of the intention of the Legislature to secure proper and effective fulfillment of public religious or charitable purposes and with a view to effectually carrying out the same that the Legislature has provided in Section 56B that if in any suit or legal proceedings it appears to the Court that any question affecting public religious or charitable purposes is involved, the Court should not proceed to determine such question until notice has been given to the Charity Commissioner, so that the Charity Commissioner can appear before the Court if he think it necessary and make his submissions in order to protect the interests of the charity. The Charity Commissioner being constituted un....
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....public of religious or charitable purpose. Mr. B.R.Sompura and Mr. A.D.Desai on the other hand contended that the question of appointment of a member of the Committee under Cl.7 of the Scheme was undoubtedly a question affecting a public religious or charitable purpose since the appointments would necessarily have an effect one way or the other on the achievement or execution of the public religious or charitable purpose of the trust and the District Court, therefore, acted illegally in proceeding to determine the question of appointment of a member of the Committee without giving notice to the Charity Commissioner as required by Sec. 56B. the question raised by these rival contentions is an important one from the point off view of administration of public trusts and Mr.B.R.Sompura, appearing on behalf of the Charity Commissioner, strongly protested against a construction which would have the effect of depriving the Charity Commissioner of an opportunity to place his point of view before the Court in such an important matter as the appointment of trustees of a public trust., I may mention here that Mr. B.R.Sompura frankly stated to the Court that the Charity Commissioner was not in....
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.... religious or charitable purpose of such public trust could be said to direct and proximate or indirect and remote. Now some illustrations were given in order to emphasize the argument on either side. Mr.I.M.Nanavati asked me to consider a case where a suit may be filed against the trustees of a public religious or charitable purpose of the public trust might be carried on. The determination of the question whether the trustees should be evicted or not, if adverse to the trustees, might affect the public religious or charitable purpose of the public trust for the trustees may not be able to find another place where such purpose can be carried out as properly and effectively as it was being carried on in the premises forming the subject-matter of the suit and this might produce an adverse effect on the execution of such purpose, but can it, therefore, be said that a notice must go to the Charity Commissioner before the suit can be decided by the Court? Mr. I.M.Nanavati also gave another illustration of a case where a suit maybe filed against the trustees to recover a certain sum of money and posed the question, that merely because, if a decree is passed against the trustees, the tru....
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....d scholastic questions as to where a horse's tail and where it ceases. You are obliged to say, "This is a horse's tail", at sometime". I may say in the present case without entering into any infinitely analysis of the chain of causation, that the appointment of a trustee of a public trust would have a direct and proximate effect on the public religious or charitable purpose of the trust and that the question of appointment of a trustee of a public trust is, therefore, a question affecting a public religious or charitable purpose within the meaning of Section 56B. it is obvious that if a trustee of a public trust happens to be an unfit person, the execution of the public religious or charitable purpose of the public trust is certain to be adversely affected, while if the trustee happens to be a fit person, the cause of the public religious or charitable purpose would certainly be advanced. It is the trustees who are charged with the duty of carrying out the public religious or charitable purpose of the public trust and the achievement of such public religious or charitable purpose must, therefore, necessarily depend on competence or incompetence of the trustee....
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....een the same even if the requirements of that Section had been complied with. There is great force in this contention of Mr.I.M.Nanavati, Section 115 vests a discretionary power in the High Court. The High Court is not bound to interfere even if the conditions specified in any of the three clause of the Section are satisfied. Even if the subordinate Court has acted without jurisdiction or failed to exercise jurisdiction or acted illegally or with material irregularity in the exercise of jurisdiction, the High Court will not interfere if the result of the interference would be to bring about injustice or promote mere technicality without advancing the cause of justice. The interference of the High Court under the section is confined to cases here illegal assumption of jurisdiction to exercise jurisdiction or illegality in the exercise of jurisdiction committed by the subordinate Court is such that it has occasioned or might occasion a substantial failure of justice. The decision of the subordinate Court would not ordinarily be set aside by the High Court in revision upon a mere technicality when there is no real failure of justice. This rule so well settled that no authority is need....
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....Court will not interfere in revision, even though the conditions specified in any of the three clauses of the Section are satisfied. (38) Applying these principles, it is clear that no case is made out for interference with the order of the District Court. I may again mention that so far as the Charity Commissioner represented by Mr.B.R.Sompura is concerned, he has no objection to the objection to the appointment of Shri Navnitlal Ranchhoddas as a member of the Committee and his revision application is not directed against the order of the District Court appointing Shri Navnitlal Ranchhoddas as a member of the Committee. His revision application is directed only against the order passed by the District Court holding that no notice was necessary to be given to the Charity Commissioner before appointing a member of the Committee. Mr.B.R.Sompura appearing on behalf of the Charity Commissioner has therefore not pressed for setting aside the order of the District Court appointing Shri Navnitlal Ranchhoddas as a member of the Committee. The grievance against the order of the District Court appointing Shri Navnitlal Ranchhoddas as a member of the Committee has been made only by the petit....
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.... the priest of Shrimati Sumatiben Morarji. The petitioners thus led evidence in the shape of this affidavit even though the proceedings were continued by the District Court without giving notice to the Charity Commissioner. If the petitioners wanted to lead any further evidence they would have certainly led such evidence along with the evidence in the shape of this affidavit. The petitioners not only led evidence in the shape of this affidavit, but also participated in the proceedings after the District Court had made the order declining to issue notice to the Charity Commissioner. It is therefore, entirely incorrect on the part of the petitioners now to allege that the petitioners did not lead full evidence on the basis that the proceedings were illegal or that they would be prejudiced if the order of the District Court is not set aside in revision. (40) The second ground on which Mr.A.D.Desai pressed that I should interfere with the order of the District Court in revision, was that if notice has been issued to the Charity Commissioner, the petitioners would have had an opportunity to persuade the Charity Commissioner to support the candidature of Shrimati Sumatiben Morarji in pr....