Developer-specific performance barred where statutory conditions fail; revocable power-of-attorney did not create an interest in property.

A developer's suit for specific performance of a development agreement was held not maintainable because the statutory conditions for enforcement under the Specific Relief Act were not satisfied, including the absence of the possession-based requirement relied on by the court. The court also held that a power-of-attorney executed to facilitate development was not coupled with an interest in the immovable property, so it remained revocable and could not by itself support ad interim injunction. As the substantive claim was barred, no prima facie case was established and the injunction refusal was upheld.

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Issues: (i) Whether a developer's suit for specific performance of a development agreement is maintainable in view of the bar under Section 14(3)(c) of the Specific Relief Act, 1963. (ii) Whether an irrevocable power-of-attorney executed for the purpose of a development arrangement creates such an interest in the immovable property as to prevent revocation and justify ad interim injunction.

Issue (i): Whether a developer's suit for specific performance of a development agreement is maintainable in view of the bar under Section 14(3)(c) of the Specific Relief Act, 1963.

Analysis: Section 14(3)(c) permits specific performance of a contract for construction or execution of work on land only in the limited situation where the suit is for enforcement of such contract and the statutory conditions are satisfied, including possession having been obtained by the defendant in pursuance of the contract. The plaintiffs were developers suing for enforcement of a development agreement at their own instance. On the plaint averments, the statutory condition contemplated by clause (iii) was absent, and the suit was therefore hit by the prohibition against specific enforcement.

Conclusion: The suit for specific performance was not maintainable at the instance of the developer, and no prima facie case was made out on that basis.

Issue (ii): Whether an irrevocable power-of-attorney executed for the purpose of a development arrangement creates such an interest in the immovable property as to prevent revocation and justify ad interim injunction.

Analysis: A power-of-attorney is irrevocable only where it is coupled with an interest. The authority granted here was only to facilitate the alleged development arrangement and did not create any interest in the property. Sections 202 and 203 of the Indian Contract Act, 1872 recognize revocability except in cases covered by Section 202, and an agreement for sale or development by itself does not create an interest in immovable property. As the substantive relief of specific performance was itself barred, the plaintiffs could not obtain an injunction merely on the footing that the power-of-attorney had been revoked.

Conclusion: The power-of-attorney was revocable, did not create a proprietary interest, and did not justify ad interim injunction.

Final Conclusion: The refusal of ad interim injunction was upheld because the plaintiffs failed to establish a prima facie case, and the appeal was dismissed.

Ratio Decidendi: A developer cannot maintain a suit for specific performance of a development agreement when the statutory conditions of Section 14(3)(c) of the Specific Relief Act, 1963 are not met, and an authority granted only to implement such an arrangement does not become irrevocable unless it is coupled with an interest in the property.

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