Purposive reading of specific performance law limits developer claims only where development rights and contract terms are sufficiently certain.

Section 14(3)(c) of the Specific Relief Act, 1963 is explained as a purposive exception to the general bar on specific performance of contracts for construction or other work on land. A developer is not excluded merely because the owner did not obtain possession under the contract, but the statutory conditions must still be met. The agreement must define the work with sufficient precision and create enforceable development rights; where terms are vague or the alleged loss can be adequately compensated in money, specific performance will not lie. The commentary also notes that relief depends on strict satisfaction of these requirements.

---

---

Issues: (i) whether a developer's suit for specific performance of a development agreement is barred by Section 14(3)(c) of the Specific Relief Act, 1963 and whether that provision requires a purposive construction; (ii) whether the agreement in question satisfied the statutory conditions for specific performance.

Issue (i): whether a developer's suit for specific performance of a development agreement is barred by Section 14(3)(c) of the Specific Relief Act, 1963 and whether that provision requires a purposive construction.

Analysis: Section 14(3)(c) is an exception to the general rule against specific performance of contracts for construction or other work on land. A literal reading of clause (iii) would create an anomaly in cases where the developer, rather than the owner, sues for enforcement, because the owner may remain in possession by title and not by virtue of the agreement. To avoid defeating the legislative purpose, the provision must be read purposively so that a developer is not excluded merely because the defendant owner did not obtain possession under the contract. The developer must, however, still satisfy the other statutory conditions.

Conclusion: Section 14(3)(c) is not a bar in principle to a developer's suit for specific performance, provided the statutory requirements are otherwise met.

Issue (ii): whether the agreement in question satisfied the statutory conditions for specific performance.

Analysis: On the terms of the agreement, the work to be done was not described with sufficient precision. Expressions such as "first class materials", "residential apartments of various sizes and denomination", "similar condition", and "special fittings" left the scope of construction uncertain, and the remuneration payable was also not clearly fixed. The developer's alleged expenditure and loss were capable of being quantified in money, so compensation was an adequate remedy. The agreement therefore did not satisfy the requirements of precise contractual definition or substantial interest requiring specific performance.

Conclusion: The agreement was not specifically enforceable and the suit for specific performance failed.

Final Conclusion: The appeal was dismissed because, although a developer is not inherently barred from seeking specific performance of a development agreement, the particular agreement here did not meet the statutory preconditions for such relief.

Ratio Decidendi: Section 14(3)(c) of the Specific Relief Act, 1963 must be construed purposively so that a developer may sue for specific performance of a development agreement where the agreement creates enforceable development rights and the statutory conditions are satisfied, but relief will be refused if the agreement is vague or compensation in money is an adequate remedy.

---