Issues: (i) Validity of a consolidated show cause notice and order-in-original covering multiple financial years; (ii) Territorial jurisdiction of Chandigarh GST authorities to demand tax on rental income from immovable property situated in Punjab; (iii) Invocation of Section 74(1) for rental income, freight charges, excess input tax credit, and blocked credit; (iv) Liability for late fee and interest; (v) Admissibility of excess and blocked input tax credit.

Issue (i): Validity of a consolidated show cause notice and order-in-original covering multiple financial years.

Analysis: A consolidated show cause notice and adjudication order spanning more than one financial or tax year are not, by themselves, prohibited. The adoption of the applicable legal position rejected the challenge based solely on the consolidated form of the proceedings.

Conclusion: The consolidated show cause notice and order-in-original are legally valid. This is against the assessee.

Issue (ii): Territorial jurisdiction of Chandigarh GST authorities to demand tax on rental income from immovable property situated in Punjab.

Analysis: Under Section 12(3) of the Integrated Goods and Services Tax Act, 2017, the place of supply for services directly connected with immovable property is the property's location. However, Section 2(71) of the Central Goods and Services Tax Act, 2017 and Section 2(15) of the Integrated Goods and Services Tax Act, 2017 make the registered place of business the location of the supplier of services. The Punjab location of the property consequently made the supply inter-State and attracted IGST, but did not displace the jurisdiction of the authorities administering the supplier's Chandigarh registration.

Conclusion: Chandigarh GST authorities had jurisdiction to raise the rental-income demand. This is against the assessee.

Issue (iii): Invocation of Section 74(1) for rental income, freight charges, excess input tax credit, and blocked credit.

Analysis: The extended limitation and penalty mechanism under Section 74(1) requires foundational facts demonstrating fraud, wilful misstatement, or suppression of facts with intent to evade tax; a mechanical recital of those expressions is insufficient. The freight reverse-charge amount, the alleged excess input tax credit, and the blocked credit were discernible from statutory returns and audit material, with no adequate allegation establishing the requisite suppression. The finding that the excess-credit exercise was revenue neutral also negated recourse to Section 74 for that amount. In contrast, rental receipts detected through Form 26-AS had not been declared in GST returns. Such non-declaration falls within suppression under Explanation 2 to Section 74.

Conclusion: Section 74(1) was validly invoked for the undisclosed rental income, including equal penalty and interest, but could not be invoked for the freight, excess-credit, and blocked-credit components. The ruling is against the assessee for the rental-income component and in favour of the assessee for the remaining components; any tax liability on those remaining components must be determined under Section 75(2) as if notice had been issued under Section 73(1).

Issue (iv): Liability for late fee and interest.

Analysis: Section 74 concerns demand of tax and imposition of penalty and does not govern late fee or interest. Its inapplicability therefore did not affect the independently payable late fee and related interest.

Conclusion: The late fee and interest are upheld. This is against the assessee.

Issue (v): Admissibility of excess and blocked input tax credit.

Analysis: Subject to fulfilment of the conditions in Section 16 of the Central Goods and Services Tax Act, 2017, input tax credit cannot be denied solely because the invoices are not reflected in Form GSTR-2A. The claimed blocked credit also required merits examination where the relevant invoice was asserted to have subsequently become available.

Conclusion: The admissibility of the excess and blocked input tax credit requires fresh merits determination by the adjudicating authority. This is in favour of the assessee.

Final Conclusion: The rental-tax liability, equal penalty, interest, and late fee remain enforceable, while the extended-period demands and penalties relating to freight and the disputed credits cannot stand; the disputed credit claims require adjudication on their substantive eligibility.

Ratio Decidendi: The extended-period mechanism under Section 74 cannot rest on a mechanical allegation of fraud, wilful misstatement, or suppression; undisclosed information required to be furnished in GST returns constitutes suppression, whereas matters evident from statutory returns without supporting foundational facts do not.

Issues: Whether refund of accumulated input tax credit for zero-rated export supplies is admissible where export invoices were issued during the relevant refund period but the goods were exported after that period.

Analysis: Under the refund mechanism for zero-rated supplies made without payment of tax under bond or letter of undertaking, the turnover of zero-rated supply is determined by invoices issued during the relevant period. The statutory scheme concerning time of supply and issuance of invoices treats the supply of export goods as occurring upon their removal for export and invoicing. Actual export remains a condition for grant of refund, but the date of the shipping bill does not exclude invoice value from the relevant period's zero-rated turnover where the goods have subsequently been exported.

Conclusion: Refund is admissible in respect of invoices issued during the relevant period notwithstanding that the corresponding goods were exported after that period, provided actual export is established.

Issues: (i) Whether the disputed input tax credit was admissible despite documentary and banking records when actual receipt and physical movement of goods were not established; (ii) Whether penalty under Section 122 of the Central Goods and Services Tax Act, 2017 could be imposed together with proceedings under Section 74 without reasoned findings and compliance with Section 75(13).

Issue (i): Whether the disputed input tax credit was admissible despite documentary and banking records when actual receipt and physical movement of goods were not established.

Analysis: Section 16(2)(b) of the Central Goods and Services Tax Act, 2017 requires actual receipt of goods, while Section 155 places the burden of proving eligibility to input tax credit upon the claimant. Invoices, e-way bills, stock records and banking-channel payments do not by themselves establish actual receipt when reliable contrary material exists. The suppliers were found to be bogus and non-existent, and the vehicle-verification reports disclosed untraceable vehicles, inadequate carrying capacity, invalid permits, and missing insurance or fitness records. The material was not substantively rebutted and established, on a preponderance of probabilities, that the transactions were paper transactions without physical movement of goods. Compliance with Section 16(2)(c) cannot substitute the antecedent requirement of actual receipt under Section 16(2)(b).

Conclusion: The disputed input tax credit was inadmissible, and recovery of the tax and consequential interest under Section 74 was sustained against the assessee.

Issue (ii): Whether penalty under Section 122 of the Central Goods and Services Tax Act, 2017 could be imposed together with proceedings under Section 74 without reasoned findings and compliance with Section 75(13).

Analysis: Section 75(13) bars imposition of another penalty for the same act or omission where penalty is imposed under Section 74. The orders did not provide reasons for invoking Section 122 alongside Section 74, and the enhanced penalty was imposed without addressing the statutory bar and the requirements of natural justice identified in the applicable circular.

Conclusion: The penalties imposed under Section 122 read with Section 74 were set aside for fresh determination in accordance with Section 75(13), in favour of the assessee.

Final Conclusion: The tax and interest liability arising from inadmissible input tax credit remains undisturbed, while the penalty component requires redetermination under the statutory bar against multiple penalties.

Ratio Decidendi: Eligibility for input tax credit is conditional upon the claimant proving actual receipt and genuineness of supplies; invoices, e-way bills and banking records alone are insufficient where reliable evidence establishes absence of physical movement of goods.

Issues: Whether a mismatch in the place of dispatch shown in transport records and e-way bills, without intent to evade tax, attracts penalty under Section 129.

Analysis: The consignments were accompanied by valid e-invoices and e-way bills, were accounted for in the statutory returns, and the applicable tax had been discharged. The difference arose because the goods moved by rail from the supplier's location to Kolkata and thereafter by road to the recipient, with the road transport receipt reflecting Kolkata as the dispatch point. A merely technical discrepancy in the dispatch location, without discrepancy in the goods or evidence of tax evasion, was treated as a procedural lapse rather than a substantive contravention warranting penalty.

Conclusion: A technical mismatch in the place of dispatch, where the goods and transactions are duly documented and taxed and no intent to evade tax exists, does not attract penalty under Section 129; decided in favour of the assessee.

Issues: (i) Whether participation and consent waived the contractual requirement of a three-member arbitral tribunal and precluded objection to the sole arbitrator; (ii) Whether the special purpose vehicle undergoing corporate insolvency could pursue the arbitral claim and seek extension of mandate; and (iii) Whether the High Court acting under Section 11 could extend the arbitral mandate under Section 29A.

Issue (i): Whether participation and consent waived the contractual requirement of a three-member arbitral tribunal and precluded objection to the sole arbitrator.

Analysis: Although the arbitration agreement stipulated a three-member tribunal, consent was recorded for appointment of successive sole arbitrators, and the relevant appointment orders were never challenged. Continued participation in the proceedings, consent to an earlier time extension, and filing of counterclaims constituted acquiescence. Section 4 of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996 deems waiver where a known non-compliance with an arbitration agreement is not promptly objected to, while Section 16(2) requires a jurisdictional plea within the prescribed stage.

Conclusion: The requirement of a three-member tribunal stood waived by conduct, and the challenge to the sole arbitrator was barred by acquiescence, against the appellant.

Issue (ii): Whether the special purpose vehicle undergoing corporate insolvency could pursue the arbitral claim and seek extension of mandate.

Analysis: The moratorium under Section 14 of the Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code, 2016 restrains proceedings against a corporate debtor but does not prevent it from pursuing recovery claims that may improve its financial position. The special purpose vehicle was a separate party to the tripartite agreement and had been formed for implementation of that agreement. Its participation in the arbitration was authorised by the resolution professional with approval of the committee of creditors under Section 28(1)(h) of the Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code, 2016.

Conclusion: The special purpose vehicle was competent to continue the arbitral proceedings and seek extension of the arbitral mandate, against the appellant.

Issue (iii): Whether the High Court acting under Section 11 could extend the arbitral mandate under Section 29A.

Analysis: For domestic arbitration, the court competent to exercise powers under Section 29A is the court defined by Section 2(1)(e)(i) of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996, namely the principal civil court of original jurisdiction in the district or a High Court exercising ordinary original civil jurisdiction. The appointing authority under Section 11 is not such a court merely because it constituted the arbitral tribunal, and Section 42 does not confer continuing jurisdiction upon it. The authority to extend the mandate under Section 29A(4) and (5) therefore rests with the court so defined.

Conclusion: The Chief Justice of the High Court or a Section 11 designate lacked authority to extend the mandate under Section 29A; the contrary determination was set aside, in favour of the appellant.

Final Conclusion: The sole-arbitrator proceedings remain valid, the restraint on pronouncement of the award stands lifted, and the arbitral proceedings are to be concluded within the stipulated period.

Ratio Decidendi: An extension of an arbitral mandate under Section 29A can be granted only by the court defined in Section 2(1)(e) of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996; a High Court or its designate exercising appointment power under Section 11 has no residual authority to grant that extension.

Issues: (i) Whether removal of earth, laying of gravel and metal, compact rolling and formation of granular sub-base constituted an integral part of road construction rather than an independent Site Formation Service, and alternatively whether it was exempt under Notification No. 17/2005-ST dated 07.06.2005; (ii) Whether invocation of the extended period and imposition of penalties under Sections 77(2) and 78 of the Finance Act, 1994 were sustainable.

Issue (i): Whether removal of earth, laying of gravel and metal, compact rolling and formation of granular sub-base constituted an integral part of road construction rather than an independent Site Formation Service, and alternatively whether it was exempt under Notification No. 17/2005-ST dated 07.06.2005.

Analysis: The work order expressly connected the earthwork, gravel and metal laying, rolling and granular sub-base formation with the proposed paver-road project. A granular sub-base is a foundational and essential stage of road construction, and subsequent laying of paver blocks by another person does not permit artificial severance of that integrated activity into a separate site-formation service. The Board's clarification also treats laying of a new road and changing a road surface as construction activities. Independently, Notification No. 17/2005-ST exempts site-formation and similar services undertaken in the course of construction of roads, without imposing a Government ownership, public-use or non-commercial-premises condition.

Conclusion: The activity was integral to road construction and was not separately taxable as Site Formation Service; alternatively, it was exempt under Notification No. 17/2005-ST. This issue was decided in favour of the assessee.

Issue (ii): Whether invocation of the extended period and imposition of penalties under Sections 77(2) and 78 of the Finance Act, 1994 were sustainable.

Analysis: The material relied upon in the notice consisted of the work order, bill, correspondence and audit material forming part of the assessee's regular records. The dispute concerned classification, taxability and exemption of road-related work. Discovery during audit and a contrary departmental view did not establish wilful suppression with intent to evade tax, which is required for extended limitation. The assessee's reliance on the statutory exclusion, exemption and Board clarifications also constituted reasonable cause for purposes of Section 80 of the Finance Act, 1994.

Conclusion: The extended period was unavailable, the demand was time-barred, and the associated interest and penalties could not survive. This issue was decided in favour of the assessee.

Final Conclusion: No service-tax liability, consequential interest or penalty was legally sustainable in respect of the road-related granular sub-base work.

Ratio Decidendi: Foundational and preparatory works contractually undertaken in the course of road construction cannot be artificially severed and taxed as a standalone site-formation service, and an exemption for such work admits no unstated public-use limitation.

Issues: (i) Whether construction undertaken for educational and health-care institutions during 01.04.2010 to 30.06.2012 was taxable as commercial or industrial construction; (ii) Whether the construction activities during 01.07.2012 to 31.03.2015 were composite works contracts and could be taxed on the entire consideration under Section 66E(b) of the Finance Act, 1994; (iii) Whether extended limitation, consequential interest and penalties were sustainable.

Issue (i): Whether construction undertaken for educational and health-care institutions during 01.04.2010 to 30.06.2012 was taxable as commercial or industrial construction.

Analysis: Sections 65(25b) and 65(105)(zzq) of the Finance Act, 1994 required the buildings to be used or intended to be used primarily for commerce or industry. Circular No. 80/10/2004-S.T. required examination of the purpose and actual use of the construction rather than the institutional form or source of income. The Revenue bore the burden of proof in classification to establish the requisite primary commercial or industrial use. Applying the Predominant Object Test, generation of educational surplus alone did not establish a profit-making or commercial character. The available material did not establish that the educational buildings or hospital building were used or intended primarily for commerce or industry.

Conclusion: The pre-01.07.2012 demand was unsustainable and was set aside in favour of the assessee.

Issue (ii): Whether the construction activities during 01.07.2012 to 31.03.2015 were composite works contracts and could be taxed on the entire consideration under Section 66E(b) of the Finance Act, 1994.

Analysis: Section 65B(54) of the Finance Act, 1994 covers construction contracts involving a taxable transfer of property in goods as Composite Works Contracts. The agreements, construction schedules and VAT records showed procurement and incorporation of materials, and did not support treatment of the activities as pure labour contracts. Under Section 66E(h) and Rule 2A of the Service Tax (Determination of Value) Rules, 2006, only the Service Portion of Works Contract could be valued under the prescribed mechanism. The show-cause notice instead proposed tax under Section 66E(b) on the entire consideration. Adjudication Beyond the Show Cause Notice by converting that demand into one under Section 66E(h) and Rule 2A was impermissible. Denial of the notification benefit did not permit taxation of the entire composite consideration.

Conclusion: The post-01.07.2012 demand under Section 66E(b) on the entire consideration was unsustainable and was set aside in favour of the assessee.

Issue (iii): Whether extended limitation, consequential interest and penalties were sustainable.

Analysis: Extended Limitation under the proviso to Section 73(1) required Wilful Suppression or misstatement with intent to evade tax. Registration, maintained agreements and VAT records, payments made for the later period, and a bona fide belief founded on the operative departmental circular were inconsistent with such suppression. Belated filing of returns alone did not establish the statutory ingredients. Consequential Interest under Section 75 could not survive after failure of the substantive demands.

Conclusion: The extended period was not invocable; consequential interest and penalties under Sections 77(2) and 78 were unsustainable, in favour of the assessee.

Final Conclusion: The confirmed tax demands, interest and penalties lacked a sustainable basis under the applicable classification, valuation and limitation framework.

Issues: (i) Whether the rejection of the assessee's VCES declaration under Section 111 of the Finance Act, 2013 on the ground that it was substantially false was sustainable; (ii) Whether the demand was barred by limitation and whether invocation of the extended period, interest and penalty was sustainable.

Issue (i): Whether the rejection of the assessee's VCES declaration under Section 111 of the Finance Act, 2013 on the ground that it was substantially false was sustainable.

Analysis: The Voluntary Compliance Encouragement Scheme concerned historical unpaid tax dues, and eligibility was to be tested with reference to the prescribed date. An investigation initiated after that date could not retrospectively disqualify the declaration. Section 111 required proof that the declaration was substantially false; a higher tax computation based on accounts, returns, Form 26AS, contracts, invoices and other contemporaneous records did not by itself establish substantial falsity. The differences arose from identifiable disputes concerning taxability, valuation, classification, exemption and the treatment of works-contract receipts. The Revenue did not discharge its burden of proof to show that the declaration was substantially false.

Conclusion: The VCES declaration was not established to be substantially false, and its rejection under Section 111 of the Finance Act, 2013 was unsustainable, in favour of the assessee. The amount paid under the Scheme remained non-refundable under Section 109 of the Finance Act, 2013.

Issue (ii): Whether the demand was barred by limitation and whether invocation of the extended period, interest and penalty was sustainable.

Analysis: The relevant date under Section 73 had to be determined return-period-wise. The show-cause notice was issued after expiry of the normal limitation period, including for the final return period. The legal fiction in Section 111(3) of the Finance Act, 2013 only attracted the recovery machinery under Section 73 and did not substitute the VCES declaration date for the relevant date or restart limitation. Invocation of the extended period required proof of fraud, collusion, wilful misstatement, suppression of facts, or contravention with intent to evade tax. Since the transactions were traceable from documentary and statutory records and the dispute concerned their legal treatment, the requisite deliberate suppression was not established.

Conclusion: The entire demand was time-barred because the extended period was not invocable; the consequential interest and penalty under Section 78 of the Finance Act, 1994 could not survive, in favour of the assessee.

Final Conclusion: The VCES rejection and the confirmed fiscal liabilities could not be sustained, while the remittance already made under the VCES remained unavailable for refund.

Issues: Whether the importer rebutted the presumption that the incidence of countervailing duty was passed on to customers, entitling it to payment of the refund.

Analysis: Under the Customs Act, the importer bears the burden of rebutting the presumption that duty was passed on. The evidence included invoices, balance sheets and a chartered accountant's certificate. The invoices did not reflect recovery of countervailing duty from buyers. Non-claiming of the duty as expenditure was not, by itself, proof that its burden was passed on. The applicable Board circular supported reliance on the certificate, particularly alongside the books of account.

Conclusion: The presumption was rebutted and the refund was payable to the assessee. No substantial question of law arose.

Ratio Decidendi: The presumption that duty has been passed on may be rebutted by a chartered accountant's certificate supported by accounting records and invoices; the certificate cannot be disregarded contrary to the applicable Board circular.

Issues: (i) Validity of the second show cause notice without a document identification number; (ii) Whether a service tax demand can rest solely on a mismatch between balance sheet figures and returns; (iii) Entitlement to construction service abatement; (iv) Admissibility of disputed Cenvat credit on merits; (v) Applicability of the extended limitation period.

Issue (i): Validity of the second show cause notice without a document identification number.

Analysis: The binding departmental circulars require specified communications to bear a document identification number unless an exception applies. A communication lacking one is invalid under those instructions, although it remains effective until set aside by a competent court or authority.

Conclusion: The second notice must be treated as never issued, and the demand based on it cannot stand. The issue is in favour of the assessee.

Issue (ii): Whether a service tax demand can rest solely on a mismatch between balance sheet figures and returns.

Analysis: Construction revenue may be recognised in accounts proportionately to project completion, whereas the point of taxation arises when an invoice is issued or payment is received, whichever is earlier. Reconciliation requires adjustment for relevant advances and invoices and consideration of applicable abatements and exemptions.

Conclusion: A demand based solely on the mismatch cannot be sustained. The issue is in favour of the assessee.

Issue (iii): Entitlement to construction service abatement.

Analysis: The notification requires that no Cenvat credit be taken on inputs and that land value be included in the amount charged. The returns showed credit on input services rather than inputs, and the agreements produced included land value. The department bore the burden of establishing that the conditions were breached.

Conclusion: The assessee is entitled to the abatement. The issue is in favour of the assessee.

Issue (iv): Admissibility of disputed Cenvat credit on merits.

Analysis: The credit determination followed invoice-wise verification of the supporting documents and payment records. No reason was found to disturb that verification.

Conclusion: On merits, the disallowance of Cenvat credit of Rs. 1,04,36,669 was upheld. The issue is against the assessee on merits.

Issue (v): Applicability of the extended limitation period.

Analysis: The relevant accounts had been audited, and returns and audited balance sheets had been supplied to the department. The accounting basis explained the mismatch, and credit reversals had been made. Extended limitation requires more than mere inaction: conscious and deliberate withholding of information must be established.

Conclusion: Extended limitation was wrongly invoked, and both notices are time-barred. The issue is in favour of the assessee.

Final Conclusion: No demand under either notice survives, including the disputed credit recovery and associated interest and penalties; the adverse credit finding on merits does not overcome the limitation bar.

Ratio Decidendi: Extended limitation cannot be invoked merely for non-payment or inaction where the relevant facts were disclosed to and known by the department, absent conscious and deliberate withholding of information.

Issues: (i) Whether the assessee was liable under the reverse charge mechanism for manpower supply and works contract services received from subcontractors; (ii) whether the extended period of limitation and penalty for suppression were sustainable.

Issue (i): Whether the assessee was liable under the reverse charge mechanism for manpower supply and works contract services received from subcontractors.

Analysis: Notification No. 30/2012-ST allocated specified portions of service tax liability to recipients of those services. The definition of intermediary excludes a person providing the main service. The assessee contracted to provide the services to public sector undertakings and engaged subcontractors, with no direct service arrangement between the subcontractors and the ultimate customers.

Conclusion: The assessee was liable under reverse charge on the services received from subcontractors; payment of tax as provider and revenue neutrality did not extinguish that liability. The issue was decided against the assessee on merits.

Issue (ii): Whether the extended period of limitation and penalty for suppression were sustainable.

Analysis: Invocation of the extended period requires a prescribed ground involving intent to evade; suppression must be deliberate. Revenue neutrality arising from credit available to the same assessee bears on that intent. The assessee was registered and regularly filed returns, while incorrect self-assessment alone did not establish deliberate suppression; best judgment assessment was available for incorrect self-assessment.

Conclusion: The extended period and penalty under Section 78 were unsustainable, and the demand was time-barred. The issue was decided in favour of the assessee.

Final Conclusion: Reverse-charge liability was established in principle, but the demand and related penalty could not be sustained on the limitation finding.

Ratio Decidendi: For invocation of the extended limitation period, revenue neutrality for the same assessee negates intent to evade, and incorrect self-assessment alone does not establish deliberate suppression.

Issues: Whether the assessment, rectification and appellate orders were vitiated by failure to consider the claimed correction of reverse-charge reporting.

Analysis: The claimed correction concerned an erroneous GSTR-1 entry, which the petitioner sought to amend in September 2021. The correction was permitted under law, but the assessing authority had overlooked it. Fresh consideration requires verification of the amended returns, a hearing and a reasoned speaking order.

Conclusion: The challenged orders were vitiated by non-application of mind. The claimed correction and tax liability remain for fresh adjudication.

Ratio Decidendi: Failure to consider a legally permissible correction of a return can vitiate an assessment for non-application of mind.

Issues: Whether confirmation of the provisional attachment of the immovable property as proceeds of crime was justified.

Analysis: The Prevention of Money Laundering Act, 2002 provides for confirmation of attachment and confiscation of property involved in money laundering. The appellant had been convicted of a scheduled offence involving a commercial quantity of drugs. The claimed masonry income was unsupported by income-tax returns or other proof of its amount. An agreement to sell ancestral property was not accompanied by a sale deed or evidence of the claimed instalment payments. Cash deposits remained unexplained, and a withdrawal of Rs. 2.50 lakh coincided with execution of the sale deed for the attached property.

Conclusion: The property remained subject to attachment as proceeds of crime.

Issues: (i) Whether the supply of deep freezers to dealers constituted a deemed sale rather than a taxable service; (ii) Whether the refundable security deposits constituted consideration for a taxable service; (iii) Whether the extended period of limitation could be invoked for the service tax demand.

Issue (i): Whether the supply of deep freezers to dealers constituted a deemed sale rather than a taxable service.

Analysis: The Finance Act, 1994 excludes a deemed sale under Article 366(29A) of the Constitution from the definition of service, while treating a transfer of goods without transfer of the right to use them as a declared service. The agreements gave dealers exclusive use and possession of the freezers during their term; the supplier retained ownership and a right to recover the freezers on termination.

Conclusion: The supply constituted a deemed sale rather than a taxable service, in favour of the assessee.

Issue (ii): Whether the refundable security deposits constituted consideration for a taxable service.

Analysis: Taxable consideration must have a nexus with a service. The one-time, interest-free deposits were refundable on termination, subject to a deduction of 20% of the freezer value. The absence of an actual refund did not negate the contractual provision for refund.

Conclusion: The deposits were not consideration for taxable services, in favour of the assessee.

Issue (iii): Whether the extended period of limitation could be invoked for the service tax demand.

Analysis: Invocation of the extended period required evidence of a positive act of suppression with intent to evade tax. The department bore that burden. Registration for other service tax liabilities did not by itself establish suppression concerning an activity for which no taxable service was found.

Conclusion: The extended period could not be invoked, in favour of the assessee.

Final Conclusion: The freezer arrangement and associated deposits do not attract service tax, and the demand is time-barred.

Ratio Decidendi: A transfer of exclusive possession and the right to use goods constitutes a deemed sale excluded from the definition of service.

Issues: Whether penalty under Section 129 could be imposed on the entire consignment where valid documents covered part of the goods and only an excess quantity was undocumented.

Analysis: Section 129 permits detention and penalty for goods transported in contravention of the statutory requirements, but the penalty must correspond to the nature and extent of the contravention established from the record. The tax invoice and e-way bill covered 418 pieces, while only 32 additional pieces were found without supporting documents. No cogent material established that the documented quantity lacked valid documents, that the documents were false, or that the underlying transaction was fictitious. Detection of undocumented excess goods did not by itself render the entire consignment undocumented. Although separate proof of dishonest intention is not indispensable for action under Section 129, deliberate tax evasion in respect of the documented goods could not be presumed without an adequate factual foundation.

Conclusion: Penalty was rightly confined to the excess undocumented goods, and the order restricting the penalty to that quantity was sustained.

Issues: (i) Whether a writ petition can reopen a custody issue already determined in an earlier High Court proceeding; (ii) Whether setting aside cognizance for want of a pre-cognizance hearing invalidated further remand or entitled the accused to default bail where the prosecution complaint had been filed within the statutory period.

Issue (i): Whether a writ petition can reopen a custody issue already determined in an earlier High Court proceeding.

Analysis: The earlier decision had already addressed the legality of continued custody after cognizance was set aside and had left open the remedy of seeking regular bail. The subsequent dismissal of the special leave petition did not displace that determination. Reagitating the same custody issue in a fresh writ petition would impermissibly seek appellate review of the earlier decision.

Conclusion: The custody issue could not be reopened in the writ petition, against the petitioner.

Issue (ii): Whether setting aside cognizance for want of a pre-cognizance hearing invalidated further remand or entitled the accused to default bail where the prosecution complaint had been filed within the statutory period.

Analysis: Section 187 of the Bharatiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita, 2023 requires completion of investigation and filing of the complaint within the prescribed period. A timely complaint ends any claim to statutory or default bail; taking cognizance within that period is not an additional requirement. Setting aside cognizance solely for non-compliance with the hearing requirement under Section 223 did not nullify the timely complaint or disrupt continuity of judicial custody pending fresh consideration of cognizance. The proper remedy was an application for regular bail on merits.

Conclusion: Further remand was lawful and the accused was not entitled to release on default bail merely because cognizance had been set aside, against the petitioner.

Final Conclusion: Setting aside cognizance for procedural non-compliance does not sever judicial custody where the prosecution complaint was timely filed; release may be sought through regular bail on merits.

Ratio Decidendi: A prosecution complaint filed after completion of investigation within the statutory period extinguishes entitlement to default bail notwithstanding delayed or set-aside cognizance, and custody may continue under pre-cognizance remand powers pending fresh cognizance.

Issues: (i) Whether service tax could be demanded on composite construction works contracts involving material and labour for periods before 01.06.2007; (ii) Whether refund of service tax paid on subcontract construction work was admissible without unjust enrichment.

Issue (i): Whether service tax could be demanded on composite construction works contracts involving material and labour for periods before 01.06.2007.

Analysis: The construction contracts involved both supply of goods and labour, and VAT had been discharged on the goods component. Applying the governing position on indivisible composite works contracts, such activities could not be vivisected and classified under another taxable-service category before works contract service became taxable from 01.06.2007. All the demand periods were prior to that date.

Conclusion: The service-tax demands for the pre-01.06.2007 period were unsustainable. This issue is decided in favour of the assessee.

Issue (ii): Whether refund of service tax paid on subcontract construction work was admissible without unjust enrichment.

Analysis: The payment was made despite the absence of service-tax liability for the relevant period. The principal contractor's certification of payment of service tax for the relevant financial year was accepted as sufficient, and quarterly or project-wise payment particulars were not necessary. The record did not establish any unjust enrichment.

Conclusion: Refund of Rs. 1,24,681 was admissible. This issue is decided in favour of the assessee.

Final Conclusion: Composite construction works performed before 01.06.2007 could not sustain service-tax recovery under another taxable category, and the erroneous tax payment on the subcontract work was refundable without unjust enrichment.

Ratio Decidendi: An indivisible composite works contract involving transfer of property in goods cannot be subjected to service tax under another taxable category for the period before works contract service became taxable.

Issues: (i) Whether the value of material and spare parts separately sold while providing maintenance and repair service was includible in the taxable value despite availment of CENVAT credit; and (ii) Whether the extended period of limitation was invocable for the service-tax demand.

Issue (i): Whether the value of material and spare parts separately sold while providing maintenance and repair service was includible in the taxable value despite availment of CENVAT credit.

Analysis: Section 67 of the Finance Act, 1994 confined valuation to the gross amount charged for services provided and did not include amounts charged for materials consumed or sold. Explanation 1(vi) to Section 67 expressly excluded, until 18.04.2006, the cost of parts or other materials sold to customers during maintenance or repair service. Rule 3(1) read with Rule 2(k)(ii) of the CENVAT Credit Rules, 2004 permitted credit on duty-paid spares and accessories used as inputs for output service, without any applicable restriction. The show-cause notice did not seek recovery for wrongful availment of CENVAT credit; therefore, the conditions of Notification No. 12/2003-ST dated 20.06.2003 could not make the value of separately sold materials taxable.

Conclusion: The value of separately sold materials and spare parts was not includible in the taxable value of maintenance and repair service, and availment of CENVAT credit did not sustain the demand. This issue was decided in favour of the assessee.

Issue (ii): Whether the extended period of limitation was invocable for the service-tax demand.

Analysis: The service provider had filed ST-3 returns, paid service tax on the services rendered, and the Department had knowledge of the relevant facts from the 2007 audit. No wilful suppression was established.

Conclusion: The extended period of limitation was not invocable. This issue was decided in favour of the assessee.

Final Conclusion: The service-tax demand and consequential penalty lacked legal sustenance.

Issues: (i) Whether concurrent disciplinary findings of professional misconduct for failure to report audit irregularities warranted interference under Article 226; and (ii) Whether the punishment of reprimand and monetary penalty was disproportionate.

Issue (i): Whether concurrent disciplinary findings of professional misconduct for failure to report audit irregularities warranted interference under Article 226.

Analysis: Judicial review under Article 226 is confined to examining whether the disciplinary decision-making process suffers from a recognised legal infirmity, perversity, or legal unsustainability; it does not permit reappreciation of evidence merely because another view is possible. The disciplinary authorities had assessed the audit scope, contemporaneous reports, and explanation, and found that the relevant irregularities were not reported during the audit period. Subsequent communications did not displace that finding.

Conclusion: The concurrent findings of professional misconduct warranted no interference in writ jurisdiction; against the petitioner.

Issue (ii): Whether the punishment of reprimand and monetary penalty was disproportionate.

Analysis: Failure to flag the relevant transactions in the audit reports was treated as gross negligence in the discharge of concurrent-audit responsibilities. The sanction was not so disproportionate as to justify intervention in judicial review.

Conclusion: The punishment was not disproportionate and warranted no interference; against the petitioner.

Final Conclusion: The disciplinary determination of professional misconduct and the sanction imposed remain operative.

Ratio Decidendi: Judicial review under Article 226 does not permit reappreciation of concurrent disciplinary findings absent a recognised legal infirmity or perversity, and a sanction that is not disproportionate is not liable to be disturbed.

Issues: Whether the setting aside of tax and penalty under Section 129(3) despite discrepancies in the physical quantity of goods and the accompanying e-way bill records was justified.

Analysis: The availability of an invoice, e-way bill and bilty does not preclude verification of whether the goods actually transported correspond with the declared quantity, source and documentary trail. The physical verification recorded supplier-wise and aggregate weight discrepancies, which remained unsupported by any contemporaneous objection, independent weighment report, or technical evidence establishing inaccuracy of the departmental measurement. The discrepancies were reinforced by the unexplained sequence of generation and cancellation of e-way bills by different entities for the same invoice number and quantity. These circumstances required a cumulative assessment and could not be treated as isolated technical or minor errors. The documentary record and the physical movement of goods were not satisfactorily reconciled, establishing an intent to evade tax.

Conclusion: The appellate order setting aside the tax and penalty was unsustainable; restoration of the original order under Section 129(3) was warranted, against the assessee and in favour of Revenue.