Apprentice status and date-of-birth proof under standing orders were enforced against the claim in writ jurisdiction.

An apprentice governed by the Apprentices Act, 1961 was held not to become a workman merely because certified standing orders used inclusive language, since the special statutory scheme treats an apprentice as a trainee and not an employee for hire or reward. The Court also upheld the employer's insistence on documentary proof of age at entry under the standing order, and refused to treat the apprenticeship record of birth as conclusive where later engagement was fresh, supporting records were withheld, and the age was disputed. A contested date of birth could not be conclusively determined in writ jurisdiction under Article 226, so relief was refused.

---

---

Issues: (i) Whether an apprentice governed by the Apprentices Act, 1961 can be treated as a workman under the Industrial Employment (Standing Orders) Act, 1946 and the employer's certified standing orders. (ii) Whether the petitioner could insist on acceptance of the date of birth recorded during apprenticeship and obtain relief in writ jurisdiction despite the employer's demand for proof of age under the standing order and the dispute regarding the true date of birth.

Issue (i): Whether an apprentice governed by the Apprentices Act, 1961 can be treated as a workman under the Industrial Employment (Standing Orders) Act, 1946 and the employer's certified standing orders.

Analysis: The Apprentices Act treats an apprentice undergoing apprenticeship training as a trainee and not a worker. Although the standing orders included an apprentice within the definition of workman, that definition had to be read in the light of the scheme and overriding effect of the later and special enactment governing apprentices. A person can fall within the standing-order definition only if he is employed in the establishment to do the kinds of work specified for hire or reward, and a trade apprentice governed by the Apprentices Act does not acquire that status merely by the label of apprentice. The inclusionary language in the standing order could not override the statutory command that an apprentice under the Apprentices Act is not a worker.

Conclusion: An apprentice governed by the Apprentices Act, 1961 was not treated as a workman for the purpose of defeating the statutory regime applicable to apprentices; the point was decided against the petitioner.

Issue (ii): Whether the petitioner could insist on acceptance of the date of birth recorded during apprenticeship and obtain relief in writ jurisdiction despite the employer's demand for proof of age under the standing order and the dispute regarding the true date of birth.

Analysis: The certified standing order required a workman at the time of entry into service to produce documentary proof of date of birth in the prescribed manner. The date of birth entered during apprenticeship was not treated as sacrosanct or conclusive, especially when the later appointment was a fresh engagement and the petitioner had not produced the prescribed certificates. The Court also treated the withholding of relevant educational records and the existence of conflicting material as indicating suppression, and held that fraud vitiates the claim to rely on earlier entries. In such circumstances, principles of natural justice could not be used to stultify the statutory requirement, and a disputed question of birth date could not be finally resolved in writ proceedings under Article 226.

Conclusion: The petitioner was not entitled to have the earlier recorded date of birth treated as conclusive or to obtain writ relief on that basis; the point was decided against the petitioner.

Final Conclusion: The appeal failed because the employer was entitled to insist on proof of age under the certified standing order, the petitioner could not rely on the apprenticeship entry as conclusive evidence, and the disputed age question was not fit for adjudication in writ jurisdiction.

Ratio Decidendi: An apprentice governed by the Apprentices Act does not become a workman merely because a standing order uses inclusive language, and a certified standing order requiring proof of age at entry can be enforced in writ proceedings unless the claimant establishes an undisputed and properly proved date of birth.

---