Issues: (i) Whether the IBC moratorium barred the arbitral tribunal from entertaining the second application under Section 17 and modifying the status quo arrangement while the corporate debtor's counterclaim was pending. (ii) Whether the tribunal's erroneous statement of the scope of the Section 29A extension order invalidated the impugned order. (iii) Whether the Adjudicating Authority had exclusive jurisdiction under Section 60(5)(c) read with Section 63 of the IBC.

Issue (i): Whether the IBC moratorium barred the arbitral tribunal from entertaining the second application under Section 17 and modifying the status quo arrangement while the corporate debtor's counterclaim was pending.

Analysis: Section 14(1)(a) of the Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code, 2016 prohibits proceedings against a corporate debtor, but does not prohibit proceedings initiated by it. A counterclaim by the corporate debtor may augment its estate if successful and does not impose a pecuniary liability upon it if unsuccessful. The expression "by or against" in Section 60(6) cannot be read into Section 14(1)(a) to create a bar on the counterclaim. The termination of the development agreement preceded the CIRP; the contractual conditions for possession had not been fulfilled, and the terminated agreement was not property of the corporate debtor protected by Section 14(1)(d). The interim status quo arrangement was a voluntary pro tem measure and could be reconsidered as an arbitral interim measure in aid of the surviving counterclaim.

Conclusion: The moratorium did not deprive the arbitral tribunal of jurisdiction to entertain the second Section 17 application and modify the status quo arrangement in relation to the counterclaim. The issue is decided against the petitioner.

Issue (ii): Whether the tribunal's erroneous statement of the scope of the Section 29A extension order invalidated the impugned order.

Analysis: The Section 29A extension order had attained finality and permitted continuation of the corporate debtor's counterclaim, not the claim against it. Although the impugned order incorrectly described that order as permitting both claims to proceed, the second interim application was referable to the counterclaim. The misstatement therefore did not affect the tribunal's jurisdiction to determine the appropriate interlocutory arrangement.

Conclusion: The erroneous description of the Section 29A order did not invalidate the impugned order. The issue is decided against the petitioner.

Issue (iii): Whether the Adjudicating Authority had exclusive jurisdiction under Section 60(5)(c) read with Section 63 of the IBC.

Analysis: Section 60(5)(c) confers limited residuary jurisdiction over disputes arising out of or relating to insolvency resolution. That jurisdiction is unavailable for a contractual termination founded on pre-insolvency non-performance and unconnected with the CIRP. Since the termination notice preceded the CIRP and was not occasioned by insolvency, the necessary nexus for invoking the Adjudicating Authority's jurisdiction was absent. Consequently, the jurisdictional bar under Section 63 did not arise.

Conclusion: The Adjudicating Authority did not have exclusive jurisdiction, and the arbitral tribunal's jurisdiction was not ousted. The issue is decided against the petitioner.

Final Conclusion: The arbitral process may continue on the corporate debtor's counterclaim, with interlocutory measures remaining within the arbitral tribunal's competence; the IBC moratorium neither preserves the terminated development agreement as estate property nor transfers this contractual dispute exclusively to the Adjudicating Authority.

Ratio Decidendi: The IBC moratorium and the Adjudicating Authority's residuary jurisdiction do not displace arbitral adjudication of a corporate debtor's own counterclaim where the contractual termination preceded, and is unrelated to, the CIRP.

Issues: Whether bleaching, dyeing and processing of fabrics received from handloom or powerloom manufacturers on job-work basis constitute manufacture attracting textile cess under Section 5A of the Textiles Committee Act, 1963.

Analysis: Section 5A levies cess on textiles and textile machinery manufactured in India, while exempting textiles manufactured out of handloom or powerloom industry. As "manufacture" is undefined in the Textiles Committee Act, 1963, its specialised definition under another enactment cannot be imported absent legislative reference, incorporation, or statutes being in pari materia. On its common-parlance meaning in the statutory context, bleaching and dyeing undertaken on job-work basis merely process and refine fabrics supplied by powerloom or handloom manufacturers and returned to them; they do not result in manufacture of a new textile by the processor.

Conclusion: The issue is decided in favour of the assessee: job-work processing of the fabrics does not amount to manufacture under Section 5A of the Textiles Committee Act, 1963, and the processor is not liable to textile cess.

Issues: Whether the appellant's residual liability to the assignee should be fixed for a full and final settlement despite unresolved challenges to the NPA classification and assignment of debt.

Analysis: The validity of the NPA classification, the assignment, and the basis for calculating compensation on debt value or acquisition value were expressly left open. The report had assessed possible returns on the assignee's investment after accounting for payments already made, while relevant financial information and borrowing details were not furnished by the assignee. In the peculiar circumstances, including the need to preserve the running concern, equitable balancing warranted a conclusive monetary settlement rather than adjudication of the disputed legal issues.

Conclusion: The appellant shall pay an additional Rs.125 crores within 12 weeks, over and above Rs.250 crores already paid, as full and final settlement of the assignee's debt claims. Upon payment, the respondents must release the securities and guarantees and return the title deeds; the pending insolvency and debt-recovery proceedings shall stand disposed of. On default, the respondents may revive proceedings and the appellant will lose the benefit of the settlement directions.

Issues: (i) Whether penalty under Section 129(3) can be sustained where the physical verification confirms that the goods fully match the valid tax invoice and e-way bill; (ii) Whether an uncorroborated driver's statement can establish that goods were loaded from an undeclared place of business.

Issue (i): Whether penalty under Section 129(3) can be sustained where the physical verification confirms that the goods fully match the valid tax invoice and e-way bill.

Analysis: Section 129 is an anti-evasion measure applicable to movement of goods unsupported by genuine statutory documents. Physical verification recorded no discrepancy in the description, quantity, quality, weight or value of the goods vis-a -vis the tax invoice and e-way bill. The declared dispatch premises stood approved as an additional place of business, the vehicle was travelling towards the declared destination, and no material showed diversion, unaccounted stock, or an unrecorded supply. A technical or administrative variation, without evidence of an intent to evade tax, could not establish the basis for penalty.

Conclusion: The penalty under Section 129(3) was unsustainable; this issue was decided in favour of the assessee.

Issue (ii): Whether an uncorroborated driver's statement can establish that goods were loaded from an undeclared place of business.

Analysis: The allegation of loading from an undeclared location rested principally on the driver's statement, without corroborative evidence and without an opportunity to cross-examine the driver. That statement could not override the approved registration particulars and the certified evidence concerning operation of the weighbridge. The Revenue did not produce contemporaneous verification material, photographs, independent witness evidence, or other objective proof to support its allegation.

Conclusion: The driver's uncorroborated statement was insufficient to prove the alleged contravention; this issue was decided in favour of the assessee.

Final Conclusion: The statutory preconditions for imposing a transit penalty were not established, and the penalty remained unsustainable.

Ratio Decidendi: A penalty under Section 129(3) cannot rest on technical irregularities or an uncorroborated driver's statement where valid transit documents correspond with the goods and the evidence does not establish an intent to evade tax.

Issues: Whether a short administrative delay in posting genuine stock transactions, supported by contemporaneous records and statutory returns, constitutes failure to account for goods warranting confiscation under Section 130(1)(ii).

Analysis: Section 130(1)(ii) imposes the severe consequence of confiscation only where the facts establish deliberate tax evasion through unaccounted goods. The disputed stock was supported by a pre-survey invoice, was subsequently verifiable in the regular books and statutory returns, and the delay in posting was attributable to the accountant's temporary absence. A delayed entry of a genuine commercial transaction is distinct from non-accountal intended for clandestine removal. The physical-stock allegation was also based on visual approximations rather than standard weighment, while the separate assessment under Section 74 substantially accepted the explanation and treated only a minor quantity as discrepant. Treating the same transactions as reconcilable under Section 74 and as confiscable under Section 130 was legally inconsistent.

Conclusion: A short, bona fide bookkeeping delay supported by contemporaneous commercial records does not amount to unaccounted goods or a confiscable offence under Section 130(1)(ii).

Issues: (i) Whether income discovered during reassessment may be assessed when no addition is made on the original ground for reopening. (ii) Whether the trading loss on penny-stock transactions was allowable.

Issue (i): Whether income discovered during reassessment may be assessed when no addition is made on the original ground for reopening.

Analysis: The amended Section 147 of the Income-tax Act, 1961 omits the conjunctive words in the earlier provision on which the prior judicial interpretation depended. Its Explanation addresses escaped income arising from issues subsequently noticed during reassessment and dispenses with compliance with Section 148A for those issues.

Conclusion: Such subsequently discovered income may be assessed even if no addition is made on the original ground. The issue is decided against the assessee.

Issue (ii): Whether the trading loss on penny-stock transactions was allowable.

Analysis: The assessment identified a substantial difference between the purchase and sale prices and price movements unrelated to the company's financial performance or the market index. The assessee provided no evidence to dispute the findings underlying the treatment of the transactions as colourable.

Conclusion: The trading loss is disallowed. The issue is decided against the assessee.

Final Conclusion: The reassessment may encompass the subsequently discovered income, and the trading-loss disallowance stands.

Ratio Decidendi: Under amended Section 147, income from an issue discovered during reassessment may be assessed without an addition on the original ground or separate compliance with Section 148A for the subsequently discovered issue.

Issues: (i) Whether CENVAT credit is admissible on services used to set up the co-generation plant; (ii) Whether CENVAT credit is admissible on the works contract services involving dismantling, structural work and installation of an RCC chimney; (iii) Whether the extended limitation period applies to the disallowed credit demand.

Issue (i): Whether CENVAT credit is admissible on services used to set up the co-generation plant.

Analysis: The definition of input service in the Cenvat Credit Rules, 2004 was amended to omit the expression "setting up" from 1 April 2011. The adopted precedents addressed services used as part of modernisation and renovation of a co-generation plant notwithstanding that omission.

Conclusion: Credit on the input services used for the co-generation plant is admissible, in favour of the assessee.

Issue (ii): Whether CENVAT credit is admissible on the works contract services involving dismantling, structural work and installation of an RCC chimney.

Analysis: The input service definition excludes specified works contract and construction services used for buildings or civil structures. The invoices described works contract or construction services, and the activities included dismantling existing equipment and construction and installation of an RCC chimney. The dismantling and erection of plant items were also described as erection, commissioning or installation services.

Conclusion: Credit on the disputed services is inadmissible, against the assessee.

Issue (iii): Whether the extended limitation period applies to the disallowed credit demand.

Analysis: The allegation was that the credit had not been brought to the department's notice. The assessee had regularly filed returns showing the credit, and the relevant invoices identified the services as works contract services.

Conclusion: The extended period is inapplicable; the demand is confined to the normal limitation period, in favour of the assessee.

Final Conclusion: Credit remains available for the co-generation plant services, while the surviving works contract credit demand is confined to the normal limitation period.

Ratio Decidendi: Omission of "setting up" from the input service definition does not itself bar credit for services used in modernisation or renovation of a co-generation plant.

Issues: (i) Whether manpower supply designated as "Sweeper" or "Paryavaran Mitra" under the contract is eligible for exemption under Serial No. 3 of Notification No. 12/2017-Central Tax (Rate) dated 28.06.2017; (ii) Whether the contracted manpower supply constitutes "pure services" for the purposes of Serial No. 3 of Notification No. 12/2017-Central Tax (Rate) dated 28.06.2017; (iii) If the supply is not exempt under Serial No. 3 of Notification No. 12/2017-Central Tax (Rate) dated 28.06.2017, what is the applicable GST rate and tax liability?

Issue (i): Whether manpower supply designated as "Sweeper" or "Paryavaran Mitra" under the contract is eligible for exemption under Serial No. 3 of Notification No. 12/2017-Central Tax (Rate) dated 28.06.2017.

Analysis: The exemption requires pure services supplied to a specified recipient in relation to functions entrusted to a municipality under Article 243W of the Constitution of India. The contract covered several categories of personnel and activities, and the material did not establish contractual or factual segregation of an independently identifiable sanitation-related supply satisfying all exemption conditions. A personnel designation or the recipient's request for non-levy of GST cannot itself create exemption.

Conclusion: The contracted manpower supply was not eligible for the exemption under Serial No. 3 of Notification No. 12/2017-Central Tax (Rate) dated 28.06.2017. This is against the assessee.

Issue (ii): Whether the contracted manpower supply constitutes "pure services" for the purposes of Serial No. 3 of Notification No. 12/2017-Central Tax (Rate) dated 28.06.2017.

Analysis: Mere supply of manpower, without any supply of goods, falls within pure services. However, pure-service character is only one condition for exemption; the remaining conditions concerning the recipient and nexus with a municipal function must also be established.

Conclusion: The manpower supply constitutes pure services. This finding is in favour of the assessee, but does not by itself establish eligibility for exemption.

Issue (iii): If the supply is not exempt under Serial No. 3 of Notification No. 12/2017-Central Tax (Rate) dated 28.06.2017, what is the applicable GST rate and tax liability?

Analysis: A supply not covered by an exemption is taxable at the rate applicable to its service classification. On the stated facts, the manpower outsourcing supply attracted GST at 18%, comprising CGST at 9% and SGST at 9% for an intra-State supply.

Conclusion: GST is payable at 18% on the supply. This is against the assessee.

Final Conclusion: The exemption claim fails because the overall contractual arrangement and supporting material did not demonstrate a separately identifiable supply meeting every condition prescribed for the municipal-function exemption.

Ratio Decidendi: A manpower supply may constitute pure services, but exemption for services connected with municipal functions is available only where the supplier establishes fulfilment of every prescribed condition; job nomenclature, contractual GST clauses, or a recipient's request cannot determine statutory taxability.

Issues: (i) Eligibility for threshold exemption under Notification No. 33/2012-ST dated 20.06.2012 for financial year 2016-17; (ii) Sustainability of the service-tax demand without correct classification of membership-fee and commission receipts; and (iii) Validity of invoking the extended limitation period under the proviso to Section 73(1) of the Finance Act, 1994.

Issue (i): Eligibility for threshold exemption under Notification No. 33/2012-ST dated 20.06.2012 for financial year 2016-17.

Analysis: The profit-and-loss records showed revenue from operations of Rs. 9,16,756.40 in financial year 2015-16, below the prescribed Rs. 10 lakh threshold. The condition for the small service-provider exemption was therefore fulfilled.

Conclusion: Threshold exemption for financial year 2016-17 was available in favour of the assessee.

Issue (ii): Sustainability of the service-tax demand without correct classification of membership-fee and commission receipts.

Analysis: The receipts comprised membership fees and commission income. The demand proceeded on the assumption that these receipts represented legal and administrative services without determining or correctly classifying the taxable service. A service-tax demand could not rest on that unverified classification.

Conclusion: The demand based on unclassified receipts was unsustainable in favour of the assessee.

Issue (iii): Validity of invoking the extended limitation period under the proviso to Section 73(1) of the Finance Act, 1994.

Analysis: The notice for financial year 2016-17 was issued in October 2021 by invoking the extended period. Non-registration, non-payment, and non-filing of returns alone did not establish a positive and deliberate act of suppression or misstatement with intent to evade tax. The order contained no specific finding of such conduct, and the dispute was interpretational, supporting a bona fide belief.

Conclusion: Invocation of the extended limitation period was invalid, rendering the notice time-barred in favour of the assessee.

Final Conclusion: The service-tax demand and consequential interest and penalties lack legal basis.

Ratio Decidendi: Extended limitation under the Finance Act, 1994 requires a positive and deliberate suppression or misstatement with intent to evade tax; mere non-payment or a bona fide interpretational belief is insufficient.

Issues: Whether the extended limitation period for recovery of service tax could be invoked where the Department had already issued an earlier show-cause notice concerning the assessee's identical activities.

Analysis: The proviso to Section 73(1) of the Finance Act, 1994 permits an extended limitation period only where suppression of facts, collusion, or wilful misstatement with intent to evade tax is established. The earlier show-cause notice demonstrated that the Department was already aware of the nature of the assessee's activities and the basis of the demand. In the absence of the requisite ingredients for invoking the extended period, the subsequent notice for the disputed financial year, issued beyond the normal limitation period, was time-barred.

Conclusion: The extended period of limitation was not invocable, and the impugned show-cause notice was barred by limitation. The issue was decided in favour of the assessee.

Issues: (i) Whether service tax was payable on the lease of a plot with a timber chalet/villa constructed as an individual residence; and (ii) Whether the purchaser's refund claim was within limitation and eligible to be considered under Section 11B of the Central Excise Act, 1944.

Issue (i): Whether service tax was payable on the lease of a plot with a timber chalet/villa constructed as an individual residence.

Analysis: The statutory concept of a residential complex under Section 65(91a) of the Finance Act, 1994 does not bring an independently constructed residential unit for the buyer's personal use within the taxable category merely because it is situated in a larger housing layout. The lease arrangements established that the plot and timber chalet were provided in perpetuity for individual residential use. The settled construction-service principle excluding individual residential houses from levy was applicable. A dismissal of a civil appeal, after appellate jurisdiction had been invoked, attracted the doctrine of merger and operated as binding precedent notwithstanding the absence of reasons.

Conclusion: No service tax was payable on the individual timber chalet/villa; the issue is decided in favour of the assessee.

Issue (ii): Whether the purchaser's refund claim was within limitation and eligible to be considered under Section 11B of the Central Excise Act, 1944.

Analysis: By Section 83 of the Finance Act, 1994, Section 11B of the Central Excise Act, 1944 applies to service-tax refunds. For a purchaser other than the service provider, the relevant date is the date of purchase of the service, evidenced by payment and the corresponding tax-bearing document. The tax burden was paid by the purchaser on 09.03.2015 and the refund application was filed on 01.02.2016, within one year. The purchaser had borne the tax incidence and had not passed it on to another person.

Conclusion: The refund claim was within limitation and is required to be considered in accordance with Section 11B of the Central Excise Act, 1944; the issue is decided in favour of the assessee.

Final Conclusion: The rejection of the refund claim on taxability and limitation grounds cannot be sustained, and the claim must be processed consistently with the determinations made.

Ratio Decidendi: A separately constructed individual residential dwelling for personal use does not become taxable construction of a residential complex merely because it is located within a common housing layout.

Issues: Whether revocation of the customs broker licence, forfeiture of security deposit, and penalty were sustainable for alleged contraventions of Regulations 1(4), 10(b), 10(d), and 10(e) of the Customs Brokers Licensing Regulations, 2018.

Analysis: Regulation 1(4) prohibits sale or transfer of a customs broker licence. Handling an import transaction referred by a clearing and forwarding agent did not establish that the licence had been sold or transferred. Likewise, dealing with stakeholders in an import transaction did not, by itself, establish that business was transacted through an unauthorised person under Regulation 10(b).

Analysis: The alleged quantity of over-debiting in the show-cause notice materially differed from the quantity ultimately attributed to the customs broker, whose role was confined to a negligible part of the imports and did not extend to the earlier consignments. Under Public Notice No. 66/2023, the actual debit entries and their verification were functions of the customs officers at the designated service centre and officers granting out-of-charge. No invalid or forged licence was supplied, and the evidence did not establish a failure to advise the importer or exercise due diligence under Regulations 10(d) and 10(e).

Conclusion: None of the alleged contraventions was established; the revocation of licence, forfeiture of security deposit, and penalty were legally unsustainable.

Issues: (i) Whether writ jurisdiction should be exercised to entertain a belated jurisdictional challenge to a show-cause notice after participation in adjudication; (ii) Whether the adjudication order was vitiated by denial of a reasonable opportunity of personal hearing.

Issue (i): Whether writ jurisdiction should be exercised to entertain a belated jurisdictional challenge to a show-cause notice after participation in adjudication.

Analysis: The extraordinary writ remedy was declined for a jurisdictional challenge raised after participation in the proceedings and substantial delay, particularly when an alternative statutory remedy was available. The jurisdictional objection was left to be addressed in the statutory adjudicatory process.

Conclusion: The jurisdictional challenge was not entertained, against the assessee.

Issue (ii): Whether the adjudication order was vitiated by denial of a reasonable opportunity of personal hearing.

Analysis: Section 75(5) requires a reasonable opportunity of hearing in adjudication. The notified hearing did not conclude the proceedings, yet no further hearing notice or date was provided for several months before an ex parte order was made on the basis of the reply. This denied the assessee a reasonable opportunity of personal hearing and breached principles of natural justice.

Conclusion: The adjudication order was unsustainable for denial of a reasonable opportunity of personal hearing, in favour of the assessee.

Final Conclusion: Fresh adjudication must be undertaken in accordance with law after affording hearing and addressing the jurisdictional objection under Section 74.

Ratio Decidendi: An adjudication order cannot be sustained where, after the notified hearing does not conclude the proceedings, no further hearing opportunity is given before an ex parte determination is made.

Issues: Whether compensation received under the BSNL Voluntary Retirement Scheme, 2019 is exempt under Section 10(10B) of the Income-tax Act, 1961.

Analysis: Section 10(10B) of the Income-tax Act, 1961 was applied to compensation received under BSNL VRS-2019. Identical claims by similarly placed BSNL employees had been accepted in earlier coordinate-bench decisions, and Revenue did not distinguish those decisions on facts or law. The applicable approach also accords with the obligation of tax authorities not to deny a lawful relief merely because the assessee was unaware of the entitlement.

Conclusion: Compensation received under BSNL VRS-2019 is exempt under Section 10(10B) of the Income-tax Act, 1961; taxable income and consequential refund are to be recomputed accordingly.

Issues: Whether penalty for misreporting under Section 270A of the Income-tax Act, 1961 could be sustained solely on disallowance of employees' PF/ESI contributions.

Analysis: Penalty for misreporting requires that the case fall within a specific category prescribed under Section 270A(9) of the Income-tax Act, 1961. A mere disallowance of a claim does not, by itself, establish misreporting. The record did not demonstrate that the delayed employees' PF/ESI contribution fell within any statutory category of misreporting.

Conclusion: The penalty for misreporting was unsustainable and was deleted, in favour of the assessee.

Issues: Whether the re-determination of FOB value pursuant to the unchallenged remand order, by applying Rules 5 to 8 of the Valuation Rules, 1988, warranted interference.

Analysis: The earlier remand order had attained finality and conclusively determined that the declared FOB values were rightly doubted, that the Revenue had discharged its burden regarding misdeclaration, and that the values required re-determination. The scope of remand was therefore confined to verifying whether the prescribed valuation procedure had been followed; the concluded question of re-determination could not be reopened. The Commissioner had considered the values of the different goods in detail and re-determined them under the applicable valuation rules.

Conclusion: The re-determination of FOB value was in accordance with the binding remand directions and required no interference.

Issues: (i) Whether service tax could be levied on a builder's construction of residential complex or works contract services before 1 July 2010; (ii) Whether service tax was payable on such services rendered from 1 July 2010.

Issue (i): Whether service tax could be levied on a builder's construction of residential complex or works contract services before 1 July 2010.

Analysis: The Explanation inserted in Section 65(105)(zzzzh) and Section 65(105)(zzzzq) by the Finance Act, 2010 treated specified construction intended for sale as a deemed service. The applicable circular treated a builder's pre-1 July 2010 construction as self-service. The deeming fiction widened the tax net and operated prospectively, applying equally to construction-of-complex and works-contract classifications.

Conclusion: No service tax was leviable under either classification for the period before 1 July 2010; the related demands and penalties were set aside, in favour of the assessee.

Issue (ii): Whether service tax was payable on such services rendered from 1 July 2010.

Analysis: From 1 July 2010, the amended statutory scheme brought covered builder services within taxability. The surviving demand related to the period from July 2010 to March 2011.

Conclusion: The service-tax demand of Rs. 9,96,156 with interest for July 2010 to March 2011 was confirmed, against the assessee.

Final Conclusion: The amendment governs builder services prospectively: pre-1 July 2010 demands under the two service categories do not survive, whereas tax liability arising after that date remains enforceable.

Ratio Decidendi: A statutory deeming provision bringing a builder's pre-completion construction for sale within the service-tax net applies prospectively from its stated effective date; before that date, the activity is self-service and cannot be taxed as either construction-of-complex or works-contract service.

Issues: (i) Whether the denial of an opportunity to rebut the verification report breached the principles of natural justice; (ii) Whether non-disclosure of gross receipts justified invocation of the extended period of limitation and imposition of penalties; (iii) Whether the composite maintenance-and-repair contracts were chargeable before 1 June 2007 and, thereafter, the applicable method for valuing the works-contract service.

Issue (i): Whether the denial of an opportunity to rebut the verification report breached the principles of natural justice.

Analysis: The remand directions required a reasonable opportunity of hearing and permitted additional evidence. Four hearings were fixed, and the assessee ultimately requested a decision on the existing written record. The verification report relied only on facts and calculations already forming part of the show-cause notice, and no specific inaccuracy in that report was identified.

Conclusion: No breach of the principles of natural justice was established; this issue is against the assessee.

Issue (ii): Whether non-disclosure of gross receipts justified invocation of the extended period of limitation and imposition of penalties.

Analysis: The receipts reflected in the service recipient's tax-deduction records exceeded the values declared in the service-tax returns. Service tax is chargeable on the gross amount charged and cannot be reduced by payments made to subcontractors. The failure to disclose the full consideration amounted to suppression of value.

Conclusion: The extended period of limitation was validly invoked. Penalties under Sections 76 and 77 remain sustainable, while the penalty under Section 78 is to be recomputed with the redetermined tax; this issue is against the assessee.

Issue (iii): Whether the composite maintenance-and-repair contracts were chargeable before 1 June 2007 and, thereafter, the applicable method for valuing the works-contract service.

Analysis: A composite contract involving services and materials is a works contract. Such contracts were not chargeable under the pre-existing taxable-service categories before works contract service was introduced with effect from 1 June 2007; consequently, the claimed pre-introduction abatement is immaterial. For the subsequent period, the composition scheme was unavailable because no option for it was established. As the value of goods transferred in execution of the contracts was not determinable, Rule 2A(ii) applies, under which maintenance and repair works are valued at 70% of the gross amount charged. Free supplies by the service recipient are excluded from the gross amount, while subcontractor payments are not deductible. The resulting amount is to receive cum-tax treatment, with tax already paid adjusted.

Conclusion: The demand for the period before 1 June 2007 is unsustainable. For the subsequent period, tax is payable on 70% of the gross amount charged, excluding free supplies and allowing cum-tax benefit; this issue is partly in favour of the assessee.

Final Conclusion: The enforceable tax liability is confined to the post-1 June 2007 works-contract period and must be recomputed on the prescribed valuation basis, with consequential revision of the Section 78 penalty.

Ratio Decidendi: A composite contract involving service and materials is chargeable as works contract service only from its statutory introduction; where composition was not elected and the goods value is not determinable, the prescribed percentage valuation applies.

Issues: Whether cash refund of service tax erroneously paid on invoices raised for a period in which no service was rendered is barred by the limitation under Section 11B of the Central Excise Act, 1944, or by the absence of a credit note under Rule 6(3) of the Service Tax Rules, 1994.

Analysis: Although invoices were issued and service tax was paid, no service was rendered during the relevant period. Rule 6(3) of the Service Tax Rules, 1994 permitted credit of tax paid where services were not rendered and imposed no time limit for taking that credit. Following the introduction of GST and repeal of the earlier service-tax regime, Section 142(5) of the Central Goods and Services Tax Act, 2017 required the amount otherwise available as credit to be refunded in cash. The limitation under Section 11B could not apply to such a transitional cash refund. A credit note was unnecessary because there was no contract, service, or payment from the service recipient during the period concerned.

Conclusion: The cash refund was admissible and was neither time-barred under Section 11B nor deniable for want of a credit note.

Issues: (i) Validity of the sanction granted under Section 151(i) on 1 April 2022 after expiry of three years, including the temporal operation of the Finance Act 2023 proviso to Section 151; (ii) Whether third-party survey material established a live link between the assessee and alleged unaccounted sale consideration.

Issue (i): Validity of the sanction granted under Section 151(i) on 1 April 2022 after expiry of three years, including the temporal operation of the Finance Act 2023 proviso to Section 151.

Analysis: Sections 149(1)(a), 149(2), and 151 of the Income-tax Act, 1961 prescribe the limitation framework and identify the specified authority competent to approve reassessment. The three-year period for the relevant assessment year ended on 31 March 2022. Approval granted on 1 April 2022 by the authority under Section 151(i) did not meet the requirement applicable after expiry of that period. The time allowed for response under Section 148A(b) could not cure the jurisdictional defect under the unamended Section 151. The proviso inserted in Section 151 with effect from 1 April 2023 altered the computation of the three-year threshold for identifying the approving authority; it was a substantive jurisdictional change and was expressly prospective.

Conclusion: The sanction under Section 151(i) was without jurisdiction, and the Finance Act 2023 proviso to Section 151 did not retrospectively validate it. The issue is decided in favour of the assessee.

Issue (ii): Whether third-party survey material established a live link between the assessee and alleged unaccounted sale consideration.

Analysis: The impounded loose papers from a third-party survey contained neither the assessee's name nor particulars directly connecting her with the alleged on-money. The assessee had not sold the land to the person whose statement was relied upon, and no material established that person as her broker or otherwise connected her to the third-party transaction. The material was impounded nearly two years after the sale, without any demonstrated nexus to the assessee.

Conclusion: The third-party material did not establish a live link with the assessee or provide a sustainable basis for reassessment. The issue is decided in favour of the assessee.

Final Conclusion: The statutory safeguard governing approval for reassessment remained applicable under the law in force on the relevant date, and the evidentiary foundation for reopening was independently insufficient.

Ratio Decidendi: A statutory amendment altering the computation for identifying the competent reassessment-sanctioning authority cannot retrospectively cure a jurisdictionally invalid sanction unless the legislature clearly provides for retrospective operation.