Criminal appeal on merits without counsel, proof of illegal gratification, and limits on reducing statutory corruption sentences.

A criminal appeal may be decided on merits even if the appellant's counsel is absent, where binding larger Bench precedent permits the court to proceed on the record; a later contrary view was treated as per incuriam. In corruption proceedings, demand and acceptance of illegal gratification remain essential ingredients, with the statutory presumption rebuttable only on a preponderance of probability; on the facts, recovery and the accused's role were proved, so conviction was sustained. The sentence under the Prevention of Corruption Act could not be reduced below the statutory minimum merely on equitable grounds, though the custodial term was moderated within permissible limits and the fine left intact.

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Issues: (i) Whether a criminal appeal can be decided on merits in the absence of the appellant's counsel and whether the contrary view in a later decision was per incuriam in light of the binding larger Bench ruling; (ii) Whether the prosecution proved demand and acceptance of illegal gratification and the related offence under the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988; (iii) Whether the sentence under Section 13(1)(d) read with Section 13(2) of the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988 could be reduced below the statutory minimum on mitigating circumstances.

Issue (i): Whether a criminal appeal can be decided on merits in the absence of the appellant's counsel and whether the contrary view in a later decision was per incuriam in light of the binding larger Bench ruling.

Analysis: The prior larger Bench ruling held that an appellate court is not bound to adjourn a criminal appeal merely because counsel is absent and may decide the matter on merits after perusing the record. A later view insisting that the court must not decide the appeal in the absence of counsel was found to be inconsistent with that binding precedent. The later view was therefore treated as having been rendered in ignorance of the controlling larger Bench authority.

Conclusion: The appeal could validly be decided on merits despite the earlier absence of counsel, and the contrary later view was held to be per incuriam.

Issue (ii): Whether the prosecution proved demand and acceptance of illegal gratification and the related offence under the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988.

Analysis: Demand and acceptance of illegal gratification are essential ingredients of the offence, and the statutory presumption could be rebutted only on a preponderance of probability. On the evidence, recovery of the amount was proved, the defence version was found improbable, and the explanation offered by the accused was rejected. The official capacity to influence allotment of work was also established on the record.

Conclusion: The prosecution proved demand and acceptance of illegal gratification, and the conviction was sustained.

Issue (iii): Whether the sentence under Section 13(1)(d) read with Section 13(2) of the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988 could be reduced below the statutory minimum on mitigating circumstances.

Analysis: The statute prescribed a minimum sentence for the offence, and the Court declined to substitute the statutory mandate on equitable grounds. However, considering the age and ailments of the accused, the custodial term imposed for the graver count was moderated within the permissible range while the fine remained intact.

Conclusion: The sentence was reduced only to the extent ordered, and the request for reduction to the period already undergone was rejected.

Final Conclusion: The conviction was affirmed in full, the legal challenge to proceeding in the absence of counsel failed, and only limited relief was granted by reducing the custodial term on one count while maintaining the fine.

Ratio Decidendi: A criminal appeal may be decided on merits in the absence of counsel if the governing larger Bench precedent permits it, and demand plus acceptance of illegal gratification must be established for conviction under the Prevention of Corruption Act, subject to the statutory presumption and its rebuttal on a preponderance of probability.

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