Pronouncement of judgment in an accused's absence is valid where procedure allows it and no failure of justice is shown.

Section 353 of the Code of Criminal Procedure permits pronouncement of judgment despite the absence of an accused or pleader, and the judgment is not invalid on that ground alone. In the context of a Section 138 Negotiable Instruments Act prosecution, the court noted repeated absences and prior opportunities, and treated the pronouncement in absentia as procedurally valid. Section 465 applied only if a failure of justice was shown; because the accused had a fair opportunity to defend and no prejudice was established, the alleged irregularity did not justify reversal. The conviction and sentence were restored and the remand order was set aside.

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Issues: (i) Whether Section 353(7) and Section 353(8) of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 permit a criminal court to pronounce judgment despite the absence of an accused or his pleader and, in the facts of the case, whether the appellate court was justified in setting aside the conviction on that ground; (ii) Whether Section 465 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 cures the alleged defect and whether the absence of the accused at the stage of pronouncement of judgment caused a failure of justice.

Issue (i): Whether Section 353(7) and Section 353(8) of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 permit a criminal court to pronounce judgment despite the absence of an accused or his pleader and, in the facts of the case, whether the appellate court was justified in setting aside the conviction on that ground.

Analysis: Section 353 regulates pronouncement of judgment and, by sub-section (7), declares that a judgment is not invalid merely because a party or pleader is absent on the day or at the place notified for delivery. Sub-section (6) requires attendance of an accused not in custody, but the proviso enables pronouncement notwithstanding absence where there is more than one accused and undue delay would otherwise result. The judgment emphasized that the accused had remained absent on several occasions, had been afforded opportunities, and the Magistrate had already adjourned pronouncement multiple times. In the context of prosecutions under Section 138 of the Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881, the statutory scheme favours expeditious disposal and does not require coercive compulsion of attendance before pronouncement where the statute itself permits pronouncement in absence.

Conclusion: The judgment delivered by the Magistrate in the absence of the accused was valid, and the appellate court was not justified in setting aside the conviction and sentence on that ground.

Issue (ii): Whether Section 465 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 cures the alleged defect and whether the absence of the accused at the stage of pronouncement of judgment caused a failure of justice.

Analysis: Section 353(8) makes Section 465 applicable, so the decisive question is whether any irregularity occasioned a failure of justice. The controlling test is whether the accused had a full and fair opportunity to defend and whether the proceeding, viewed substantively, suffered prejudice. The Court treated the alleged lapse, if any, as at most an irregularity, not a jurisdictional illegality, because the trial had substantially followed the prescribed procedure and the accused's own absence contributed to the situation. Since the accused had been granted opportunity and no prejudice was shown, the statutory standard for reversal was not met.

Conclusion: Section 465 did not warrant interference because no failure of justice was established.

Final Conclusion: The conviction and sentence recorded by the Magistrate were restored, the appellate order remanding the matter was set aside, and the appeal was directed to be decided on merits by the appellate court.

Ratio Decidendi: A judgment pronounced in the absence of a party is not invalid where the governing procedural statute expressly permits such pronouncement and no failure of justice is shown; mere absence of the accused at pronouncement, without demonstrated prejudice, does not justify setting aside a conviction.

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