FEMA limitation and condonation principles require actual receipt and exclusion of bona fide writ time before dismissing appeals.

Limitation under FEMA appeals had to be assessed from the actual receipt of the impugned order, and the period bona fide spent pursuing a writ remedy could be excluded. The Court noted that the appellants were entitled to have their condonation applications examined on the merits, and the Appellate Tribunal erred in dismissing the appeals by treating its power to condone delay as confined by the repealed regime. The dismissal on limitation was set aside, and the matter was remanded for consideration of condonation of delay and, if delay is condoned, for decision on the appeals on merits.

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Issues: Whether the appeals before the Court were barred by limitation and whether the Appellate Tribunal was justified in dismissing the appeals without examining the applications for condonation of delay on merits.

Analysis: The relevant appeal provision under FEMA governed the matter, and limitation being procedural, the period had to be assessed in light of the actual receipt of the impugned order and the time spent bona fide in pursuing the writ remedy. The Court accepted that the copy of the Tribunal's order was received later than the date relied on by the respondent and further held that the appellants were entitled to seek exclusion of the period spent in prosecuting the writ petition. It also held that the Appellate Tribunal had erred in treating its power to condone delay as capped in the manner applicable under the repealed regime, when the governing provision under FEMA permitted consideration of sufficient cause beyond the initial period.

Conclusion: The Tribunal's dismissal on limitation was set aside and the matter was remanded for decision of the condonation applications on merits and, if delay is condoned, for decision of the appeals on merits.

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