Suspension of conviction in corruption cases is exceptional; conviction-linked disabilities generally continue pending appeal.

The power to suspend a conviction under Section 389(1) CrPC exists but is to be exercised only in very exceptional cases; mere pendency of an appeal does not justify it. Where a public servant stands convicted of corruption, public policy and public interest require that the disability flowing from the conviction ordinarily continues until the conviction is set aside, even if the sentence of imprisonment is suspended. Disciplinary consequences may also follow such conviction, and earlier authorities do not support automatic suspension of conviction in this context. The request for suspension of conviction was therefore rightly refused.

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Issues: Whether the conviction of a public servant found guilty of corruption could be suspended under Section 389(1) of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 during pendency of the appeal merely because the sentence had already been suspended.

Analysis: The power under Section 389(1) to suspend conviction exists, but it is to be used only in very exceptional cases. Mere filing of an appeal does not justify suspension of conviction. Where the conviction is for corruption by a public servant, the Court held that public policy and public interest require that the disability flowing from the conviction should ordinarily continue until the conviction is overturned, even if the sentence of imprisonment is suspended. The Court also relied on the principle that disciplinary consequences may follow conviction and that earlier decisions do not support automatic suspension of conviction in such a situation.

Conclusion: The conviction could not be suspended, and the request for suspension of conviction was rightly refused.

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