Issues: Whether an order rejecting an application for revocation of cancellation of GST registration without recording reasons could be sustained.

Analysis: An order determining civil rights must be speaking and intelligible. The impugned rejection contained no reasons and was unsupported by any attached order disclosing the basis for rejection.

Conclusion: The unreasoned rejection order was unsustainable and required fresh determination in accordance with law.

Issues: Whether an assessment order under Section 74 could be sustained where the show-cause notice was uploaded only on the GST portal after cancellation of the registered person's registration.

Analysis: Following cancellation of registration, the registered person was not obliged to monitor the GST portal. Uploading the show-cause notice solely on that portal was not adequate service; the notice was required to be served through an alternative mode. The resulting denial of opportunity violated the principles of natural justice.

Conclusion: The assessment order was quashed for violation of principles of natural justice, with liberty to issue a proper notice and proceed in accordance with law.

Issues: Whether a rectification application filed within time could be rejected without merits solely because more than three months had elapsed from its filing under Notification No. 22/2024-CT dated 08.10.2024.

Analysis: Section 161 of the Central Goods and Services Tax Act, 2017 and Clause 4 of the notification prescribe that a decision on a timely rectification application should be made, as far as possible, within three months. The expression "as far as possible" makes the prescribed period directory and requires the competent authority to endeavour to decide the application within that period. Expiry of the period does not render the authority functus officio or extinguish its power to determine a timely application on merits.

Conclusion: The rejection of the timely rectification application as time-barred was unsustainable; the competent authority remained empowered to decide it on merits. This is in favour of the assessee.

Issues: Whether cancellation of GST registration for continuous non-furnishing of returns should be revoked and the registration restored where the period for statutory revocation and return filing had expired.

Analysis: The GST registration was cancelled for non-furnishing of returns for a continuous period of six months. The petitioner could not respond to the portal-based notice or file the pending returns and, following expiry of the applicable periods, was unable to regularise the defaults through the portal. The matter was found to be covered by similar orders granting restoration upon clearance of statutory liabilities, and the revenue authorities did not oppose equivalent relief.

Conclusion: The cancellation is to be revoked and GST registration restored upon intimation and payment of all statutory dues, penalty or fine within the prescribed time. The issue is decided in favour of the assessee.

Issues: (i) Legality of directing re-credit of excess tax or input tax credit where no refund claim was made and no reasons were recorded; (ii) Validity of the reduced tax-liability computation without disclosure of its basis.

Issue (i): Legality of directing re-credit of excess tax or input tax credit where no refund claim was made and no reasons were recorded.

Analysis: Section 54 provides the statutory framework for claiming refund of tax, interest or other amounts, subject to application within the prescribed period. Rule 86(4A) and Rule 92(1A), read with Circular No. 135/05/2020-GST, contemplate re-credit to the electronic credit ledger where a refund claim is made and the amount debited from that ledger is found admissible. No refund claim had been made before the adjudicating or first appellate authority, and the re-credit direction contained no reasons establishing entitlement under that framework.

Conclusion: The direction permitting re-credit was unsustainable; entitlement to re-credit requires fresh determination under the applicable refund and re-credit framework by a reasoned order.

Issue (ii): Validity of the reduced tax-liability computation without disclosure of its basis.

Analysis: The first appellate authority substantially reduced the confirmed demand but did not explain the basis for the revised computation or correlate it with the self-assessed and auto-generated returns, audit reports, and other record material. A reduced determination of liability without recorded reasons could not be sustained.

Conclusion: The reduced tax-liability computation was unsustainable; the liability requires fresh computation on the available returns and audit material through a reasoned determination.

Final Conclusion: The directions on re-credit and revised liability were set aside for fresh reasoned adjudication after hearing both sides.

Ratio Decidendi: Re-credit of tax debited from an electronic credit ledger can be granted only within the prescribed refund framework upon a reasoned finding that the claimed amount is admissible.

Issues: Whether detention and penalty for transport of goods in a vehicle different from that declared in the e-way bill, without satisfactory proof of vehicle breakdown or transfer, were valid.

Analysis: Goods covered by the appellant's invoice were intercepted in a vehicle other than the one recorded in the e-way bill. Part-B had not been updated to reflect the actual vehicle. The discrepancy in declared and ascertainable weight also remained unexplained. No reliable contemporaneous evidence established either the alleged breakdown of the original vehicle or a consequent transfer of goods to the intercepted vehicle. A subsequent e-way bill generated by the purchaser was unavailable at interception and did not cure the defective documentation accompanying the goods. A change of vehicle and any separate subsequent movement required a valid documentary trail corresponding to the vehicle actually transporting the goods.

Conclusion: The absence of a valid e-way bill for the actual vehicle and the unsubstantiated explanation for the discrepancy justified proceedings and penalty under Section 129 of the Uttar Pradesh Goods and Services Tax Act, 2017.

Issues: (i) Whether breach of Condition No. 104 governing duty exemption for an imported aircraft justified recovery of duty, confiscation, and redemption fine; (ii) Whether the demand was barred by limitation under Section 28 of the Customs Act, 1962; (iii) Whether duty was required to be computed using actual transport and transit-insurance costs rather than notional values; (iv) Whether penalties for improper importation were sustainable.

Issue (i): Whether breach of Condition No. 104 governing duty exemption for an imported aircraft justified recovery of duty, confiscation, and redemption fine.

Analysis: Condition No. 104 required the aircraft to be used only for non-scheduled charter services, which required approval by the Directorate General of Civil Aviation. Although the aircraft was imported within the validity of the import approval, it was commercially operated for over 100 hours after the operating permission had expired and without any valid approval. Customs could determine compliance with the exemption condition because no subsisting licence or permit required interpretation by the aviation authorities. The deliberate unauthorised commercial operation was not a minor infraction capable of being sanctioned by the proper officer. Such breach rendered the aircraft liable to confiscation under Section 111(o), with duty payable under Section 125(2) upon redemption.

Conclusion: The exemption condition was breached; confiscation, redemption fine, and consequential customs-duty liability are sustainable against the assessee.

Issue (ii): Whether the demand was barred by limitation under Section 28 of the Customs Act, 1962.

Analysis: The duty liability arose as a consequence of confiscation and redemption under Section 125(2), following breach of a post-import exemption condition, rather than as a demand for non-levy or short-levy under Section 28. The limitation periods in Section 28 therefore did not govern the recovery.

Conclusion: The recovery is not time-barred; this issue is decided against the assessee.

Issue (iii): Whether duty was required to be computed using actual transport and transit-insurance costs rather than notional values.

Analysis: Actual ferry charges for bringing the aircraft into India and the actual transit-insurance premium were available. Notional additions under Rule 9(2) of the Customs Valuation Rules, 1988 could not be substituted for those actual figures. As the departmental proceedings had reopened the duty assessment, the resulting clerical and arithmetical error in valuation required correction.

Conclusion: Duty must be recalculated using the actual transport and transit-insurance costs; this issue is decided in favour of the assessee.

Issue (iv): Whether penalties for improper importation were sustainable.

Analysis: The unauthorised commercial use of the duty-exempt aircraft rendered it liable to confiscation. The importer and its responsible managerial personnel were directly connected with the decisions resulting in that breach, and the penalties imposed were within the statutory limits and proportionate to the confirmed duty.

Conclusion: The penalties imposed under Section 112 are sustainable against the assessee and the responsible personnel.

Final Conclusion: Liability arising from the deliberate breach of the post-import exemption condition, including confiscation consequences, redemption fine, and penalties, remains enforceable, while the customs-duty quantum must reflect actual valuation costs.

Ratio Decidendi: Breach of a post-import condition of a customs exemption renders the goods confiscable and makes duty recoverable under Section 125(2), independently of the limitation regime under Section 28.

Issues: Whether a penalty exceeding Rs. 50,000 could be imposed under Regulation 12(8) of the Handling of Cargo in Customs Areas Regulations, 2009.

Analysis: Regulation 12(8) expressly caps the penalty imposable thereunder at Rs. 50,000. The proposed penalties under other provisions of the Customs Act and cancellation of licence were not imposed, and no challenge was brought against that part of the adjudication. The statutory ceiling under Regulation 12(8) could not be exceeded; the cited earlier order did not alter the clear limit prescribed by the Regulation.

Conclusion: The penalty was liable to be restricted to the statutory maximum of Rs. 50,000, in favour of the assessee.

Issues: Whether, upon dissolution of a partnership at will, a partner's share in immovable partnership assets must be confined to their value on the date of dissolution or determined upon liquidation and final-decree proceedings.

Analysis: A partnership at will stood dissolved upon written notice under Section 43. Upon dissolution, Sections 46 and 48 require the firm's property to be applied towards its debts and liabilities and the surplus to be distributed among the partners according to their respective rights. The date of dissolution governs ascertainment of business profits and losses, but does not restrict a partner's entitlement in the residue of the firm's assets. The erstwhile partners' subsequent use or retention of partnership property through a new firm could not defeat the dissolved firm's obligation to liquidate assets or settle the outgoing partner's share. The assets may be retained only if the other partners pay the entitled partner's market-value share after adjustment of liabilities; otherwise, sale and distribution are required.

Conclusion: The respondent is entitled to 25% of the value realised from the partnership assets after discharge of firm liabilities, and that entitlement is not confined to the assets' value as on the date of dissolution.

Issues: Whether a deposit made expressly without prejudice after a Section 7 insolvency petition was reserved for orders could justify closure of the proceeding without adjudicating objections concerning maintainability, financial debt and default.

Analysis: A deposit expressly made without prejudice to rights, remedies and contentions is not, by itself, an unconditional admission of liability or default. Although the deposit could be considered, it could not replace the determination required in a Section 7 proceeding where the corporate debtor had specifically disputed the petition's maintainability and the existence of financial debt and default. The subsequent demand asserting different components of interest, default interest and legal expenses could not independently establish a financial debt; each component required a contractual or statutory foundation and legal recoverability. Liberty to pursue legally maintainable claims did not amount to adjudication of those claims.

Conclusion: Closure of the Section 7 proceeding without deciding the appellant's objections to maintainability, financial debt and default was legally unsustainable.

Issues: (i) Whether death of an individual resolution applicant after CoC approval but before Adjudicating Authority approval makes the resolution plan unimplementable and permits liquidation under Section 33(1). (ii) Whether liquidation could be ordered and the Section 12A withdrawal application dismissed as infructuous while that application was pending.

Issue (i): Whether death of an individual resolution applicant after CoC approval but before Adjudicating Authority approval makes the resolution plan unimplementable and permits liquidation under Section 33(1).

Analysis: A resolution applicant is not an office-holder with non-heritable obligations, but occupies the position of a promisor within the statutory resolution process. Section 33(1) permits liquidation only where no plan is received within the CIRP period or where a CoC-approved plan is rejected under Section 31; death of the applicant is not an additional statutory ground. The objective of preserving the corporate debtor as a going concern requires examination of the continued viability of the plan rather than automatic liquidation. Where the request for resolution plan or the plan itself does not address the contingency, inherent powers may be used to require the CoC to assess whether the plan can be sustained, including whether an heir is eligible, qualified, free from Section 29A disqualification, and willing to implement it.

Conclusion: Death of the resolution applicant does not by itself render the plan unimplementable or authorise liquidation under Section 33(1); the liquidation order on that basis was unsustainable.

Issue (ii): Whether liquidation could be ordered and the Section 12A withdrawal application dismissed as infructuous while that application was pending.

Analysis: The withdrawal route under Section 12A remains available during the resolution process. Once the sole CoC member had resolved to withdraw the CIRP following settlement and the application was pending, liquidation could not be mechanically ordered without considering that statutory exit mechanism.

Conclusion: The pending Section 12A application must be considered in accordance with law, and its dismissal as infructuous could not be sustained.

Final Conclusion: The CIRP stands revived, with the statutory withdrawal request requiring adjudication before further steps are taken.

Ratio Decidendi: Death of a resolution applicant pending approval of a CoC-approved plan is not a statutory ground for liquidation under Section 33(1); the resolution process must instead explore continuation of the plan within the statutory framework before liquidation is resorted to.

Issues: Whether a successful purchaser of a corporate debtor as a going concern in liquidation is entitled to immunity under Section 32A for pre-sale investigations, proceedings, non-compliances, and consequential liabilities.

Analysis: Section 32A protection and the clean slate principle apply where a corporate debtor is sold as a going concern during liquidation, as they do upon successful completion of CIRP. Past liabilities that do not survive the insolvency process cannot be fastened upon the purchaser merely because the sale occurred in liquidation. The statutory immunity remains conditional upon fulfilment of the requirements prescribed by Section 32A. Reliefs seeking waivers or concessions from statutory authorities must be pursued before those authorities.

Conclusion: The purchasers are entitled to Section 32A protection in respect of the declined reliefs concerning past investigations, proceedings, non-compliances, penalties, and liabilities, subject to fulfilment of the statutory conditions.

Issues: (i) Whether non-compliance with Section 61 of the GST Act read with Rule 99 vitiated the show-cause notice; (ii) Whether invocation of Section 74A(5)(ii) of the GST Act lacked jurisdictional foundation; (iii) Whether writ jurisdiction under Article 226 should be exercised to interdict the show-cause notice at the threshold.

Issue (i): Whether non-compliance with Section 61 of the GST Act read with Rule 99 vitiated the show-cause notice.

Analysis: Section 61 is a pre-adjudicatory mechanism confined to scrutiny of returns. Its procedure, including Rule 99, applies once scrutiny has in fact been initiated and discrepancies are noticed. Proceedings under Section 74A are independent and may be triggered by material obtained through scrutiny, audit, inspection, investigation or other credible independent verification. Here, the notice was founded on independent verification concerning allegedly bogus and non-existent sub-contractors, and not on a scrutiny of the petitioner's returns under Section 61.

Conclusion: Prior scrutiny under Section 61 and compliance with Rule 99 were not jurisdictional preconditions for the notice under Section 74A. The issue was decided against the assessee.

Issue (ii): Whether invocation of Section 74A(5)(ii) of the GST Act lacked jurisdictional foundation.

Analysis: The notice alleged that input tax credit had been availed through fake documents and invoices relating to fictitious entities and without actual underlying supplies. Such allegations prima facie disclose fraudulent availment of input tax credit and satisfy the foundational threshold for initiating action under Section 74A(5)(ii). The truth of those allegations, including the existence and functioning of the sub-contractors and actual execution of work, requires evidentiary adjudication by the statutory authority.

Conclusion: The notice disclosed sufficient jurisdictional facts for invocation of Section 74A(5)(ii). The issue was decided against the assessee.

Issue (iii): Whether writ jurisdiction under Article 226 should be exercised to interdict the show-cause notice at the threshold.

Analysis: A show-cause notice ordinarily does not warrant writ interference unless it is wholly without jurisdiction or falls within recognised exceptional circumstances. The asserted objections involve disputed facts and are available for determination in the statutory adjudication. No infringement of fundamental rights, breach of natural justice, want of jurisdiction, or surviving challenge to statutory validity was established.

Conclusion: No case for threshold interference under Article 226 was made out. The issue was decided against the assessee.

Final Conclusion: The challenge to the notice fails, while all factual and legal defences on the merits of the proposed tax demand remain available before the adjudicating authority.

Ratio Decidendi: Scrutiny of returns is not an invariable condition precedent to proceedings for determination of wrongly availed input tax credit where the proper officer acts on independent material that prima facie discloses fraud or fictitious supplies; disputed factual defences must ordinarily be addressed in statutory adjudication rather than writ jurisdiction.

Issues: (i) Whether the impugned findings rested on grounds beyond the show cause notice; (ii) Whether the authorised courier breached Regulations 13(i) and 13(j) of the Courier Imports and Exports (Clearance) Regulations, 2010; (iii) Whether penalties for attempted improper export and use of a false declaration could be imposed upon the courier for prohibited goods concealed in the export consignment.

Issue (i): Whether the impugned findings rested on grounds beyond the show cause notice.

Analysis: The show cause notice alleged only unauthorised outsourcing and deficient KYC verification by the appellant as an authorised courier. It neither alleged failure to obtain consignor authorisation nor treated the appellant as the consignor or exporter, and did not allege knowing use of a false declaration or conscious participation in the attempted export. Those were material factual and legal foundations of liability, not mere particulars or evidentiary inferences, and could not first be introduced in the adjudication order.

Conclusion: The findings based on consignor/exporter status, failure to obtain consignor authorisation, and knowing participation in the attempted export were beyond the show cause notice and were unsustainable, in favour of the assessee.

Issue (ii): Whether the authorised courier breached Regulations 13(i) and 13(j) of the Courier Imports and Exports (Clearance) Regulations, 2010.

Analysis: Regulation 13(i) requires verification through reliable, independent and authentic material; it does not itself require two identity documents. The genuine driving licence furnished proof of both identity and address, and absence of a second document did not establish a regulatory breach. Regulation 13(j) applies only where a regulatory function required or permitted under the Regulations is outsourced without written permission. Physical collection or pick-up of a consignment is not an assessment or clearance function of an authorised courier, and installation of software at an intermediary's premises did not establish outsourcing of a regulatory function.

Conclusion: Neither the use of one identity document nor outsourcing of physical pick-up established contravention of Regulations 13(i) or 13(j), in favour of the assessee.

Issue (iii): Whether penalties for attempted improper export and use of a false declaration could be imposed upon the courier for prohibited goods concealed in the export consignment.

Analysis: No cogent evidence established that the appellant knew of, participated in, or facilitated the misdeclaration or concealed pseudoephedrine hydrochloride. Filing a courier declaration based on the consignor's information, followed by discovery of ingeniously concealed prohibited goods, did not establish a knowing false declaration. The statutory ingredients of an act or omission rendering goods liable to confiscation under Section 114(i), and knowledge or intent under Section 114AA, were not proved.

Conclusion: Penalties under Sections 114(i) and 114AA of the Customs Act, 1962 were unsustainable, in favour of the assessee.

Final Conclusion: The alleged regulatory breaches and the evidentiary basis for penal liability failed; consequently, the penal action against the appellant could not survive.

Ratio Decidendi: An adjudication order cannot impose liability on material factual or legal grounds absent from the show cause notice, and penal liability of an authorised courier for concealed prohibited goods requires cogent proof of the applicable regulatory breach or knowing involvement.

Issues: (i) Whether release of the cash escrow under Regulation 15B(8) of the Buyback Regulations precludes an independent inquiry or finding of fraud under the PFUTP Regulations; (ii) Whether the fraud finding could be sustained without resolving material discrepancies in the historical trading data and SEBI's investigation reports.

Issue (i): Whether release of the cash escrow under Regulation 15B(8) of the Buyback Regulations precludes an independent inquiry or finding of fraud under the PFUTP Regulations.

Analysis: Regulation 14(3) requires deployment of a stipulated minimum amount for buyback, while Regulation 15B(8) prescribes the escrow-forfeiture consequences of non-compliance and enumerates exceptions to forfeiture. The escrow mechanism is confined to determining entitlement to release or forfeiture and neither defines fraud nor adjudicates its existence. Internal departmental notings are not binding determinations unless approved by the competent authority and communicated as a final order. Fraud under the PFUTP Regulations requires proof from reliable material on the balance of probabilities, assessed from the cumulative surrounding circumstances; it cannot rest on conjecture or suspicion alone.

Conclusion: Release of the escrow under Regulation 15B(8) does not bar an independent fraud inquiry or finding under the PFUTP Regulations. This issue is decided in favour of the appellant.

Issue (ii): Whether the fraud finding could be sustained without resolving material discrepancies in the historical trading data and SEBI's investigation reports.

Analysis: The alleged fraud was founded substantially on historical exchange trading data concerning available sell orders, prevailing prices and placement of buy orders. Material inconsistencies were identified between the investigation material and exchange data, and there was also an unresolved contradiction between the earlier investigation report recording no material price or volume impact from the corporate announcement and the later report alleging fraud. These factual discrepancies go to the evidentiary foundation of the fraud allegation. The statutory appellate forum has powers to obtain evidence, summon and examine relevant persons, and determine these factual matters.

Conclusion: The existing determination on fraud cannot be sustained without adjudicating the material evidentiary discrepancies; the fraud question must be freshly determined by the statutory appellate forum on the basis of accurate trading data and any corroborating circumstances. This issue is decided in favour of the appellant.

Final Conclusion: The escrow-forfeiture regime and the anti-fraud regime operate in separate fields, and a fraud finding must be founded on reliable evidence evaluated on the applicable standard of proof.

Ratio Decidendi: Satisfaction of conditions for release of a buyback escrow does not confer immunity from proceedings for fraudulent or unfair trade practices, which require an independent evidentiary determination on the balance of probabilities.

Issues: (i) Whether the NCLT, New Delhi Bench-II could exercise jurisdiction over a Section 95 application against a personal guarantor when the corporate debtor's CIRP was pending before the NCLT, Chandigarh Bench-II; (ii) Whether Rule 16(d) of the National Company Law Tribunal Rules, 2016 permits transfer of such proceedings between Benches in different territorial locations.

Issue (i): Whether the NCLT, New Delhi Bench-II could exercise jurisdiction over a Section 95 application against a personal guarantor when the corporate debtor's CIRP was pending before the NCLT, Chandigarh Bench-II.

Analysis: Section 60(2) of the Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code, 2016, operating notwithstanding Section 60(1), requires an insolvency or bankruptcy application concerning a personal guarantor to be filed before the same NCLT where the corporate debtor's CIRP or liquidation is pending. The provision mandates consolidation before one Adjudicating Authority to secure consistency and avoid parallel or conflicting proceedings.

Conclusion: In favour of the Appellant. The NCLT, New Delhi Bench-II lacked territorial and inherent jurisdiction over the Section 95 proceedings, which were coram non judice and non-est in law.

Issue (ii): Whether Rule 16(d) of the National Company Law Tribunal Rules, 2016 permits transfer of such proceedings between Benches in different territorial locations.

Analysis: Rule 16(d), read with Rule 2(7) of the National Company Law Tribunal Rules, 2016 and Section 60(2) of the Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code, 2016, empowers the President of the NCLT to transfer a case from one Bench to another when circumstances warrant. This power is not confined to transfers within the same territorial jurisdiction where transfer is required to give effect to the mandatory forum prescribed by Section 60(2).

Conclusion: In favour of the Appellant. The restrictive interpretation limiting Rule 16(d) to intra-territorial transfers was incorrect.

Final Conclusion: Proceedings against the personal guarantor must be instituted before the NCLT, Chandigarh Bench-II, being the Adjudicating Authority where the corporate debtor's CIRP was pending; the creditor remains at liberty to pursue proceedings before the competent forum in accordance with law.

Ratio Decidendi: Where the corporate debtor's CIRP or liquidation is pending before an NCLT, Section 60(2) of the Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code, 2016 mandatorily fixes the forum for personal-guarantor insolvency proceedings at that same NCLT, and Rule 16(d) permits inter-Bench transfer to enforce that mandate.

Issues: Whether the direction requiring repayment of the amount released to the complainant under Section 148 of the Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881 was liable to be set aside because it was made by the trial court rather than the appellate court.

Analysis: The proviso to Section 148(3) mandates repayment, with stipulated interest, of an amount released to the complainant where the appellant is acquitted. The complainant had also undertaken before the appellate court to repay the amount subject to disposal of the appeal. Although the refund direction ought ordinarily to have been made by the appellate court, the subsequent deposit of the amount pursuant to court directions and the complainant's failure to comply promptly did not justify interference with the refund direction.

Conclusion: Upon acquittal of the accused, the complainant was bound to repay the released amount, and the refund direction was sustained against the petitioner.

Issues: (i) Validity of reassessment after four years under section 147; (ii) Eligibility of voluntary contributions for corpus exemption under section 11(1)(d); (iii) Application of accumulated income to purchase immovable property; (iv) Availability of fifteen per cent statutory accumulation after denial of corpus exemption; and (v) Validity of accumulation under section 11(2) based on Form No. 10 and the trustee resolution.

Issue (i): Validity of reassessment after four years under section 147.

Analysis: The proviso to section 147 requires failure to make full and true disclosure of material facts where reassessment is initiated beyond four years. The recorded reasons identified material considered insufficiently disclosed. The record did not establish that the specific matters forming the basis of reassessment had been consciously examined and decided in the original assessment, and therefore did not establish a prohibited change of opinion. Proceedings under section 263 for another year merely provided the background; the recorded reasons disclosed independent prima facie satisfaction. The enquiries related directly to taxable income and were not a fishing or roving enquiry.

Conclusion: The reassessment was valid. The issue is decided against the assessee.

Issue (ii): Eligibility of voluntary contributions for corpus exemption under section 11(1)(d).

Analysis: Section 11(1)(d) requires a voluntary contribution to be accompanied by a specific direction of the donor that it shall form part of the corpus, along with compliance with the prescribed corpus-investment requirement under section 11(5). Individual donor letters expressing such intention require verification of their authenticity and contemporaneity. Directions issued only by persons managing a group of contributors cannot be treated as directions of the individual donors without material establishing their authority. Contributions initially made for general activities, with only a contingent future transfer of surplus to corpus, do not amount to an unconditional donor direction that the contribution itself shall form part of the corpus.

Conclusion: The issue is partly in favour of the assessee. Donations supported by individual donor directions are remitted for limited verification, while the claim for contributions supported only by group-manager directions is not allowable as corpus exemption.

Issue (iii): Application of accumulated income to purchase immovable property.

Analysis: Acquisition of immovable property from accumulated income does not by itself establish application in conformity with section 11(2). The purpose stated in Form No. 10, the source of acquisition funds, the nexus with charitable objects, and contemporaneous evidence of actual utilisation require verification. The available purchase records, electricity records and activity register are relevant but do not conclusively establish the nature and purpose of utilisation.

Conclusion: The claim is restored for limited factual verification and fresh adjudication. The issue is decided in favour of the assessee only to the extent of this remand, with no final allowance determined.

Issue (iv): Availability of fifteen per cent statutory accumulation after denial of corpus exemption.

Analysis: The statutory accumulation under section 11(1)(a) is available while computing eligible exempt income and cannot be refused solely because a claimed corpus exemption under section 11(1)(d) is denied. The allowance remains subject to statutory conditions and must not result in a double benefit.

Conclusion: The statutory benefit of fifteen per cent accumulation is allowable, to the extent permissible in law, in respect of donations ultimately not accepted as corpus. The issue is decided in favour of the assessee.

Issue (v): Validity of accumulation under section 11(2) based on Form No. 10 and the trustee resolution.

Analysis: Section 11(2) read with Rule 17 permits the purpose of accumulation to be disclosed in Form No. 10 by reference to a trustee resolution where the prescribed form has limited space. The resolution identified distinct proposed projects and did not merely reproduce broad charitable objects. The disclosed purposes were sufficiently specific for the statutory accumulation claim.

Conclusion: The accumulation under section 11(2) is allowable. The issue is decided in favour of the assessee.

Final Conclusion: Reassessment jurisdiction remains valid; corpus treatment is confined to contributions supported by verifiable individual donor directions, while group-manager directions are insufficient; the property claim requires factual determination; and the statutory accumulation benefits under sections 11(1)(a) and 11(2) must be granted as directed.

Ratio Decidendi: A voluntary contribution qualifies for corpus exemption only where a specific direction that it shall form part of corpus emanates from the donor; subsequent classification by the recipient or an unauthorised group representative cannot substitute that direction.

Issues: Whether the demand under Section 74A of the respective GST enactments for turnover already addressed in ASMT proceedings could be sustained without considering payment of the differential tax and interest.

Analysis: The record comprising the ASMT-10 intimation, ASMT-12 acceptance order and the impugned demand showed that the differential tax and corresponding interest for the same turnover had been paid. The Section 74A demand had been issued without a reply to the DRC-01 notice and required reconsideration upon the petitioner's response and supporting documents.

Conclusion: The impugned demand was set aside for fresh merits determination after the petitioner files a reply and documents, with prior notice before fresh adjudication. Amounts recovered towards the demand are to be refunded in accordance with law.

Issues: Whether the short-term capital-gains computation based on the value adopted under section 50C required reconsideration through the valuation mechanism under section 50C(2).

Analysis: The addition was made without supporting details concerning the cost and date of acquisition and the relevant transactional documents, leaving material facts necessary for computation of capital gains unexamined. Section 50C(2) provides a statutory valuation mechanism where the prescribed conditions are met and the stamp-valuation figure is claimed to exceed the fair market value. Both sides agreed that the valuation issue required reconsideration with a reference to the Departmental Valuation Officer where warranted.

Conclusion: The quantum of capital gains is to be determined afresh after examination of the relevant material, consideration of the valuation report where obtained, and effective opportunity of hearing; no view was expressed on the merits of the computation.