Issues: (i) Whether publication of Form G under Regulation 36A(1) requires prior approval by the Committee of Creditors of eligibility criteria under Section 25(2)(h); (ii) Whether liquidation under Section 33(1)(a) may be declined after expiry of the CIRP period without a resolution plan because the delay was attributable to stakeholders; (iii) Whether the finding that the Corporate Debtor was not a going concern was sustainable; (iv) Whether a pending application under Section 65 barred liquidation under Section 33; (v) Whether non-impleadment of the suspended board vitiated the liquidation order; and (vi) Whether alternatives short of liquidation were inadequately considered.

Issue (i): Whether publication of Form G under Regulation 36A(1) requires prior approval by the Committee of Creditors of eligibility criteria under Section 25(2)(h).

Analysis: Section 25(2)(h) requires prospective resolution applicants to satisfy criteria formulated by the resolution professional with approval of the Committee of Creditors. Regulation 36A(1) mandates timely publication of Form G but does not dispense with that approval. Form G operationalises the invitation contemplated by Section 25(2)(h); therefore, publication cannot proceed without approved eligibility criteria. The 66% threshold under Section 33(2) applies to an affirmative decision to liquidate during CIRP and does not govern ordinary Committee of Creditors deliberations concerning publication of Form G.

Conclusion: Prior Committee of Creditors approval of eligibility criteria was necessary before publication of Form G. The issue was decided against the Appellant.

Issue (ii): Whether liquidation under Section 33(1)(a) may be declined after expiry of the CIRP period without a resolution plan because the delay was attributable to stakeholders.

Analysis: Section 33(1)(a) uses imperative language requiring liquidation where the CIRP period has expired without receipt of a resolution plan under Section 30(6). The exceptional flexibility recognised for extending insolvency timelines does not permit an indefinite suspension of liquidation merely because of Committee of Creditors deadlock or lack of diligence during CIRP. No timely application for extension or exclusion was made despite the CIRP having remained unresolved for more than five years.

Conclusion: Expiry of the CIRP period without a resolution plan required liquidation under Section 33(1)(a). The issue was decided against the Appellant.

Issue (iii): Whether the finding that the Corporate Debtor was not a going concern was sustainable.

Analysis: Going-concern status depends on continuing business operations, employees, revenue generation, and operational activity, rather than mere ownership of assets. The identified land, shops, vehicle, and sale proceeds were subject to litigation, attachment, sale, or third-party custody, while no material established continuing business operations, employees, income, or trading after commencement of CIRP.

Conclusion: The finding that the Corporate Debtor was not a going concern was sustainable. The issue was decided against the Appellant.

Issue (iv): Whether a pending application under Section 65 barred liquidation under Section 33.

Analysis: Section 65 provides for penal consequences for fraudulent or malicious initiation of insolvency proceedings; it does not automatically annul a final admission order or suspend an otherwise ripe liquidation proceeding. A belated Section 65 application challenging the basis of CIRP could not operate as an automatic bar where the admission order had not been directly challenged and had attained finality.

Conclusion: Pendency of the Section 65 application did not bar liquidation under Section 33. The issue was decided against the Appellant.

Issue (v): Whether non-impleadment of the suspended board vitiated the liquidation order.

Analysis: The suspended board's right to participate in Committee of Creditors meetings does not create an unqualified right to be impleaded in every CIRP application. The Section 33(1)(a) inquiry turned on the objective facts of expiry of CIRP and non-receipt of a resolution plan. Prolonged non-cooperation and delayed engagement with the process, coupled with a full appellate opportunity to address all contentions, established absence of prejudice sufficient to vitiate the order.

Conclusion: Non-impleadment of the suspended board did not vitiate the liquidation order. The issue was decided against the Appellant.

Issue (vi): Whether alternatives short of liquidation were inadequately considered.

Analysis: Publication of Form G and further resolution efforts were considered repeatedly by the Committee of Creditors but did not secure the requisite support. The prolonged deadlock, absence of a resolution plan, expiry of the CIRP period, and lack of an operating business brought the matter within the time-bound insolvency framework. Commercial wisdom concerning further resolution efforts could not be substituted by appellate assessment.

Conclusion: Alternatives short of liquidation were sufficiently considered and no infirmity was established. The issue was decided against the Appellant.

Final Conclusion: The statutory liquidation consequence upon expiry of CIRP without a resolution plan remained applicable notwithstanding the unresolved Committee of Creditors deadlock, the pending Section 65 application, and the suspended board's objections.

Ratio Decidendi: Publication of Form G requires Committee of Creditors-approved eligibility criteria under Section 25(2)(h), and expiry of CIRP without a resolution plan activates the mandatory liquidation consequence under Section 33(1)(a) absent a timely extension or exclusion.

Issues: (i) Whether cash deposits in specified bank notes claimed to arise from cash sales were liable to be treated as unexplained credits under section 68 of the Income-tax Act, 1961; (ii) Whether the enhanced tax treatment under section 115BBE of the Income-tax Act, 1961 applied to Assessment Year 2017-18.

Issue (i): Whether cash deposits in specified bank notes claimed to arise from cash sales were liable to be treated as unexplained credits under section 68 of the Income-tax Act, 1961.

Analysis: The claim that the deposits represented festive-season cash sales from a new showroom was not substantiated by sale invoices or day-to-day item-wise stock records. The exceptional volume of cash sales immediately preceding demonetisation, absence of sufficient staff and corresponding expenditure, and the inability to verify stock availability supported the finding that the source of deposits was not proved. The gross-profit component embedded in the claimed sales had already been reduced while computing the addition, negating double taxation.

Conclusion: The cash deposits were rightly treated as unexplained credits under section 68 of the Income-tax Act, 1961; this issue is against the assessee.

Issue (ii): Whether the enhanced tax treatment under section 115BBE of the Income-tax Act, 1961 applied to Assessment Year 2017-18.

Analysis: The law governing an assessment year is that in force on its first day. The amendment enhancing the tax consequences under section 115BBE became effective from 01.04.2017 and contained no express retrospective operation; it therefore applied from Assessment Year 2018-19 onwards, not to Assessment Year 2017-18.

Conclusion: Section 115BBE of the Income-tax Act, 1961, as amended, was inapplicable to Assessment Year 2017-18, and tax on the sustained addition must be charged at normal rates; this issue is in favour of the assessee.

Final Conclusion: The addition for unexplained cash deposits remains sustained, while the consequential tax computation must be made at the normal applicable rate.

Ratio Decidendi: In the absence of express retrospectivity, an amendment enhancing tax liability under section 115BBE of the Income-tax Act, 1961 operates prospectively and cannot govern Assessment Year 2017-18.

Issues: (i) Whether recovery of duty drawback under Rule 16, which prescribes no limitation period, was initiated within a reasonable period; (ii) Whether the availability of a statutory appeal barred the writ petition where the recovery order was passed after unreasonable delay.

Issue (i): Whether recovery of duty drawback under Rule 16, which prescribes no limitation period, was initiated within a reasonable period.

Analysis: Rule 16 permits recovery of erroneously or excessively paid drawback but contains no express limitation period. Such power must therefore be exercised within a reasonable period determined by the circumstances. The recovery related to drawback availed in 2010, whereas the notice was issued in 2018 and the order followed in 2022. There was no allegation of fraud or suppression and no explanation for the prolonged delay. In the absence of fraud, the principle that fraud defeats limitation could not justify delayed recovery; the adopted precedent treated three years as the maximum reasonable period for such recovery.

Conclusion: The recovery proceedings were barred by limitation and were in favour of the assessee.

Issue (ii): Whether the availability of a statutory appeal barred the writ petition where the recovery order was passed after unreasonable delay.

Analysis: Although an appeal was available under Section 128(1), the recovery order was without statutory authority because the proceedings had been initiated beyond a reasonable period. The alternative appellate remedy did not require relegation to appeal in those circumstances.

Conclusion: The writ petition was maintainable and the issue was decided in favour of the assessee.

Final Conclusion: The delayed drawback recovery lacked statutory authority, rendering the consequential coercive action unsustainable and requiring restoration of the amount recovered.

Ratio Decidendi: Where a statute authorises recovery without prescribing limitation, the power must be exercised within a reasonable period; unexplained prolonged delay, absent fraud or suppression, invalidates the recovery.

Issues: (i) Whether filing Form 10-IC binds the domestic company to concessional taxation under section 115BAA despite non-compliance with statutory conditions; and (ii) whether an adjustment disallowing additional depreciation on that basis can be made in an intimation under section 143(1).

Issue (i): Whether filing Form 10-IC binds the domestic company to concessional taxation under section 115BAA despite non-compliance with statutory conditions.

Analysis: Section 115BAA permits concessional taxation only where its prescribed conditions are cumulatively fulfilled. The return claimed additional depreciation, which is barred under section 115BAA(2)(i), made no corresponding reversal or adjustment, and computed tax under the normal regime. The tax audit report also contained no reference to concessional taxation. These facts established substantive non-compliance with the mandatory conditions, rendering the option invalid under the proviso to section 115BAA(1), notwithstanding the filing of Form 10-IC.

Conclusion: The section 115BAA option was invalid, and the assessee was not liable to be taxed under the concessional regime. This issue is decided in favour of the assessee.

Issue (ii): Whether an adjustment disallowing additional depreciation on that basis can be made in an intimation under section 143(1).

Analysis: The proposed disallowance depended upon the disputed legal and factual question whether the assessee had validly exercised and retained the option under section 115BAA. Such a determination, particularly after the assessee's clarification and the apparent non-fulfilment of statutory conditions, exceeded the limited scope of a prima facie adjustment under section 143(1).

Conclusion: The adjustment disallowing additional depreciation under section 143(1) was beyond the permissible scope of that provision and was deleted. This issue is decided in favour of the assessee.

Final Conclusion: The additional depreciation claim remains governed by the normal provisions because the purported concessional-tax option stood invalidated by non-compliance with its mandatory conditions.

Ratio Decidendi: A section 143(1) adjustment cannot impose taxation under section 115BAA solely because Form 10-IC was filed where the return demonstrates non-fulfilment of mandatory conditions that invalidate the option.

Issues: Whether the reassessment notice was invalid because it was issued by an Income-tax Officer allegedly lacking pecuniary jurisdiction.

Analysis: Section 120 of the Income-tax Act, 1961 contemplates jurisdiction based on directions of the competent authorities and permits concurrent exercise of jurisdiction by more than one Assessing Officer. CBDT Instruction No. 1/2011 dated 31.01.2011 governs administrative allocation of work and does not independently create or extinguish statutory jurisdiction. Section 127 of the Income-tax Act, 1961 permits transfer of any case, without limitation by monetary thresholds; a valid transfer order vests complete jurisdiction in the transferee Assessing Officer. The assessment records did not establish whether such a transfer order existed.

Conclusion: Pecuniary allocation under administrative instructions does not, by itself, invalidate the notice; verification of a transfer order under Section 127 of the Income-tax Act, 1961 and fresh adjudication of the jurisdictional challenge are required.

Issues: Whether the non-resident assessee for Assessment Year 2016-17 was an eligible assessee under section 144C and whether the consequential final reassessment order was barred by limitation.

Analysis: The amendment made by the Finance Act, 2020 with effect from 01.04.2020 to include a non-resident within the definition of an eligible assessee did not govern the assessment year in question. The assessee was therefore not an eligible assessee for that year, and the assessment was required to conform to the limitation under section 153(2). Independently, no reference had been made to the Transfer Pricing Officer under section 92CA, so the extended limitation under section 153(4) was unavailable. The final assessment order dated 23.04.2024 was beyond the applicable period.

Conclusion: The final assessment order was held to be time-barred and was quashed.

Issues: (i) Whether the seized board resolutions, legal notes, valuation reports and related documents constituted incriminating material for assessment under Section 153A of the Income-tax Act, 1961; (ii) Whether the firm's prior asset sale and alteration of partners' capital interests violated the conditions for succession under Section 47(xiii) of the Income-tax Act, 1961.

Issue (i): Whether the seized board resolutions, legal notes, valuation reports and related documents constituted incriminating material for assessment under Section 153A of the Income-tax Act, 1961.

Analysis: In a search assessment of the concluded assessment, additions require incriminating material found during the search. The seized records concerned the ordinary course of the firm's conversion, its legal constitution, valuation and prior transactions; they did not disclose any undisclosed income or evidence warranting the impugned addition.

Conclusion: The documents were not incriminating material, and the assessment proceedings under Section 153A were not maintainable. This issue is decided in favour of the Assessee.

Issue (ii): Whether the firm's prior asset sale and alteration of partners' capital interests violated the conditions for succession under Section 47(xiii) of the Income-tax Act, 1961.

Analysis: The conditions under provisos (a) and (c) to Section 47(xiii) require that the firm's business assets and liabilities immediately before succession become those of the company, and that partners receive no consideration or benefit other than shares in the company. The assets and liabilities existing immediately before succession passed unchanged to the company, and the partners received shares corresponding to their pre-succession interests. A sale of assets and changes in capital-sharing ratios effected before succession neither altered the assets and liabilities immediately before succession nor amounted to prohibited consideration on conversion.

Conclusion: The conditions of Section 47(xiii) were satisfied; the succession was not rendered a taxable transfer, and the Section 80-IA deduction could not be denied on that basis. This issue is decided in favour of the Assessee.

Final Conclusion: The additions founded on the search assessment and on treating the firm's succession as a taxable transfer lack legal basis.

Issues: (i) Whether exemption under Section 10(23FB) is available to a SEBI-registered venture capital fund when its separately maintained contributory schemes lack individual SEBI registration; (ii) Whether shares held by trustees in their fiduciary capacity for the fund are includible in determining whether a venture capital undertaking is an associated company.

Issue (i): Whether exemption under Section 10(23FB) is available to a SEBI-registered venture capital fund when its separately maintained contributory schemes lack individual SEBI registration.

Analysis: Section 10(23FB) exempts income of a qualifying venture capital fund from investments in venture capital undertakings. The regulatory scheme requires registration of the trust as the venture capital fund; Regulations 3(1) and 7 do not require each scheme operated by that registered fund to obtain a separate registration. Scheme-specific submission of the private placement memorandum to SEBI does not convert each scheme into an independently registrable fund.

Conclusion: Separate SEBI registration for each contributory scheme is not required, and the assessee is eligible for exemption under Section 10(23FB) on this ground.

Issue (ii): Whether shares held by trustees in their fiduciary capacity for the fund are includible in determining whether a venture capital undertaking is an associated company.

Analysis: Regulation 12(c) prohibits a venture capital fund from investing in an associated company, which is identified by reference to shareholding exceeding 15% held by trustees, settlors, sponsors or directors. That test concerns their personal shareholding and addresses conflicts arising from their own interest. Shares acquired and held by trustees solely for and on behalf of the fund are held in a fiduciary capacity and cannot be aggregated with their personal holdings. A subsisting SEBI registration satisfies the statutory definition of a venture capital fund, absent any regulatory action for breach of the governing regulations.

Conclusion: Shares held by trustees on behalf of the fund are excluded from the associated-company test; the investments did not disentitle the assessee to exemption under Section 10(23FB).

Final Conclusion: The registered fund's scheme structure and its investments, assessed by reference to trustees' personal rather than fiduciary holdings, preserve the claimed statutory exemption.

Ratio Decidendi: Where SEBI registration is granted to a trust as a venture capital fund, separate schemes need not be independently registered, and fiduciary shareholding held for the fund cannot be treated as trustees' personal holding for the associated-company restriction.

Issues: (i) Whether penalty for the claim of deduction under Section 80G in respect of CSR expenditure was sustainable; (ii) Whether penalty could be levied on deduction of education cess claimed under binding precedent when the return was filed but subsequently disclaimed following a retrospective amendment; and (iii) Whether penalty could be levied on a transfer-pricing royalty adjustment after an Advance Pricing Agreement was finalised and a timely modified return was furnished.

Issue (i): Whether penalty for the claim of deduction under Section 80G in respect of CSR expenditure was sustainable.

Analysis: The underlying addition had been deleted by the Tribunal. Further, the claim was supported by binding Tribunal decisions, and initiation or levy of penalty contrary to such binding decisions was impermissible.

Conclusion: Penalty on the CSR deduction claim was unsustainable, in favour of the assessee.

Issue (ii): Whether penalty could be levied on deduction of education cess claimed under binding precedent when the return was filed but subsequently disclaimed following a retrospective amendment.

Analysis: The claim was made when it was supported by a binding jurisdictional precedent. The retrospective amendment and reversal of that precedent occurred after the return had been furnished. A claim so made and later relinquished could not attract penal consequences for under-reporting or misreporting.

Conclusion: Penalty on the education cess claim was unsustainable, in favour of the assessee.

Issue (iii): Whether penalty could be levied on a transfer-pricing royalty adjustment after an Advance Pricing Agreement was finalised and a timely modified return was furnished.

Analysis: Upon execution of the Advance Pricing Agreement and filing of the modified return within the prescribed period, Section 92CD required modification of total income in accordance with that agreement. The royalty deduction in the return and the assessment would consequently align. The conditions for under-reporting under Section 270A(2) were not attracted, and complete disclosure of the royalty transaction excluded misrepresentation or suppression under Section 270A(9). Penalty based on an adjustment resolved under the statutory APA framework would defeat that framework's object of reducing litigation.

Conclusion: Penalty on the transfer-pricing royalty adjustment was unsustainable, in favour of the assessee.

Final Conclusion: The statutory requirements for imposing penalty for under-reporting or misreporting were absent in respect of all three adjustments.

Ratio Decidendi: Penalty for under-reporting or misreporting cannot be imposed where the claim was fully disclosed and legally supported when made, including where a subsequent Advance Pricing Agreement and timely modified return govern the relevant adjustment.

Issues: Whether additional evidence comprising a Departmental Valuation Officer's valuation report for the jointly purchased property should be admitted and the addition under section 56(2)(x) remitted for fresh adjudication.

Analysis: The additional valuation report determined the fair market value of the same property and had a direct bearing on the difference between the purchase consideration and stamp duty value forming the basis of the addition. Its verification was required at the assessment stage, and its admission was not opposed by the Revenue.

Conclusion: The additional evidence is admitted, and the issue concerning the addition is restored to the Assessing Officer for verification and fresh adjudication after affording reasonable opportunity of hearing; all merits contentions remain open.

Issues: Whether a bona fide purchaser of property under provisional attachment is entitled to its release where the sale consideration remains available for substitution.

Analysis: The provisional attachment pre-dated the agreement for sale, but the seller suppressed that attachment despite publication of a public notice and during proceedings culminating in a court-directed conveyance. The purchaser acquired registered title after paying the agreed consideration, while the unpaid balance of Rs. 6,95,62,552 remained with the court-appointed receiver. These peculiar circumstances established the purchaser's bona fides and preserved an identifiable amount capable of being attached in substitution for the property.

Conclusion: The bona fide purchaser is entitled to release of the property, with liberty to the Enforcement Directorate to seek attachment of the sale consideration lying with the court-appointed receiver as substituted property.

Issues: (i) Whether the proposed transfer of the entire proprietorship business to an LLP without consideration constitutes a supply under GST; (ii) Whether such transfer is a supply of goods or services; (iii) Whether the transfer is exempt as a transfer of a going concern under Entry No. 2 of Notification No. 12/2017-Central Tax (Rate) dated 28.06.2017; and (iv) Whether GST applies to stock and assets if the business does not qualify as a going concern.

Issue (i): Whether the proposed transfer of the entire proprietorship business to an LLP without consideration constitutes a supply under GST.

Analysis: Section 7 has an inclusive scope, and includes activities specified in Schedule I even when made without consideration. The proposed arrangement involves transfer of the entire business, including its assets, liabilities, employees, rights and customer relationships, to enable its uninterrupted continuation by the transferee.

Conclusion: The proposed transfer of the business constitutes a supply under GST.

Issue (ii): Whether such transfer is a supply of goods or services.

Analysis: A business transferred as a going concern is not treated as a supply of goods under Entry No. 4(c) of Schedule II. Since the transfer of the business as a whole is not a transfer of goods, it falls within the residual definition of services under Section 2(102).

Conclusion: The transaction is a supply of services.

Issue (iii): Whether the transfer is exempt as a transfer of a going concern under Entry No. 2 of Notification No. 12/2017-Central Tax (Rate) dated 28.06.2017.

Analysis: Entry No. 2 grants a nil-rate exemption for services by way of transfer of a going concern as a whole or an independent part thereof. Although the proposed arrangement contemplates transfer of the complete operational business, the material furnished did not establish that the business satisfies the requisite going-concern status.

Conclusion: The exemption under Entry No. 2 is available only if the business qualifies as a going concern by all applicable standards.

Issue (iv): Whether GST applies to stock and assets if the business does not qualify as a going concern.

Analysis: Where the business is not transferred as a going concern, Entry No. 4(c) of Schedule II treats goods forming part of the business assets as deemed supplies upon cessation as a taxable person.

Conclusion: If the business does not qualify as a going concern, the transferred stock and assets constitute a supply of goods taxable at the rates applicable to the respective goods.

Final Conclusion: The business transfer is classified as a service, but the nil-rate treatment depends upon substantiation that the transferred business is a going concern; failing that status, goods forming part of the transfer attract GST at their applicable rates.

Ratio Decidendi: Transfer of an entire business as a going concern is a supply of services, and the exemption for such transfer applies only where the going-concern character of the business is established.

Issues: (i) Whether battery-operated e-rickshaws, e-carts, hydraulic e-carts and e-scooters, supplied with or without batteries, are classifiable under tariff headings 8703 and 8711 respectively and taxable at 5 per cent GST; (ii) Whether the question concerning refund of accumulated input tax credit arising from inverted duty structure falls within the scope of advance ruling.

Issue (i): Whether battery-operated e-rickshaws, e-carts, hydraulic e-carts and e-scooters, supplied with or without batteries, are classifiable under tariff headings 8703 and 8711 respectively and taxable at 5 per cent GST.

Analysis: Three-wheeled e-rickshaws, e-carts and hydraulic e-carts fall under tariff item 87038040, while electrically propelled e-scooters fall under tariff item 87116020. An electrically operated vehicle derives traction solely from electrical energy and has no alternate source of propulsion. Where the motor, inverter, control module, drivetrain and vehicle body are fitted, the absence of a battery at the time of supply does not alter its essential character as an electrically operated vehicle. Serial No. 441 of Schedule I of Notification No. 09/2025-Central Tax (Rate) dated 17.09.2025 covers electrically operated two- and three-wheeled vehicles.

Conclusion: The specified three-wheeled vehicles are classifiable under tariff heading 8703 and the e-scooter under tariff heading 8711, whether supplied with or without batteries, and all are taxable at 5 per cent GST.

Issue (ii): Whether the question concerning refund of accumulated input tax credit arising from inverted duty structure falls within the scope of advance ruling.

Analysis: Section 97(2) of the Central Goods and Services Tax Act, 2017 specifies the questions that may be raised for advance ruling. Entitlement to refund of accumulated input tax credit under Section 54(3)(ii) does not fall within those specified categories.

Conclusion: The question seeking determination of refund entitlement on account of inverted duty structure is outside the statutory scope of advance ruling and was not admitted.

Final Conclusion: The ruling establishes the applicable classification and concessional GST treatment of the specified electric vehicles, while refund entitlement remains outside the advance-ruling jurisdiction.

Ratio Decidendi: A vehicle designed to run solely on electrical energy retains its character as an electrically operated vehicle notwithstanding that its battery is not fitted at the time of supply.

Issues: (i) Whether the imported IT support services received from the related foreign entity constitute a taxable import of services on which IGST is payable under reverse charge; and (ii) Whether the value declared in the recipient's self-invoice can be deemed the open market value for reverse-charge GST.

Issue (i): Whether the imported IT support services received from the related foreign entity constitute a taxable import of services on which IGST is payable under reverse charge.

Analysis: Import of services for consideration falls within supply, and import from a related person in the course or furtherance of business is also treated as supply. The foreign supplier and Indian recipient were related persons under the common-control test. As the supplier was outside India, the recipient was in India, and the place of supply was India under the recipient-location rule, the transaction satisfied the requirements of import of services. Such imported services are inter-State supplies, and the recipient is liable to pay IGST under reverse charge.

Conclusion: The IT support services are a taxable import of services, with IGST payable by the Indian recipient under reverse charge.

Issue (ii): Whether the value declared in the recipient's self-invoice can be deemed the open market value for reverse-charge GST.

Analysis: Valuation of supplies between related persons is governed by Rule 28. Its second proviso deems the invoice value to be the open market value where the recipient is eligible for full input tax credit. For imported services taxable under reverse charge, the recipient is required to issue a self-invoice. Circular No. 210/4/2024-GST extends the Rule 28 deeming principle to imports of services from related foreign entities and recognises the value declared by the related domestic recipient in its invoice as the open market value where full input tax credit is available.

Conclusion: The value stated in the self-invoice is deemed to be the open market value, provided the recipient is eligible for full input tax credit.

Final Conclusion: The statutory valuation deeming mechanism applies to the reverse-charge import of services where the full input tax credit condition is fulfilled.

Ratio Decidendi: For an import of services from a related foreign person, the recipient's self-invoice value is deemed open market value under the second proviso to Rule 28(1) where the recipient is eligible for full input tax credit.

Issues: (i) The appropriate Service Accounting Codes for setting up a new main water pipeline and revamping a water pipeline distribution network; (ii) Whether the works-contract services qualify for exemption and the applicable GST rate.

Issue (i): The appropriate Service Accounting Codes for setting up a new main water pipeline and revamping a water pipeline distribution network.

Analysis: The contracts involve transfer of goods in the execution of civil works that become part of immovable property and consequently satisfy the definition of a works contract. A works contract is treated as a supply of services. The installation of a new water main is general construction of civil engineering waterworks, whereas revamping an existing distribution network is repair and maintenance of such construction.

Conclusion: Setting up the new main water pipeline is classifiable under SAC 995422, while revamping the water pipeline distribution network is classifiable under SAC 995429. This is against the assessee's proposed classification under SAC 995479.

Issue (ii): Whether the works-contract services qualify for exemption and the applicable GST rate.

Analysis: The exemptions for pure services and composite supplies require, among other conditions, supply to specified governmental recipients and, for composite supplies, a goods component not exceeding 25 per cent. Those conditions are not met because the contracts are works contracts involving goods exceeding 75 per cent of their value. Although the recipient qualifies as a Governmental Authority, the exemption confined to services supplied "by way of" water supply requires direct provision of water supply. Civil engineering and repair works merely connected with water-supply infrastructure do not meet that direct supply requirement. Exemption notifications require strict interpretation.

Conclusion: The services are not exempt under Serial Nos. 3, 3A, or 3B and are taxable at 9 per cent CGST plus 9 per cent SGST under Serial No. 3(ii). This is against the assessee.

Final Conclusion: The pipeline installation and revamping are taxable works-contract services under their respective civil-engineering and repair-and-maintenance service classifications.

Ratio Decidendi: An exemption restricted to services supplied "by way of" water supply does not extend to works-contract civil engineering or repair activities merely connected with water-supply infrastructure.

Issues: Whether a successful resolution applicant is required to discharge employees' provident-fund and gratuity dues, including statutory interest, notwithstanding an approved resolution plan.

Analysis: Provident-fund and gratuity dues are excluded from the liquidation estate and cannot be subjected to distribution under the insolvency waterfall. A resolution plan must comply with applicable law, while the statutory first charge for provident-fund dues prevails. Interest under Section 7Q is statutorily payable and is distinct from damages under Section 14B.

Conclusion: A successful resolution applicant must pay provident-fund and gratuity dues in full, together with interest payable under Section 7Q; such dues are not distributable under the insolvency waterfall.

Issues: (i) Whether duty under Rule 6 of the Central Excise Valuation (Determination of Price of Excisable Goods) Rules, 2000 is to be computed on the total sale value or the amortised value of tools, dies and moulds separately sold to customers and used in manufacturing final products; (ii) Whether the captive consumption exemption under Notification No. 67/95-CE applies to tools, dies and moulds separately sold to customers and thereafter used in manufacture; (iii) Whether the extended period of limitation, interest and penalty are sustainable.

Issue (i): Whether duty under Rule 6 of the Central Excise Valuation (Determination of Price of Excisable Goods) Rules, 2000 is to be computed on the total sale value or the amortised value of tools, dies and moulds separately sold to customers and used in manufacturing final products.

Analysis: Tools and dies are used repeatedly for producing final goods; their cost must consequently be spread over the goods produced through amortisation. The appellant had adopted this method where the tooling was customer-supplied, and the same method applies where the tooling was manufactured or procured by the appellant and separately invoiced to customers.

Conclusion: Only the amortised value of the tools, dies and moulds is includible in the assessable value of the final products. This issue is decided in favour of the assessee.

Issue (ii): Whether the captive consumption exemption under Notification No. 67/95-CE applies to tools, dies and moulds separately sold to customers and thereafter used in manufacture.

Analysis: The captive consumption exemption applies where goods are not sold and their value is absorbed in the value of the final products. Tools and dies sold to customers under separate invoices and thereafter used in manufacture stand on the same footing as tooling supplied by customers and do not qualify for that exemption.

Conclusion: The captive consumption exemption is unavailable. This issue is decided against the assessee.

Issue (iii): Whether the extended period of limitation, interest and penalty are sustainable.

Analysis: The appellant had included amortised tooling value in comparable cases involving customer-supplied tools and dies. Its omission to include such value for tooling separately sold to customers could not therefore be attributed to a bona fide belief.

Conclusion: The extended period of limitation is invocable; interest and penalty are consequently sustainable, subject to recalculation. This issue is decided against the assessee.

Final Conclusion: The duty liability must be recalculated by adopting the amortised tooling value in the assessable value of the final products, with corresponding recalculation of interest and penalty; the claims to captive-use exemption and limitation protection fail.

Ratio Decidendi: Where tools, dies or moulds sold to customers are subsequently used in manufacture, their amortised value must be included in the assessable value of the final products, and such tooling does not qualify for captive consumption exemption.

Issues: Whether import transactions backed by substantial advance payments made before the restriction on gold imports were entitled to transitional protection under Paragraph 1.05(b) of the Foreign Trade Policy, 2023.

Analysis: Paragraph 1.05(b) protects imports made before a policy restriction and extends protection to pre-existing commitments supported by irrevocable commercial letters of credit. The exception is intended to protect bona fide transactions concluded before the restrictive notification. An irrevocable commercial letter of credit provides payment security through banking arrangements; however, advance payments exceeding 90% of the invoice value provided greater security to the overseas seller. The petitioners established through their business records and prior transactions that they were regular bona fide traders in precious metals and that the impugned transactions were not devised to circumvent the changed import policy. While the restriction itself was a policy decision not warranting interference, its transitional application required a purposive rather than mechanical construction. Notifications issued as delegated legislation ordinarily operate prospectively unless retrospective operation is statutorily authorised.

Conclusion: The petitioners were entitled to the benefit of Paragraph 1.05(b) of the Foreign Trade Policy, 2023 for the identified pre-notification transactions supported by substantial advance payments.

Issues: Whether provisional release of seized betel nuts was warranted under Section 110A of the Customs Act, 1962 in writ jurisdiction.

Analysis: The initial test report identified the representative samples as resembling Indonesian areca nuts and recorded mould infestation. Although a subsequent re-sampled report indicated Indian origin, it did not address mould infestation. A further food laboratory report found the nuts damaged by mould and insects beyond prescribed limits and classified them as sub-standard and unsafe. The evidence therefore did not establish an unequivocal case of Indian origin, and an appellate statutory remedy was available.

Conclusion: Provisional release was not warranted; the petitioner was left to pursue the statutory remedy.

Issues: (i) Whether the respondent had locus standi to challenge the Way Leave Permission granted for revival of the appellant's water pipeline; (ii) Whether the retrospective renewal of an expired Way Leave Permission was lawful despite intervening rights, absence of a safety audit and the insolvency resolution process; (iii) Whether the findings of fraud and collusion against the appellant and Railway authorities were justified.

Issue (i): Whether the respondent had locus standi to challenge the Way Leave Permission granted for revival of the appellant's water pipeline.

Analysis: The respondent had constructed and operated railway underpasses under agreements with the Railway authorities. Its recorded safety concerns showed a real possibility that pipeline restoration and associated construction could adversely affect those underpasses and its adjoining property. A person facing possible adverse civil consequences has sufficient standing to challenge the administrative permission; the Railway authorities also owed a duty to ensure that later permissions did not impair existing authorised works.

Conclusion: The respondent had locus standi to maintain the writ petition. This issue is decided against the appellant.

Issue (ii): Whether the retrospective renewal of an expired Way Leave Permission was lawful despite intervening rights, absence of a safety audit and the insolvency resolution process.

Analysis: The original permission expired by efflux of time before commencement of the corporate insolvency resolution process. An expired permission could not be retrospectively renewed, and the NCLT lacked jurisdiction under the insolvency framework to revive, renew or preserve a railway-land permission that had already lapsed; any fresh permission lay within the Railway authorities' competence. The proposed overhead structure was also inconsistent with Clause 1033(12) of the Indian Railway Code for Engineering Department. In view of the respondent's specific objections and the potential safety implications for existing underpasses and the surrounding industrial area, a comprehensive safety audit and an opportunity of hearing were necessary before grant of the permission.

Conclusion: The retrospective renewal or revival of the expired Way Leave Permission was illegal. This issue is decided against the appellant.

Issue (iii): Whether the findings of fraud and collusion against the appellant and Railway authorities were justified.

Analysis: Fraud and fraudulent collusion are serious charges requiring proof on proper material beyond reasonable doubt; suspicion cannot substitute proof. The illegality of the permission did not by itself establish fraud or collusion.

Conclusion: The findings and observations of fraud and collusion were unwarranted and stand expunged. This issue is decided in favour of the appellant.

Final Conclusion: The invalidity of the Way Leave grant and consequential actions remains undisturbed, but the adverse imputations of fraud and collusion are deleted.

Ratio Decidendi: An administrative authority cannot retrospectively renew an expired permission so as to affect intervening rights without jurisdiction, a proper safety assessment and compliance with natural justice; insolvency resolution proceedings do not revive rights that had lapsed before commencement of the process.