Issues: Whether the challenges to the adjudication orders should be pursued through the statutory appellate remedy; and whether the validity of service through the Common Portal required adjudication.

Analysis: The question of service through the Common Portal was not finally adjudicated because the operation and effect of an earlier decision on that issue had been stayed by the Supreme Court. The petitioners were permitted to pursue statutory appeals within the stipulated period, with the appellate authorities directed not to object on limitation upon compliance with the required statutory deposit.

Outcome: The writ petitions were disposed of with liberty to pursue statutory appeals.

Issues: (i) Whether the bank-account freezing order under Section 17(1-A) of the Prevention of Money Laundering Act, 2002 was invalid for omitting the reasons to believe and for alleged non-compliance with Section 17(2) and Section 17(4); (ii) Whether writ relief against the freezing order was available despite the pending statutory adjudication and appellate remedies under the Prevention of Money Laundering Act, 2002.

Issue (i): Whether the bank-account freezing order under Section 17(1-A) of the Prevention of Money Laundering Act, 2002 was invalid for omitting the reasons to believe and for alleged non-compliance with Section 17(2) and Section 17(4).

Analysis: Section 17(1) authorises the Director or Deputy Director to record reasons to believe, and an authorised subordinate officer may freeze property under Section 17(1-A) where seizure is impracticable. The statutory scheme does not require the freezing order itself to set out those reasons; Section 17(2) instead requires their transmission, with the relevant material, to the Adjudicating Authority in a sealed envelope. The record established that an application for continuation of the freezing order was made within the prescribed period under Section 17(4) and that statutory notice was issued.

Conclusion: The freezing order was valid and procedurally compliant; the issue was decided against the petitioner.

Issue (ii): Whether writ relief against the freezing order was available despite the pending statutory adjudication and appellate remedies under the Prevention of Money Laundering Act, 2002.

Analysis: Sections 8(1) to 8(3) provide for notice, hearing, and adjudication of whether all or any frozen property is involved in money laundering. The objection that the restraint should be confined to identifiable proceeds of crime falls for determination in that adjudication. Further appeals are available under Sections 26 and 42. The precedent relied upon concerning a bank restraint without exercise of the statutory freezing power was distinguishable because the freezing power under Section 17(1-A) had been invoked here.

Conclusion: Writ intervention was not warranted while the statutory adjudication and appellate remedies remained available; the issue was decided against the petitioner.

Final Conclusion: The challenge to the freezing measure must be pursued through the statutory adjudication and appellate framework under the Prevention of Money Laundering Act, 2002.

Ratio Decidendi: A freezing order under Section 17(1-A) need not itself disclose recorded reasons to believe where those reasons and materials are forwarded to the Adjudicating Authority as prescribed, and writ review is ordinarily unavailable while the statutory adjudication and appellate remedies remain effective.

Issues: Whether rejection of the trust's application for registration under section 12AB without confronting it with the adverse verification findings and without granting an effective opportunity of hearing was sustainable.

Analysis: The material submitted by the trust, including financial statements, activity-related documents and the verification report, disclosed receipt of donations and expenditure. Those figures did not by themselves justify a conclusion that the trust had not commenced its activities. Before declining registration on that basis, the registering authority was required to confront the trust with the adverse material, independently verify whether the activities were carried on, and examine their genuineness. A fresh application could not be rejected merely because an earlier rejection had not been appealed, since there is no statutory bar against a further application after activities commence.

Conclusion: The rejection of registration was unsustainable and was quashed; the registration application must be adjudicated afresh after granting due opportunity of hearing.

Issues: Whether the petitioner was entitled to regular bail.

Analysis: Under Section 483 of the Bharatiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita, 2023, the relevant circumstances included the nature of the allegations, the petitioner's stated willingness to provide a voice sample, and the fact that 34 out of 37 accused had already been granted bail. The seriousness of the alleged organised tax-evasion arrangement and the pending forensic voice-sample process did not warrant continued custody on the facts considered.

Conclusion: The petitioner met the threshold for grant of regular bail.

Issues: Whether reassessment initiated by a notice issued under section 148 in the name of an assessee who had died before its issuance, followed by an assessment in that name, was valid.

Analysis: The notice was issued nearly five years after the assessee's death, despite which the reassessment was initiated and completed in the deceased assessee's name. A notice under section 148 must be issued to a living assessee or, where legally permissible, to the legal representative. The statutory mechanism concerning legal representatives applies to continuation of proceedings validly initiated during the assessee's lifetime and does not validate proceedings initiated against a deceased person. Subsequent participation by a legal heir does not cure this jurisdictional defect.

Conclusion: The notice issued to the deceased assessee and the consequential reassessment order were void ab initio and were quashed.

Issues: Whether income from the sale of stock-in-trade, for which consideration was received and possession was handed over in FY 2013-14, was taxable in AY 2014-15 rather than AY 2016-17 merely because the conveyance deed was subsequently registered, and whether Section 43CA could be invoked in AY 2016-17.

Analysis: The transfer had been completed in substance when the entire consideration was received, possession was handed over and the income was recognised in FY 2013-14. Section 2(47)(v) of the Income-tax Act, 1961, read with the principle of part performance under Section 53A of the Transfer of Property Act, 1882, supported taxation upon completion of these substantive acts. Applying substance over form and the doctrine of accrual of income, the subsequent registration was a procedural continuation of the earlier transaction and did not create a fresh taxable event. The deeming fiction under Section 43CA presupposes a taxable transfer in the relevant previous year and could not be applied solely because the instrument relating to an already completed and taxed transaction was registered later; taxing the same income again would result in double taxation.

Conclusion: The income arose in AY 2014-15 and not in AY 2016-17; the subsequent registration did not shift the year of taxability, and Section 43CA was inapplicable in AY 2016-17.

Issues: Whether a writ of mandamus should issue for unblocking input tax credit in the electronic credit ledger blocked under Rule 86A.

Analysis: Rule 86A(3) limits the restriction on utilisation of blocked credit to one year. The statutory framework also enables the registered person to seek an order from the Commissioner under Rule 86A(2) after the credit is blocked. That remedy was not pursued. Subsequent cancellation of registration and demand proceedings could be separately challenged before seeking unblocking of the credit.

Conclusion: No entitlement to a mandamus for unblocking the input tax credit was established; the issue was decided against the assessee.

Issues: (i) Whether a return filed after the period stipulated in a notice under Section 148 for Assessment Year 2014-15 could be treated as non est; (ii) Whether reassessment could be completed without serving a notice under Section 143(2) after the return had been filed.

Issue (i): Whether a return filed after the period stipulated in a notice under Section 148 for Assessment Year 2014-15 could be treated as non est.

Analysis: Under the regime applicable to the relevant assessment year, the stipulated thirty-day period did not render the subsequently filed return non est. The record established that the return had been filed, while the subsequent departmental communication incorrectly proceeded on the premise that no return had been furnished.

Conclusion: The return was valid and could not be treated as non est.

Issue (ii): Whether reassessment could be completed without serving a notice under Section 143(2) after the return had been filed.

Analysis: Once the return and the required materials had been furnished in the reassessment proceedings, service of notice under Section 143(2) was mandatory before completion of the assessment. No such notice was issued or served.

Conclusion: The reassessment completed without the mandatory notice under Section 143(2) was invalid.

Final Conclusion: The filed return had to be recognised and the statutory scrutiny notice had to be served before reassessment could lawfully be completed.

Ratio Decidendi: A return filed pursuant to a reassessment notice cannot be treated as non est merely for being filed beyond the period stated in that notice where the applicable law permits its filing, and reassessment on such return requires service of the mandatory notice under Section 143(2).

Issues: Whether mobile phones and bank debit cards seized under the GST law could be retained beyond six months without an order extending the seizure.

Analysis: Section 67(7) of the Central Goods and Services Tax Act, 2017 permits retention of seized articles beyond six months only where an extension of seizure has been ordered. No order extending the seizure existed.

Conclusion: The seized mobile phones and bank debit cards could not be further detained and were required to be returned to the petitioner.

Issues: Whether the petitioner was entitled to place documents demonstrating the genuineness of transactions before continuation of the blocking of input tax credit under Rule 86A.

Analysis: Rule 86A permits blocking of input tax credit in the electronic credit ledger where the statutory conditions are met. The hearing intimation and postal acknowledgement disproved the assertion that no pre-decisional opportunity had been provided. However, the claim that the supplier was registered and that transactions were supported by valid invoices and banking-channel payments required evaluation on supporting material. The blocking could not be automatically lifted merely because a further opportunity was being granted.

Conclusion: The issue is decided in favour of the assessee to the limited extent that it may submit a detailed response and supporting documents, which must be considered after an opportunity of hearing before deciding whether the blocking of input tax credit should continue.

Issues: (i) Whether cash/currency could lawfully be seized under Section 67(2) of the Central Goods and Services Tax Act, 2017; and (ii) Whether the seized mobile phones, pen drives and bank card could continue to be retained after issuance of the demand-cum-show-cause notice.

Issue (i): Whether cash/currency could lawfully be seized under Section 67(2) of the Central Goods and Services Tax Act, 2017.

Analysis: Section 67(2) authorises seizure only of articles falling within its statutory scope. The interpretation that cash/currency is not a "thing" capable of seizure under that provision was adopted, there being no impediment to following that view. The cash had already been refunded, but it had remained withheld from 5 June 2025 until 19 August 2026.

Conclusion: Seizure of the cash was illegal. The issue is decided in favour of the assessee, who is entitled to interest on the wrongfully withheld amount, payable within six weeks.

Issue (ii): Whether the seized mobile phones, pen drives and bank card could continue to be retained after issuance of the demand-cum-show-cause notice.

Analysis: The statutory restriction permits retention of seized documents, books or things only so long as necessary for examination, enquiry or proceedings. Since the demand-cum-show-cause notice had already been issued, continued retention of the identified articles was not justified.

Conclusion: The issue is decided in favour of the assessee. The mobile phones, pen drives and bank card must be returned forthwith upon production of a certified copy of the order and acknowledgment.

Final Conclusion: The statutory power of search and seizure does not extend to cash/currency under Section 67(2), and it cannot support continued retention of other seized articles once their retention is no longer necessary for the proceedings.

Ratio Decidendi: Under Section 67, seizure and retention are confined to articles lawfully seizable and necessary for the statutory enquiry or proceedings; cash/currency is not a "thing" within the authorised class of seizure.

Issues: Whether the amendment to the exemption notification, which came into force after the date of the bill of lading, could be relied upon to refuse consideration of the request for provisional release of imported goods.

Analysis: The bill of lading pre-dated the commencement of the amendment. In the absence of an express provision conferring retrospective operation, a statutory notification operates prospectively and cannot govern imports covered by a bill of lading issued before its commencement. No distinguishing feature justified departure from the earlier directions governing provisional release of similar goods under Section 110A of the Customs Act, 1962.

Conclusion: The amendment could not be relied upon to deny consideration of the request for provisional release; the request must be considered in accordance with law and the goods released upon compliance with the conditions imposed.

Ratio Decidendi: A statutory notification without express retrospective operation cannot be applied to imports covered by a bill of lading issued before the notification came into force.

Issues: Whether recorded and pre-recorded audio/video CDs and DVDs were taxable at 5% under Entry 68(5)(d) rather than at 14.5% as DVDs and CDs under Entry 68(30) of the First Schedule.

Analysis: Entry 68(5) covers information-technology software and the media on which it is embedded, including recorded and pre-recorded DVDs and CDs under clause (d). The expression "on other media" and the placement of clause (d) within the software entry distinguish recorded media containing software from blank DVDs and CDs. The principle of noscitur a sociis supports this construction, as the recorded and pre-recorded media take their character from the associated software-related clauses. The clarification issued by the Authority for Clarification and Advance Rulings, the Commissioner's clarification, and consistent assessments of similar goods corroborated this classification. Since the material facts were undisputed, recourse to the statutory appellate remedy was unnecessary.

Conclusion: Recorded and pre-recorded audio/video CDs and DVDs are taxable at 5% under Entry 68(5)(d) of Part B of the First Schedule to the Tamil Nadu Value Added Tax Act, 2006, and are not taxable as blank DVDs and CDs at 14.5%.

Issues: Whether, upon transition from an export-oriented unit to the Export Promotion Capital Goods scheme, non-registration of the EPCG authorisation at the original port of import, non-production of the authorisation for debit, and non-submission of an undertaking in the prescribed form disentitled the assessee to exemption under Notification No. 16/2015-Customs dated 01.04.2015.

Analysis: Condition 2 of the notification ordinarily requires registration of the authorisation at the specified port of import and its production for debit at clearance. The capital goods had, however, already been imported under the export-oriented unit scheme and were being dealt with at the stage of debonding and transition to the EPCG scheme. The required particulars and EPCG authorisation had been furnished to the jurisdictional authorities, the exit and no-dues permissions were issued, and the export obligation was undertaken. The authorisation was available for debit, while the undertaking furnished for discharge of any future duty shortfall substantially met the relevant requirement.

Conclusion: The alleged failures were procedural lapses in the circumstances and did not constitute a substantive breach warranting denial of the EPCG exemption; no substantial question of law arose.

Issues: Whether registration under Section 12AB and approval under Section 80G could be granted subject to a condition that their applicability and consequential tax benefits would depend on the outcome of future Supreme Court proceedings.

Analysis: The statutory framework permits the Commissioner to grant or reject registration and approval in accordance with law; it does not authorise conditional registration or approval whose efficacy is kept contingent upon a future judicial outcome. A quasi-judicial authority may exercise only powers expressly conferred by statute. Once registration and approval are granted, their legal consequences must operate according to law, and any future cancellation or withdrawal can occur only through the statutory mechanism.

Conclusion: The contingent conditions attached to the registration and approval were beyond statutory jurisdiction and were directed to be deleted; the registration and approval shall operate in accordance with law without those conditions.

Issues: (i) Whether the applicant's ex-works supply of forty aircraft to the government purchaser from Gujarat is liable to GST in India; (ii) Whether the applicant must obtain GST registration in Gujarat for that supply.

Issue (i): Whether the applicant's ex-works supply of forty aircraft to the government purchaser from Gujarat is liable to GST in India.

Analysis: Section 7(1)(a) of the Central Goods and Services Tax Act, 2017 covers supplies of goods made for consideration in the course or furtherance of business. Aircraft are movable goods under Section 2(52), and transfer of title is treated as a supply of goods under Section 7(1A) read with Entry 1(a) of Schedule II. The aircraft are manufactured in Gujarat, procured by the applicant from the Indian aircraft contractor, and supplied ex-works in Gujarat to the government purchaser for contractual consideration. Notification No. 10/2025-Central Tax (Rate) dated 17.09.2025 does not provide an exemption for aircraft.

Conclusion: The supply of forty aircraft is liable to GST in India and is not exempt. This is against the assessee.

Issue (ii): Whether the applicant must obtain GST registration in Gujarat for that supply.

Analysis: Sections 22 and 25 of the Central Goods and Services Tax Act, 2017 require registration in the State from which taxable supplies are made once the applicable aggregate-turnover threshold is exceeded. The outward supply is made from Gujarat, and its stated transaction value exceeds the registration threshold.

Conclusion: GST registration in Gujarat is required. This is against the assessee.

Final Conclusion: The domestic procurement and onward ex-works supply of the aircraft constitute a taxable supply chain situated in Gujarat, with the corresponding registration nexus in that State.

Ratio Decidendi: A transfer of title in movable goods for consideration in the course of business is a taxable supply under GST, and the supplier must register in the State from which the taxable supply is made once the statutory threshold is crossed.

Issues: Whether cognizance on the complaint could validly be taken without affording the accused an opportunity of hearing as required by Section 223 of the Bharatiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita, 2023.

Analysis: The first proviso to Section 223(1) mandates that cognizance of an offence on a complaint shall not be taken without giving the accused an opportunity of being heard. The cognizance order was passed without such opportunity.

Conclusion: Cognizance taken without granting the accused the mandatory opportunity of hearing was invalid.

Issues: Whether reassessment notice issued more than three years after the relevant assessment year satisfied the monetary threshold under Section 149(1)(b) of the Income-tax Act, 1961.

Analysis: For a notice issued beyond three years, Section 149(1)(b) requires, cumulatively, that income chargeable to tax which escaped assessment is represented in the form of an asset and amounts to or is likely to amount to at least Rs. 50 lakh. The recorded basis treated the alleged escaped income as the income embedded in contractual receipts. The assessing authority subsequently estimated that income at 8% of the gross receipts and made an addition of Rs. 26,06,420. The actual alleged escaped income was therefore below the statutory threshold.

Conclusion: The jurisdictional requirements of Section 149(1)(b) were not met; the notice under Section 148 and consequential reassessment proceedings were invalid and liable to be quashed.

Issues: Whether an assessment made under the faceless assessment framework could be sustained when the assessee's specific request for a personal hearing through video conferencing was not effectively granted.

Analysis: The record showed that, after the requested video-conference hearing did not commence, the assessee sought rescheduling. The portal material reflected no further hearing notices, and the Revenue did not place any such notices on record. Where a personal hearing is specifically sought, an effective opportunity of hearing is required before finalising the assessment; its denial violates the requirements of Section 144B of the Income-tax Act, 1961 and the principles of natural justice.

Conclusion: The assessment and consequential demand and penalty proceedings could not be sustained. Fresh assessment is required after permitting a further reply, granting an effective personal hearing, disclosing any material proposed to be relied upon, and issuing a reasoned order.

Issues: Whether the assessment and consequential demand and penalty notices were vitiated by denial of adequate opportunity under the faceless-assessment procedure.

Analysis: The show-cause notice, issued late on a Friday, allowed effectively only one working day for a response, contrary to the National Faceless Assessment Centre SOP requiring a minimum of seven working days. The personal-hearing notice was issued late on a Sunday for a hearing the following afternoon, before expiry of the reply period. The request for a one-day adjournment was reasonably made but refused, and the portal was closed when the reply was sought to be uploaded. These circumstances denied a meaningful opportunity to respond and be heard.

Conclusion: The assessment order and consequential demand and penalty notices were invalid for breach of the principles of natural justice. The assessment proceedings were required to recommence from the show-cause-notice stage with prescribed time for reply, prior notice of video-conference hearing, disclosure of material relied upon, and a speaking assessment order.