Issues: Whether the absence of concealment of beneficial ownership or a future benefit to a third party excluded the transactions from Section 2(9)(A) of the Prohibition of Benami Property Transactions Act, 1988, and disclosed an error apparent on the face of the record warranting review.

Analysis: Section 2(9)(A) requires that consideration be provided by the beneficial owner and that the property be held in the name of a benamidar for the immediate or future benefit of that beneficial owner. It does not require concealment of the beneficial owner, benefit to a third party, or the use of illegitimate funds. Legitimate funds routed through banking channels may also constitute a benami transaction where the statutory ingredients are fulfilled. The illustrative factors for determining a benami transaction do not override the specific requirements of the applicable statutory clause. The admitted transfer of demonetized currency to benamidars, its deposit and routing through entity bank accounts, and its return in acceptable currency for the applicants' benefit supported the original finding.

Conclusion: The absence of concealment or benefit to a third party did not take the transactions outside Section 2(9)(A), and no error apparent on the face of the record was established to justify review.

Issues: Whether the rejection of a transitional Form 10A application deprived the trust of its pre-existing registration under Section 12AA for Assessment Year 2020-21 and justified denial of exemption under Sections 11 and 12.

Analysis: The registration granted under Section 12AA in 2007 continued unless lawfully cancelled or withdrawn. Rejection of the subsequent Form 10A application was distinct from cancellation of the existing registration and did not extinguish it. The Finance Act, 2020 version of Section 12AB was retrospectively omitted through TOLA from 01.06.2020, and the fresh Section 12AB regime operated from 01.04.2021. Section 12A(2) preserved continuity of exemption in the migration regime. A subsisting registration could not be disregarded by the Assessing Officer, particularly where exemption had been consistently allowed in earlier years on identical facts and no substantive breach of charitable conditions was found.

Conclusion: The original Section 12AA registration remained effective for Assessment Year 2020-21, and rejection of the transitional application did not create a registration gap. Denial of exemption under Sections 11 and 12 and taxation of the surplus were unsustainable; the exemption is to be granted subject to verification of other statutory conditions.

Issues: (i) Whether LFC reimbursements made while a binding interim direction barred tax deduction at source could render the deductor an assessee in default under sections 201(1) and 201(1A); (ii) Whether sufficient cause existed under section 249(3) to condone delays in eleven penalty appeals; and (iii) Whether penalties under section 271C could survive despite reasonable cause under section 273B.

Issue (i): Whether LFC reimbursements made while a binding interim direction barred tax deduction at source could render the deductor an assessee in default under sections 201(1) and 201(1A).

Analysis: LFC involving a foreign leg did not qualify for exemption under section 10(5), and tax was ordinarily deductible under section 192. However, the subsisting interim direction expressly required that the reimbursement not be treated as income so as to enable deduction of tax at source, while placing any eventual tax liability upon the employees. Section 201(1) requires a failure to perform an enforceable obligation to deduct tax. During the relevant previous years, the deductor was judicially restrained from making such deduction, and no payment-specific material established that the interim protection had been modified, vacated, or was inoperative. A later declaration of the substantive taxability of the reimbursement could not retrospectively convert compliance with the binding direction into a withholding default.

Conclusion: In favour of the assessee: it could not be treated as an assessee in default under section 201(1), and the consequential interest under section 201(1A) could not survive.

Issue (ii): Whether sufficient cause existed under section 249(3) to condone delays in eleven penalty appeals.

Analysis: The delays arose from institutional approval requirements, transfer or retirement of officials, unavailability of portal credentials, and the need to reset access through the e-filing system. The explanation was consistent across the appeals, with no material showing deliberate delay, mala fides, advantage from delay, or specific prejudice to the Revenue. In view of the common issues and the fact that the penalties rested on demands no longer sustainable, substantial justice warranted admission of the delayed appeals.

Conclusion: In favour of the assessee: sufficient cause was established and the delays in all eleven penalty appeals were condoned.

Issue (iii): Whether penalties under section 271C could survive despite reasonable cause under section 273B.

Analysis: Section 271C is subject to section 273B. The non-deduction did not arise from administrative convenience, ignorance, or an unsupported interpretation of law; it followed an express and operative judicial direction. Compliance with that direction was bona fide and compelled, as deduction contrary to it could entail disobedience of the judicial order. Further, the alleged failure to deduct tax did not survive after the finding that no enforceable withholding obligation was breached during the protected period.

Conclusion: In favour of the assessee: compliance with the interim direction constituted reasonable cause under section 273B, and the penalties under section 271C were unsustainable.

Final Conclusion: The binding interim direction insulated the deductor from withholding-default consequences for the relevant payments without affecting the substantive tax liability of the employees; the related penalty exactions were consequently impermissible.

Ratio Decidendi: A deductor expressly restrained by a binding judicial direction from treating a payment as income for tax deduction at source cannot be deemed in default under section 201(1) for complying with that direction, notwithstanding a later declaration of the payment's substantive taxability.

Issues: (i) Whether the ex parte quantum assessment required restoration for fresh adjudication owing to absence of an effective opportunity of hearing; and (ii) Whether non-compliance with one notice under section 143(2) and four successive notices under section 142(1) warranted separate penalties for every notice under section 272A(1)(d).

Issue (i): Whether the ex parte quantum assessment required restoration for fresh adjudication owing to absence of an effective opportunity of hearing.

Analysis: Section 250(6) requires an appellate order to state the points for determination, the decision and reasons. The hearing notices in the first appeal were sent to an email address different from that furnished in the appeal form. The assessment had also been completed ex parte, and relevant purchase-related material was stated to be available for production. Applying the principles of natural justice, a fresh adjudication would not prejudice the Revenue if effective opportunity were afforded.

Conclusion: The quantum matter is restored to the Assessing Officer for fresh adjudication after granting the assessee an effective opportunity of hearing.

Issue (ii): Whether non-compliance with one notice under section 143(2) and four successive notices under section 142(1) warranted separate penalties for every notice under section 272A(1)(d).

Analysis: Section 272A(1)(d) separately covers failure to comply with notices under sections 143(2) and 142(1). Non-compliance with the notice under section 143(2) constituted a distinct default. However, successive notices under section 142(1), issued for examination of similar issues, did not multiply the default; they constituted a single continuing default. The provision is directed at securing compliance rather than multiplying penal consequences for the same lapse.

Conclusion: Penalty of Rs. 10,000 for non-compliance with the notice under section 143(2) and Rs. 10,000 for non-compliance with the first notice under section 142(1) is sustained; the remaining penalty of Rs. 30,000 is deleted, partly in favour of the assessee.

Final Conclusion: The assessment requires a fresh determination on merits, while the penalty liability stands confined to two distinct defaults.

Ratio Decidendi: Successive notices under section 142(1) concerning the same subject matter give rise to a single default for penalty purposes, whereas failure to comply with a notice under section 143(2) and the first notice under section 142(1) constitutes distinct defaults.

Issues: Whether hiring private buses to a State transport undertaking under the agreements amounted to a transfer of the right to use goods taxable as a deemed sale under Section 4(8) of the Andhra Pradesh Value Added Tax Act, 2005.

Analysis: A transfer of the right to use goods requires transfer of possession and effective control to the user. The agreements required the bus owners to operate and maintain the buses, provide drivers, bear statutory and accident-related liabilities, and retain physical control and responsibility for the vehicles. The undertaking's power to fix routes and timings did not transfer control or exclusive possession of the buses. The arrangement was consequently a licence or service arrangement, not a transfer of the right to use goods.

Conclusion: The bus-hiring transactions were not deemed sales and were not liable to tax under Section 4(8) of the Andhra Pradesh Value Added Tax Act, 2005.

Issues: Whether an amendment effective from 15.06.2026 could be invoked to deny consideration of provisional release for imports covered by bills of lading dated before its commencement.

Analysis: The bills of lading pre-dated the commencement of the amendment. In the absence of an express retrospective operation, a statutory notification operates prospectively and cannot govern such earlier imports. No distinguishing feature justified departure from the earlier directions concerning provisional release of similar goods.

Conclusion: The amendment was inapplicable to the subject imports and could not be relied upon to refuse consideration of provisional release; the request is required to be considered under Section 110A of the Customs Act, 1962, with release following compliance with the conditions lawfully imposed.

Issues: Whether an amendment to an exemption notification that came into force after the dates of the bills of lading could be relied upon to refuse consideration of provisional release of imported goods under Section 110A of the Customs Act, 1962.

Analysis: Section 110A of the Customs Act, 1962 permits provisional release subject to conditions imposed in accordance with law. An amendment to a statutory notification, absent an express provision for retrospective operation, operates prospectively. The relevant bills of lading pre-dated the commencement of the amendment; therefore, that amendment could not govern the imports. The established approach concerning provisional release of similar goods applied, no distinguishing feature having been shown.

Conclusion: The amendment could not be invoked to refuse consideration of the request for provisional release. The request must be considered under Section 110A of the Customs Act, 1962, and the goods must be provisionally released upon compliance with the conditions lawfully imposed.

Issues: (i) Whether non-consideration of the applicable circular and precedent constituted a mistake apparent from the record permitting rectification under Section 129B(2) of the Customs Act, 1962; (ii) Whether the FOB value declared in shipping bills dated before 31.12.2008 was required to be treated as a cum-duty price for determining assessable value.

Issue (i): Whether non-consideration of the applicable circular and precedent constituted a mistake apparent from the record permitting rectification under Section 129B(2) of the Customs Act, 1962.

Analysis: The shipping-bill dates were evident from the record and fell within the period expressly covered by paragraph 4 of CBEC Circular No. 18/2008-Cus. dated 10.11.2008. The final order had not considered that paragraph or the decision in the assessee's own case applying it. Giving effect to those directly applicable materials required no fresh evidence or elaborate investigation and did not entail a review of the merits.

Conclusion: In favour of the assessee: the omission constituted a mistake apparent from the record, and rectification was permissible.

Issue (ii): Whether the FOB value declared in shipping bills dated before 31.12.2008 was required to be treated as a cum-duty price for determining assessable value.

Analysis: Paragraph 4 of the circular directed continuation of the existing practice of computing export duty by treating FOB price as cum-duty price until 31.12.2008. The changed valuation method under paragraph 5 applied only from 01.01.2009. Decisions concerning the post-31.12.2008 regime did not govern the subject shipping bills, whereas the applicable circular and precedents required backward computation from the declared FOB value.

Conclusion: In favour of the assessee: the declared FOB value was required to be treated as cum-duty price and the assessable value determined by working backwards from it.

Final Conclusion: Export-duty assessment for the subject pre-31.12.2008 shipping bills must follow the cum-duty valuation method prescribed by the applicable circular.

Ratio Decidendi: Failure to consider an applicable Board circular and directly relevant precedent apparent from the record is a mistake amenable to rectification where correcting it does not require reappreciation of evidence or review of the merits.

Issues: Whether the pending proceedings before the NCLT should be kept in abeyance pending completion of the governmental proceedings concerning the investigation report.

Analysis: Prima facie indications of a demerger and vesting of the company into the resulting company, together with the ongoing proceedings pursuant to the earlier direction for examination of the investigation report, warranted limited protective directions before further adjudication by the NCLT. The statutory authorities were required to complete the pending proceedings and place their report before the NCLT.

Outcome: The NCLT proceedings were directed to remain in abeyance for three months, pending completion of the governmental proceedings and submission of a report to the NCLT.

Issues: Whether a deemed stay of recovery upon appellate pre-deposit requires unblocking of an electronic credit ledger blocked in relation to input tax credit.

Analysis: Blocking of credit under Rule 86A is a provisional measure requiring recorded reasons and cannot subsist beyond one year. A deemed stay arising under Section 107(7) upon filing an appeal and making the prescribed pre-deposit stays recovery of the balance demand and prevents appropriation from the electronic cash ledger or blocked electronic credit ledger. Such deemed stay does not, by itself, affect the independently issued blocking order. The statutory framework permits the affected person to seek unblocking.

Conclusion: The deemed stay consequent to appellate pre-deposit does not mandate unblocking of the electronic credit ledger. The request for unblocking must be considered, and any refusal must be supported by a speaking order.

Issues: (i) Whether a new undertaking qualified for deductions under Sections 80IA and 80IB of the Income-tax Act, 1961 by commencing independent manufacturing operations by 31 March 1995; (ii) Whether depreciation was allowable under Section 32 of the Income-tax Act, 1961 on machinery received at the end of the previous year.

Issue (i): Whether a new undertaking qualified for deductions under Sections 80IA and 80IB of the Income-tax Act, 1961 by commencing independent manufacturing operations by 31 March 1995.

Analysis: Eligibility under Sections 80IA and 80IB depends upon the undertaking being an identifiable, integrated and independently capable manufacturing unit, and not upon complete operational isolation from the existing business. Manufacture of the same product by both units, phased augmentation of capacity, common invoicing arrangements, or limited use of old machinery within the permissible statutory threshold do not by themselves establish splitting up or reconstruction.

Analysis: The new building, fresh capital, new machinery, enhanced power load, additional workforce, unit-wise accounts, production and dispatch records, sales invoices, excise-linked records, and contemporaneous inauguration material cumulatively established commencement of commercial production before the prescribed date. The technical certification of independent capability could not be discarded without contrary expert material. Machinery added in the following year was for capacity augmentation, additional facilities and backward integration, rather than to create the undertaking for the first time. The production records also sufficiently established manufacture in the new unit.

Conclusion: In favour of the assessee: the undertaking was an integrated and independent manufacturing unit that commenced commercial production by 31 March 1995, and the claimed deductions under Sections 80IA and 80IB were allowable for all the relevant assessment years.

Issue (ii): Whether depreciation was allowable under Section 32 of the Income-tax Act, 1961 on machinery received at the end of the previous year.

Analysis: For Section 32, use for business includes an asset installed and kept ready for use. Purchase invoices, inward records and installation evidence showed that the machinery formed part of an already operational manufacturing set-up. No contrary material established that it remained uninstalled, unavailable, or incapable of deployment by the close of the previous year; receipt on 30 or 31 March alone was insufficient to deny depreciation.

Conclusion: In favour of the assessee: depreciation on the machinery was allowable on the ready-for-use principle.

Final Conclusion: The undertaking's initial-year qualification sustained its profit-linked deduction entitlement throughout the relevant statutory period, and the machinery satisfied the ready-for-use requirement for depreciation.

Ratio Decidendi: A newly established undertaking is eligible for profit-linked deduction where, by the prescribed date, it is an identifiable and independently capable manufacturing unit; later augmentation, manufacture of the same product, and non-separate invoicing do not negate eligibility when contemporaneous evidence establishes independent production.

Issues: Whether the continuation of search proceedings beyond the stated validity of the authorisation and alleged coercive recovery from the petitioner for a supplier's purported wrongful input tax credit warranted interim protection.

Analysis: The respondents' position that a search initiated within the authorisation period may continue thereafter was recorded. The allegation of pressure to discharge the supplier's liability was also noted, and instructions were directed to be obtained.

Outcome: The petitioner may carry on normal business activities, and the authorities shall not take coercive steps or exert pressure to recover the allegedly defaulting supplier's liability until the next listing.

Issues: (i) Whether the claimed cost of improvement was allowable on the basis of the approved engineer's valuation report despite absence of bills and vouchers; (ii) Whether deduction under Section 54F for interior expenditure was allowable without supporting evidence.

Issue (i): Whether the claimed cost of improvement was allowable on the basis of the approved engineer's valuation report despite absence of bills and vouchers.

Analysis: Construction of the building was undisputed. The approved engineer's valuation report was not shown to contain any defect, and no adverse material against its valuation was brought on record. The assessing authority adopted the construction year stated in that report but substituted the stated cost with unsupported per-square-foot estimates. The appellate authority likewise rejected the valuation without identifying any defect and independently applied CPWD plinth area rates. Neither authority obtained an alternative valuation despite lacking technical valuation expertise.

Conclusion: The approved engineer's valuation report must be accepted and the claimed cost of improvement allowed in favour of the assessee.

Issue (ii): Whether deduction under Section 54F for interior expenditure was allowable without supporting evidence.

Analysis: No bills, vouchers, or other supporting material substantiating the claimed interior expenditure were produced before either lower authority, and the inability to produce such evidence was maintained.

Conclusion: Deduction under Section 54F for the unsubstantiated interior expenditure is not allowable, against the assessee.

Final Conclusion: Long-term capital gains must be computed by allowing the claimed cost of improvement, while the unproved interior expenditure remains excluded from the Section 54F deduction.

Ratio Decidendi: An approved valuation report must be accepted where no defect or contrary material is established, and tax authorities cannot replace it with unsupported estimates made without technical basis.

Issues: Whether interim protection should continue pending consideration of challenges to orders raising GST demands where the adjudicating authority recorded inability to reconcile extensive e-way bill, invoice and accounting data.

Analysis: The orders indicated a prima facie inability to analyse and reconcile the delivery channels, e-way bills, invoices and supporting accounting records. The material comprised a substantial volume of entries, e-way bills and invoices, and no further material had been sought from the petitioner for reconciliation. The complexity of the amounts and documents warranted consideration of the petitions.

Outcome: Rule issued and the existing ad-interim relief continued until final disposal of the petitions.

Issues: Whether approval under Section 80G(5) can be denied to a trust having charitable objects for the public at large merely because of religious objects, without determining whether its religious expenditure exceeded the statutory threshold.

Analysis: Section 80G(5B) deems an institution or fund incurring religious expenditure not exceeding five per cent of its total income to be one to which Section 80G applies. The material did not establish that the trust had incurred religious expenditure beyond that limit. Its objects were substantially charitable and directed towards the general public. The principles concerning Section 13(1)(b) also establish that the restriction is relevant while determining exemption under Section 11, rather than at the stage of registration under Section 12A.

Conclusion: Approval under Section 80G(5) cannot be refused on the stated basis; the application requires consideration after the necessary verification of the statutory conditions.

Issues: Whether recovery of CENVAT credit for March 2007 to November 2008 under a show-cause notice issued on 30.11.2010 was barred by limitation.

Analysis: The extended limitation period under Section 11A of the Central Excise Act, 1944 required fraud, collusion, wilful misstatement or suppression of facts with intent to evade duty. The department was aware of the receipt of left-over bulk cement in the factory and had issued permission for availment of credit on that quantity. No evidence established fraud, suppression of facts, or intent to evade duty. Consequently, the notice was required to be issued within the normal limitation period of one year.

Conclusion: The CENVAT credit demand was time-barred and the limitation issue was decided in favour of the assessee.

Issues: (i) Whether assignment or acquisition of leasehold rights in a GIDC industrial plot constitutes a taxable supply liable to GST; (ii) Whether input tax credit on GST charged for acquisition of such leasehold rights is blocked under Section 17(5)(d); (iii) Whether proceedings under Section 74(1) could be invoked on the basis of fraud, wilful misstatement, or suppression of facts.

Issue (i): Whether assignment or acquisition of leasehold rights in a GIDC industrial plot constitutes a taxable supply liable to GST.

Analysis: Assignment or transfer of leasehold rights in a GIDC plot transfers benefits arising from immovable property to the assignee, who takes the place of the original lessee. Such a transaction does not fall within the scope of supply under Section 7(1)(a) read with Entry 5(b) of Schedule II and Entry 5 of Schedule III, and is not chargeable to GST under Section 9. GST charged by the supplier on the transaction was therefore without legal authority, and the reversal of credit and interest payment founded on its assumed taxability could not survive.

Conclusion: Assignment or acquisition of the leasehold rights was not a taxable supply, and the tax and interest paid through DRC-03 were liable to be refunded to the assessee.

Issue (ii): Whether input tax credit on GST charged for acquisition of such leasehold rights is blocked under Section 17(5)(d).

Analysis: Section 17(5)(d) applies to goods or services received for construction of an immovable property. The transaction involved only acquisition of leasehold rights, without any construction activity. Further, the blocking provision presupposes a lawfully taxable inward supply, which was absent because the underlying assignment was not taxable.

Conclusion: Section 17(5)(d) did not apply, and the demand founded on alleged blocked input tax credit was unsustainable in favour of the assessee.

Issue (iii): Whether proceedings under Section 74(1) could be invoked on the basis of fraud, wilful misstatement, or suppression of facts.

Analysis: The credit was disclosed in statutory returns and books of account, and was reversed with interest before the show-cause notice. As the underlying transaction was not taxable and the alleged blocked credit was misconceived, the statutory prerequisites of fraud, wilful misstatement, or suppression with intent to evade tax were not established.

Conclusion: Invocation of Section 74(1), including the consequential penalty, was without basis and unsustainable in favour of the assessee.

Final Conclusion: The adjudication and appellate orders founded on the assumed taxability of the leasehold-rights transaction, blocked credit, and fraudulent availment of credit were rendered legally ineffective, requiring restoration of the amounts recovered from the assessee.

Ratio Decidendi: Assignment of leasehold rights in a GIDC plot is a transfer of benefits arising from immovable property and, being outside the taxable scope of supply, cannot attract blocked-credit restrictions or fraud-based recovery proceedings predicated on GST liability.

Issues: (i) Whether the Fe content of Iron Ore Fines exported before 01.05.2022 must be determined on Wet Metric Ton basis or Dry Metric Ton basis for tariff classification and export-duty assessment; (ii) Whether the assessee was barred from raising the legal issue of correct Fe-content determination in appeal because it had accepted the original assessment without protest.

Issue (i): Whether the Fe content of Iron Ore Fines exported before 01.05.2022 must be determined on Wet Metric Ton basis or Dry Metric Ton basis for tariff classification and export-duty assessment.

Analysis: The applicable method is determined by the condition of the iron ore at export. For iron ore exported in moist condition, Fe content for export duty is to be computed on Wet Metric Ton basis after accounting for moisture and other impurities. The later insertion, effective from 01.05.2022, of a supplementary note to Chapter 26 requiring Dry Metric Ton computation for Heading 2601 confirms that the Dry Metric Ton method did not govern exports made before that date.

Conclusion: For the Shipping Bills filed before 01.05.2022, Fe content of the exported Iron Ore Fines must be determined on Wet Metric Ton basis, in favour of the assessee.

Issue (ii): Whether the assessee was barred from raising the legal issue of correct Fe-content determination in appeal because it had accepted the original assessment without protest.

Analysis: The challenge concerned the legally correct classification and duty assessment on the basis of test reports already on record, rather than a new factual case or additional evidence. An appellate authority may entertain a legal ground necessary for correct determination of duty liability. Acceptance of an assessment cannot validate an assessment contrary to the governing tariff, binding precedents, or the applicable Board circular.

Conclusion: The assessee was entitled to raise the legal ground in appeal, and acceptance of the assessment did not preclude correction of classification or duty liability, in favour of the assessee.

Final Conclusion: The applicable pre-01.05.2022 assessment requires determination of Fe content on Wet Metric Ton basis, followed by consequential reclassification, reassessment, and such relief as may be admissible in law.

Ratio Decidendi: Where iron ore is exported in moist condition before a later statutory prescription of Dry Metric Ton computation becomes effective, its Fe content for export-duty assessment must be determined on Wet Metric Ton basis; an assessee is not estopped from raising that legal objection at the appellate stage.

Issues: Whether penalty for attempted export of prohibited red sander logs could be imposed on the appellant solely on the basis of retracted statements without independent corroborative evidence.

Analysis: The allegation that the appellant provided logistical support rested entirely on statements, including his own statement which was retracted shortly after release from custody. The retraction was placed on record but was not addressed in the adjudication. The connected finding setting aside penalty on the person alleged to have introduced the appellant to the purported mastermind further undermined the basis for penalising the appellant. A statement under Section 108 is admissible, but a retracted statement or a co-accused's statement cannot, without independent admissible and tangible corroboration, establish involvement in the prohibited export.

Conclusion: The penalty under Section 114(i) of the Customs Act, 1962 was unsustainable for want of corroborative evidence and was set aside in favour of the assessee.

Issues: Whether Uttar Pradesh GST authorities could detain and seize goods merely transiting through Uttar Pradesh from Delhi to West Bengal.

Analysis: The goods were undisputedly destined for West Bengal and were only passing through Uttar Pradesh. The applicable precedent establishes that State GST authorities lack territorial jurisdiction to detain or seize goods that are merely in transit through the State and are not intended for delivery there.

Conclusion: The detention, consequential penalty and appellate order were without jurisdiction; the issue is decided in favour of the assessee.