Issues: (i) Whether rejection of the claim for interest on sanctioned refund on grounds of delay and laches under the Limitation Act, 1963 was sustainable; (ii) Whether the duty payments and contemporaneous electronic refund claims were voluntary payments at the assessee's peril or payments under protest made with departmental knowledge; (iii) Whether the contemporaneous electronic claims or the subsequent Form R claim constituted the application under Section 11B(1) of the Central Excise Act, 1944 for reckoning the three-month period under Section 11BB; and (iv) Whether interest under Section 11BB was payable on the sanctioned refunds and, if so, for what period.

Issue (i): Whether rejection of the claim for interest on sanctioned refund on grounds of delay and laches under the Limitation Act, 1963 was sustainable.

Analysis: Section 11BB of the Central Excise Act, 1944 imposes an automatic and self-executing obligation to pay interest where refund is delayed beyond three months. A request for such interest merely invokes that statutory obligation and does not institute a fresh, time-barred cause of action. Failure to appeal the refund sanction orders or to file cross-objections could not defeat the entitlement where those orders contained no determination on interest. The departmental appeal against the principal refund also remained pending for part of the period treated as delay.

Conclusion: Rejection of interest on grounds of limitation, delay and laches was unsustainable and is set aside in favour of the assessee.

Issue (ii): Whether the duty payments and contemporaneous electronic refund claims were voluntary payments at the assessee's peril or payments under protest made with departmental knowledge.

Analysis: The interim restraint operated against the Department and did not prohibit payment of duty under protest, a course protected by the second proviso to Section 11B(1) of the Central Excise Act, 1944. The Department accepted the registration, protest payments and electronic claims over several years without objection, reservation or recourse to the High Court. It could not subsequently rely on its own inaction to characterize the payments as voluntary.

Conclusion: The payments and contemporaneous electronic claims were made under protest with departmental knowledge, not voluntarily at the assessee's peril; the contrary finding is set aside in favour of the assessee.

Issue (iii): Whether the contemporaneous electronic claims or the subsequent Form R claim constituted the application under Section 11B(1) of the Central Excise Act, 1944 for reckoning the three-month period under Section 11BB.

Analysis: The second proviso to Section 11B(1) recognizes refund claims relating to duty paid under protest while the underlying levy remains disputed. Section 11BB measures interest from receipt of the application under Section 11B(1), and the relevant-date definition in Clause (ec) of Explanation (B) to Section 11B governs only the limitation for filing a refund application, not postponement of interest. The electronically filed claims were received without deficiency memo or objection; the later physical Form R filing was only an administrative reiteration of claims already on record.

Conclusion: The contemporaneous electronic claims constituted the applications under Section 11B(1) for computing interest under Section 11BB; Form R was only a physical reiteration of those claims, in favour of the assessee.

Issue (iv): Whether interest under Section 11BB was payable on the sanctioned refunds and, if so, for what period.

Analysis: Since the refunds corresponded to the amounts paid and claimed under protest, there was no unascertained quantification preventing the running of interest. Interest must run after expiry of three months from receipt of each corresponding electronic claim until the date on which the refund was actually sanctioned. Exact dates of receipt require verification from departmental records.

Conclusion: The assessee is entitled to interest under Section 11BB from the day following expiry of three months from receipt of each electronic claim until 05.05.2015, subject to verification and quantification by the refund sanctioning authority.

Final Conclusion: The orders denying statutory interest are displaced, and the matter is returned solely for verification of the electronic-claim receipt dates and calculation and sanction of the consequential interest in accordance with natural justice.

Ratio Decidendi: Interest under Section 11BB on refund of duty paid under protest runs from expiry of three months after receipt of the valid refund application, and cannot be postponed to a subsequent judicial determination or physical reiteration of an unobjected electronic claim.

Issues: Whether dismissal of the statutory appeal as time-barred was sustainable where the show-cause notice and adjudication order were uploaded only under the 'Additional Notice and Orders' tab without separate intimation.

Analysis: The materials indicated that the relevant notice and adjudication order were uploaded only in the specified portal tab and that no separate intimation was given. This prevented the petitioner from responding to the proceedings. As the appellate authority dismissed the appeal solely on limitation without considering its merits, the circumstances disclosed a violation of the principles of natural justice warranting interference.

Conclusion: The limitation-based appellate order was quashed, and the appeal was required to be admitted and decided afresh on merits after affording an opportunity of hearing.

Issues: Whether the penalty of Rs. 25,00,000 imposed for non-realisation of export proceeds could be sustained under Section 50 of the Foreign Exchange Regulation Act, 1973.

Analysis: Section 50 of the Foreign Exchange Regulation Act, 1973 prescribes only the maximum permissible penalty and requires the adjudicating authority to exercise its discretion reasonably, judicially, and with reasons demonstrating proportionality to the contravention. The Tribunal retained the original penalty despite excluding two guaranteed remittance forms already adjudicated and noting the RBI write-off of another form, without providing a reasoned basis for retaining the same quantum. The remaining contravention involved US$ 44,796.50, while an earlier adjudication concerning US$ 17,460 had attracted a penalty of Rs. 1,00,000.

Conclusion: The penalty of Rs. 25,00,000 was set aside as unreasoned and disproportionate, and was substituted with a penalty of Rs. 3,00,000.

Issues: (i) Whether an appeal under Section 35G against a procedural implementation direction issued under Rule 41 was maintainable, and whether the Tribunal exceeded its jurisdiction by issuing that direction; (ii) Whether service tax paid on the drinking-water project was a payment under mistake of law, disentitling the Revenue from invoking the limitations applicable to duty refunds; (iii) Whether interest on the refund was payable from three months after the original refund applications rather than from submission of subsequent administrative documents; (iv) Whether compensatory interest at 9% was valid notwithstanding Notification No. 24/2014-C.E. (N.T.).

Issue (i): Whether an appeal under Section 35G against a procedural implementation direction issued under Rule 41 was maintainable, and whether the Tribunal exceeded its jurisdiction by issuing that direction.

Analysis: Section 35G permits an appeal only from an order passed by the Tribunal in appeal under Sections 35B and 35C. A direction under Rule 41 to implement an earlier final order is procedural and connected with securing the ends of justice; it is not an order passed in appeal. Rule 41 validly enabled consequential directions necessary to ensure that the final refund order was effective.

Conclusion: The appeal under Section 35G was not maintainable, and the Tribunal acted within its jurisdiction in issuing the Rule 41 direction, in favour of the assessee.

Issue (ii): Whether service tax paid on the drinking-water project was a payment under mistake of law, disentitling the Revenue from invoking the limitations applicable to duty refunds.

Analysis: Laying potable-water pipelines for a statutory water authority under a public-welfare project did not constitute taxable commercial or industrial construction service. The amount paid consequently lacked the character of tax or duty and was paid under a mistake of law. Such collection is inconsistent with Article 265, and the restrictive procedural limitations applicable to duty refunds under Section 11B do not govern its restitution.

Conclusion: The payment was made under a mistake of law and was refundable without application of the restrictive limitation framework for duty refunds, in favour of the assessee.

Issue (iii): Whether interest on the refund was payable from three months after the original refund applications rather than from submission of subsequent administrative documents.

Analysis: Liability for interest under Section 11BB commences automatically on expiry of three months from receipt of the original refund application, not from an appellate order or a later implementation request. The later communication and documents were follow-up material for implementing the original claims and did not constitute fresh refund applications.

Conclusion: Interest was payable from expiry of three months after the original 2012 refund applications, in favour of the assessee.

Issue (iv): Whether compensatory interest at 9% was valid notwithstanding Notification No. 24/2014-C.E. (N.T.).

Analysis: Since the refundable amount was paid under a mistake of law and did not bear the character of duty, the statutory 6% rate under the notification did not restrict the compensatory interest payable. The prolonged withholding of the amount justified the 9% rate awarded for compensation.

Conclusion: Compensatory interest at 9% was valid and was not contrary to Notification No. 24/2014-C.E. (N.T.), in favour of the assessee.

Final Conclusion: The Tribunal's implementation direction for refund interest remained legally effective, with the assessee entitled to restitution and compensatory interest calculated from the original refund claims.

Ratio Decidendi: A procedural direction under Rule 41 for implementation of a final Tribunal order is not appealable under Section 35G, and interest on a refund claim accrues from expiry of three months after the original application where the delayed refund arises from a payment made under mistake of law.

Issues: Whether an ex parte GST demand based on a mismatch in returns should be set aside for fresh adjudication where the claimed payment of disputed tax was not clearly verifiable.

Analysis: The claimed payment was not clearly demonstrable from the annual return, while the demand had been confirmed without a reply to the show-cause notice. No determination of the tax liability on merits was made.

Outcome: The impugned order was quashed and the matter was remitted for fresh adjudication upon deposit of 10% of the disputed tax and submission of a reply with supporting documents.

Issues: Whether additions for unsecured loans under Section 68 and corresponding interest disallowances under Section 69C could be made in completed or unabated assessments under Section 153A without incriminating material found during the search having a direct nexus with those additions.

Analysis: Section 153A enables assessment following a valid search, but a completed or unabated assessment can be disturbed only on the basis of incriminating material found during the search that reveals undisclosed income and bears a direct nexus to the proposed addition. The unsecured loans were disclosed in the books and came to notice from details furnished during assessment proceedings, not from seized material. Statements recorded during search did not admit that the loans were fictitious, involved cash exchange, or represented unaccounted funds. The spot verification merely showed that a lender was not found at its registered address on a particular visit and yielded no material concerning the impugned loans. The third-party statement, KYC records, bank statements, fund-flow analysis and financial inquiry were obtained in a subsequent third-party search or during assessment proceedings and could not supply the foundational requirement of incriminating material found in the assessee's search. An alleged failure to establish a credit under Section 68 cannot itself be treated as incriminating material. No independent year-specific incriminating material was identified for any of the assessment years.

Conclusion: The additions under Section 68 and the corresponding interest disallowances under Section 69C were outside the permissible scope of the completed or unabated assessments under Section 153A and were deleted; the merits of the loan transactions were left open.

Issues: Validity of cancellation of GST registration where the show-cause notice was not received and revocation could not be sought on the portal after expiry of the prescribed period.

Analysis: The registration had been cancelled under Section 29 of the Central Goods and Services Tax Act, 2017. The cancellation order referred to a show-cause notice that was not received, while the portal did not permit a revocation application after limitation had expired. The established remedial directions applicable to analogous GST-registration cancellation matters were applied.

Conclusion: The cancellation order was set aside and quashed. The assessee must file outstanding returns within the stipulated period and pay the applicable tax, penalty, interest and late fees.

Issues: (i) Whether the permanent establishment relating to the Baglihar project could, by applying the force of attraction rule, be treated as connected with receipts from the other contracts. (ii) Whether receipts from the other consultancy contracts were taxable as business profits through a permanent establishment or as fees for technical services.

Issue (i): Whether the permanent establishment relating to the Baglihar project could, by applying the force of attraction rule, be treated as connected with receipts from the other contracts.

Analysis: Earlier orders for the assessee's preceding assessment years had determined that the Baglihar project permanent establishment neither played a role in nor was involved with the other contracts. The same factual position applied for the years under consideration, and the Revenue did not establish any nexus warranting application of Article 7 or the force of attraction rule.

Conclusion: In favour of the assessee: the Baglihar project permanent establishment could not be extended to the other contracts through the force of attraction rule.

Issue (ii): Whether receipts from the other consultancy contracts were taxable as business profits through a permanent establishment or as fees for technical services.

Analysis: Personnel did not visit India for certain contracts, and their presence for the remaining contracts was limited to 44 days and 35 days respectively. The services were consequently rendered in India for less than 183 days. The conditions under Articles 5(2) and 15(2) for taxation through a permanent establishment were therefore not met, while the consultancy receipts fell under Article 12.

Conclusion: In favour of the assessee: the receipts were taxable as fees for technical services under Article 12 at 10%, and not as business profits attributable to a permanent establishment.

Final Conclusion: The consultancy receipts from the contracts other than the Baglihar project are chargeable under Article 12 at the applicable fee-for-technical-services rate for both assessment years.

Ratio Decidendi: A permanent establishment created for a distinct project cannot attract receipts from separate contracts unless its involvement or nexus with those contracts is established; consultancy receipts without the requisite threshold presence are taxable as fees for technical services under the treaty.

Issues: Whether a reassessment notice founded on information arising from a search of another person was valid where the procedure under Section 148A was followed and approval was obtained only for an order under Section 148A(d), without independent prior approval for issuance of notice under Section 148.

Analysis: Information forming the basis of reassessment arose from material unearthed during the search of another person. Such cases fell within the category under clause (iv) of Explanation 2 to Section 148 read with clause (c) of the proviso to Section 148A, for which the ordinary Section 148A procedure was excluded. The approval on record was confined to the proposed order under Section 148A(d), and no independent approval for issuing the Section 148 notice was established. Compliance with the prescribed jurisdictional route and approval requirement was mandatory and could not be substituted by approval under an inapplicable procedure.

Conclusion: The notice under Section 148 suffered from a foundational jurisdictional defect; the consequent reassessment proceedings and assessment were quashed in favour of the assessee.

Issues: Whether the first appellate authority could reject fresh evidentiary material and sustain additions and disallowances without examining that material or obtaining factual verification.

Analysis: Under Section 250 of the Income-tax Act, 1961, the appellate powers of the first appellate authority are coterminous with those of the assessing authority. Fresh material produced in support of the assessee's case could be examined, and factual verification or a remand report could be obtained where required. The material was rejected solely because it had not been furnished to the assessing authority, although the additions and disallowances arose from factual discrepancies requiring verification.

Conclusion: The fresh material must be considered and the discrepancies factually verified after providing reasonable and adequate opportunity before determining the additions and disallowances.

Issues: (i) Whether the 195-day delay in filing the appeal should be condoned; (ii) Whether registration under Section 12AB of the Income-tax Act, 1961 could be refused when donations received and expenditure towards charitable objects were recorded in the books of account.

Issue (i): Whether the 195-day delay in filing the appeal should be condoned.

Analysis: Section 253(5) of the Income-tax Act, 1961 permits admission of a delayed appeal upon sufficient cause. The delay arose after a subsequent application was filed and rejected, following which legal advice was obtained to challenge the earlier rejection. The explanation disclosed no mala fides or deliberate delay. Substantial justice was preferred over technicality.

Conclusion: The delay was condoned and the appeal was admitted for adjudication, in favour of the assessee.

Issue (ii): Whether registration under Section 12AB of the Income-tax Act, 1961 could be refused when donations received and expenditure towards charitable objects were recorded in the books of account.

Analysis: For registration under Section 12AB of the Income-tax Act, 1961, the inquiry is confined to the genuineness of the trust's activities and compliance with material requirements of other applicable laws. The recorded donations and expenditure towards the stated charitable objects established that activities had commenced. Concerns relating to the mode, amount, or verifiability of donations did not justify treating the matter as an assessment of income, particularly where no finding of non-genuine activities was recorded.

Conclusion: Refusal of registration lacked merit; registration under Section 12AB of the Income-tax Act, 1961 was directed to be granted, in favour of the assessee.

Final Conclusion: The statutory registration application is required to be granted on the basis of the recorded charitable activities.

Ratio Decidendi: Registration proceedings are confined to verifying the genuineness of charitable activities and material legal compliance, and cannot be converted into an assessment of income based merely on the mode or quantum of donations.

Issues: (i) Whether interim stay of the suspension of the insolvency professional's registration should be granted pending the appeal; (ii) Whether suspension of registration affects the professional's eligibility to continue in other ongoing insolvency processes and permits intimation to their Committees of Creditors.

Issue (i): Whether interim stay of the suspension of the insolvency professional's registration should be granted pending the appeal.

Analysis: The challenges concerning Form-H disclosure, valuation, recourse under Section 19(2), compliance with the CIRP timeline, and the procedure under Sections 218 to 220 were held to be triable matters requiring examination of the complete record at final hearing. The completion and implementation of the CIRP did not alter the regulatory consequence of suspension, which operates upon the professional's registration. The possible replacement in other assignments was an ordinary consequence of suspension and did not establish irreparable injury. The Appellant failed to show a sufficiently strong prima facie case or that the balance of convenience favoured interim protection.

Conclusion: Interim protection against the suspension was declined, against the Appellant.

Issue (ii): Whether suspension of registration affects the professional's eligibility to continue in other ongoing insolvency processes and permits intimation to their Committees of Creditors.

Analysis: Registration is the statutory basis for rendering services as an insolvency professional; consequently, suspension affects eligibility to act in every insolvency process and is not confined to the assignment in which misconduct was found. Regulation 13(7) mandatorily requires communication of the suspension order to the Committees of Creditors and the Adjudicating Authority. This communication operationalises the suspension and is distinct from the Committee of Creditors' separate power under Section 27 to appoint a replacement in exercise of its commercial wisdom.

Conclusion: The Board is entitled and required to intimate the suspension to the Committees of Creditors in other ongoing processes, and the suspended professional has no right to continue as resolution professional in those assignments, against the Appellant.

Final Conclusion: The suspension and the statutory mechanism for communicating it to other ongoing insolvency processes remain operative pending an independent final determination of the main appeal.

Ratio Decidendi: Suspension of an insolvency professional's registration operates upon the professional's statutory eligibility across all insolvency assignments, and mandatory intimation under Regulation 13(7) gives effect to that suspension without displacing the Committee of Creditors' separate authority to appoint a replacement.

Issues: Whether the GST Common Portal should disclose the date on which an assessment or adjudication order is uploaded, so as to safeguard limitation and appellate rights.

Analysis: GSTN's instructions stated that the portal permits an order passed on any date to be uploaded through DRC-07 either on the same date or subsequently. Delayed uploading may enable orders to be uploaded after expiry of limitation and may impair the taxpayer's right of appeal. Further instructions were therefore required regarding compliance with the directions governing disclosure of upload dates.

Outcome: Two weeks' time was granted for further instructions and the matter was listed for further hearing; no final adjudication was made.

Issues: Whether cancellation of GST registration for non-filing of returns should be set aside where the taxpayer had not sought revocation within the prescribed period.

Analysis: Cancellation was initiated under Section 29 of the Central Goods and Services Tax Act, 2017 for admitted non-filing of returns required by Section 39. Although the statutory period for seeking revocation under Section 30 of the Assam Goods and Services Tax Act, 2017 had expired, the approach applicable to comparable cancellation cases warranted annulment of the cancellation while requiring compliance with outstanding return and payment obligations. The limitation periods under Sections 73(10) and 74(10) were directed to run from the judgment, with the specified treatment for financial year 2025-26 under Section 44.

Conclusion: The registration-cancellation order was quashed; the taxpayer must furnish all outstanding returns within 30 days and remains liable for tax, penalty, interest and late fees.

Issues: Whether cancellation of GST registration for continuous non-filing of returns should be set aside and the registration restored subject to compliance.

Analysis: The cancellation rested solely on non-filing of returns, without any allegation of a dubious process for tax evasion. Continued cancellation would prevent issuance of invoices and carrying on business, thereby impairing recovery of tax. Filing of pending returns was necessary for determination of the final tax liability.

Conclusion: The cancellation of registration is set aside subject to filing returns for the entire default period and payment of the requisite tax, interest, fine and penalty within four weeks. Upon compliance, the jurisdictional officer must restore the registration.

Issues: (i) Whether interest on refinanced borrowings was deductible under Section 24(b) of the Income-tax Act, 1961 where the original borrowing funded construction of the let-out property; (ii) Whether a disallowance under Section 14A of the Income-tax Act, 1961 could be made where no exempt income was earned; (iii) Whether interest attributable to borrowings used for investment could be capitalised.

Issue (i): Whether interest on refinanced borrowings was deductible under Section 24(b) of the Income-tax Act, 1961 where the original borrowing funded construction of the let-out property.

Analysis: Section 24(b) permits deduction of interest attributable to capital borrowed for construction or acquisition of house property. The record showed that an identified portion of the original borrowing had been used for construction and that the corresponding interest allocation had been accepted in earlier assessments. Refinancing of that borrowing retains its character where a direct nexus between the original construction borrowing and the subsequent refinancing is established. Consistency in tax assessments precluded a contrary treatment without any demonstrated change in the nature or use of the funds, though the original utilisation and loan nexus required verification from corroborative evidence.

Conclusion: Interest on refinancing is allowable under Section 24(b) to the extent it is directly linked to the verified original borrowing used for construction; the issue is decided in favour of the assessee subject to factual verification.

Issue (ii): Whether a disallowance under Section 14A of the Income-tax Act, 1961 could be made where no exempt income was earned.

Analysis: A disallowance in absence of exempt income is not warranted. The application of Rule 8D cannot be sustained merely because investments are capable of generating exempt income when no exempt income was actually earned during the relevant year.

Conclusion: No disallowance under Section 14A is permissible in the absence of exempt income; the issue is decided in favour of the assessee.

Issue (iii): Whether interest attributable to borrowings used for investment could be capitalised.

Analysis: Capitalisation of interest expenditure attributable to investment depends upon verification of the actual use of the borrowed funds and the corresponding interest allocation.

Conclusion: Interest attributable to borrowings verified as used for investment shall be allowed to be capitalised; the issue is decided in favour of the assessee subject to factual verification.

Final Conclusion: The interest claim must be apportioned according to the proven utilisation of borrowed funds, while Section 14A cannot be invoked without exempt income.

Ratio Decidendi: Interest on a refinancing borrowing retains the character of interest on capital borrowed for construction under Section 24(b) where a direct and verified nexus with the original construction borrowing is established.

Issues: Whether the reassessment notice for Assessment Year 2015-16 issued after 1 April 2021 was barred by limitation.

Analysis: The applicable limitation framework for reassessment proceedings required notices concerning Assessment Year 2015-16 issued after the cut-off date of 1 April 2021 to be dropped. The first notice was issued on 30 June 2021 and the subsequent order under Section 148A(d) was made on 28 July 2022, both after the prescribed cut-off date.

Conclusion: The reassessment notice was time-barred and invalid; the notice was quashed in favour of the assessee.

Issues: Whether imported polyester knitted fabrics covered by a valid Special Advance Authorization remained eligible for customs-duty exemption despite the Minimum Import Price restriction, and whether confiscation, redemption fine and penalty could consequently be sustained.

Analysis: Paragraph 4.04A of the Foreign Trade Policy permits duty-free import of fabrics under the Special Advance Authorization Scheme for manufacture and export of apparel. Notification No. 27/2023 grants the corresponding customs-duty exemption for imports against a valid authorization. The subsequent DGFT notification extending the Minimum Import Price condition expressly recognised imports by Special Advance Authorization holders, subject to the condition concerning sale of imported inputs in the Domestic Tariff Area. The existence of the Minimum Import Price condition did not, by itself, negate exemption for goods imported under a valid authorization.

Conclusion: The assessee was entitled to the duty exemption. The finding of ineligibility, and the consequential confiscation, redemption fine and penalty, were unsustainable.

Issues: Whether a reassessment notice issued under Section 148 to an assessee who had died before its issuance is valid.

Analysis: A notice under Section 148 issued in the name of a deceased assessee is invalid unless the legal representative submits to the jurisdiction of the Assessing Officer without objection. Mere intimation of the assessee's death or registration of the legal representative on the income-tax portal does not amount to submission to jurisdiction. Although the legal heir was subsequently recognised by the Revenue, no notice was issued to that person in the capacity of legal representative. Section 159 permits proceedings against a legal representative in accordance with law but does not validate a notice issued to a deceased person.

Conclusion: The notice issued to the deceased assessee was invalid and was quashed.