Issues: (i) Whether service tax was payable on the lease of a plot with a timber chalet/villa constructed as an individual residence; and (ii) Whether the purchaser's refund claim was within limitation and eligible to be considered under Section 11B of the Central Excise Act, 1944.

Issue (i): Whether service tax was payable on the lease of a plot with a timber chalet/villa constructed as an individual residence.

Analysis: The statutory concept of a residential complex under Section 65(91a) of the Finance Act, 1994 does not bring an independently constructed residential unit for the buyer's personal use within the taxable category merely because it is situated in a larger housing layout. The lease arrangements established that the plot and timber chalet were provided in perpetuity for individual residential use. The settled construction-service principle excluding individual residential houses from levy was applicable. A dismissal of a civil appeal, after appellate jurisdiction had been invoked, attracted the doctrine of merger and operated as binding precedent notwithstanding the absence of reasons.

Conclusion: No service tax was payable on the individual timber chalet/villa; the issue is decided in favour of the assessee.

Issue (ii): Whether the purchaser's refund claim was within limitation and eligible to be considered under Section 11B of the Central Excise Act, 1944.

Analysis: By Section 83 of the Finance Act, 1994, Section 11B of the Central Excise Act, 1944 applies to service-tax refunds. For a purchaser other than the service provider, the relevant date is the date of purchase of the service, evidenced by payment and the corresponding tax-bearing document. The tax burden was paid by the purchaser on 09.03.2015 and the refund application was filed on 01.02.2016, within one year. The purchaser had borne the tax incidence and had not passed it on to another person.

Conclusion: The refund claim was within limitation and is required to be considered in accordance with Section 11B of the Central Excise Act, 1944; the issue is decided in favour of the assessee.

Final Conclusion: The rejection of the refund claim on taxability and limitation grounds cannot be sustained, and the claim must be processed consistently with the determinations made.

Ratio Decidendi: A separately constructed individual residential dwelling for personal use does not become taxable construction of a residential complex merely because it is located within a common housing layout.

Issues: Whether revocation of the customs broker licence, forfeiture of security deposit, and penalty were sustainable for alleged contraventions of Regulations 1(4), 10(b), 10(d), and 10(e) of the Customs Brokers Licensing Regulations, 2018.

Analysis: Regulation 1(4) prohibits sale or transfer of a customs broker licence. Handling an import transaction referred by a clearing and forwarding agent did not establish that the licence had been sold or transferred. Likewise, dealing with stakeholders in an import transaction did not, by itself, establish that business was transacted through an unauthorised person under Regulation 10(b).

Analysis: The alleged quantity of over-debiting in the show-cause notice materially differed from the quantity ultimately attributed to the customs broker, whose role was confined to a negligible part of the imports and did not extend to the earlier consignments. Under Public Notice No. 66/2023, the actual debit entries and their verification were functions of the customs officers at the designated service centre and officers granting out-of-charge. No invalid or forged licence was supplied, and the evidence did not establish a failure to advise the importer or exercise due diligence under Regulations 10(d) and 10(e).

Conclusion: None of the alleged contraventions was established; the revocation of licence, forfeiture of security deposit, and penalty were legally unsustainable.

Issues: (i) Whether writ jurisdiction should be exercised to entertain a belated jurisdictional challenge to a show-cause notice after participation in adjudication; (ii) Whether the adjudication order was vitiated by denial of a reasonable opportunity of personal hearing.

Issue (i): Whether writ jurisdiction should be exercised to entertain a belated jurisdictional challenge to a show-cause notice after participation in adjudication.

Analysis: The extraordinary writ remedy was declined for a jurisdictional challenge raised after participation in the proceedings and substantial delay, particularly when an alternative statutory remedy was available. The jurisdictional objection was left to be addressed in the statutory adjudicatory process.

Conclusion: The jurisdictional challenge was not entertained, against the assessee.

Issue (ii): Whether the adjudication order was vitiated by denial of a reasonable opportunity of personal hearing.

Analysis: Section 75(5) requires a reasonable opportunity of hearing in adjudication. The notified hearing did not conclude the proceedings, yet no further hearing notice or date was provided for several months before an ex parte order was made on the basis of the reply. This denied the assessee a reasonable opportunity of personal hearing and breached principles of natural justice.

Conclusion: The adjudication order was unsustainable for denial of a reasonable opportunity of personal hearing, in favour of the assessee.

Final Conclusion: Fresh adjudication must be undertaken in accordance with law after affording hearing and addressing the jurisdictional objection under Section 74.

Ratio Decidendi: An adjudication order cannot be sustained where, after the notified hearing does not conclude the proceedings, no further hearing opportunity is given before an ex parte determination is made.

Issues: Whether compensation received under the BSNL Voluntary Retirement Scheme, 2019 is exempt under Section 10(10B) of the Income-tax Act, 1961.

Analysis: Section 10(10B) of the Income-tax Act, 1961 was applied to compensation received under BSNL VRS-2019. Identical claims by similarly placed BSNL employees had been accepted in earlier coordinate-bench decisions, and Revenue did not distinguish those decisions on facts or law. The applicable approach also accords with the obligation of tax authorities not to deny a lawful relief merely because the assessee was unaware of the entitlement.

Conclusion: Compensation received under BSNL VRS-2019 is exempt under Section 10(10B) of the Income-tax Act, 1961; taxable income and consequential refund are to be recomputed accordingly.

Issues: Whether penalty for misreporting under Section 270A of the Income-tax Act, 1961 could be sustained solely on disallowance of employees' PF/ESI contributions.

Analysis: Penalty for misreporting requires that the case fall within a specific category prescribed under Section 270A(9) of the Income-tax Act, 1961. A mere disallowance of a claim does not, by itself, establish misreporting. The record did not demonstrate that the delayed employees' PF/ESI contribution fell within any statutory category of misreporting.

Conclusion: The penalty for misreporting was unsustainable and was deleted, in favour of the assessee.

Issues: Whether the re-determination of FOB value pursuant to the unchallenged remand order, by applying Rules 5 to 8 of the Valuation Rules, 1988, warranted interference.

Analysis: The earlier remand order had attained finality and conclusively determined that the declared FOB values were rightly doubted, that the Revenue had discharged its burden regarding misdeclaration, and that the values required re-determination. The scope of remand was therefore confined to verifying whether the prescribed valuation procedure had been followed; the concluded question of re-determination could not be reopened. The Commissioner had considered the values of the different goods in detail and re-determined them under the applicable valuation rules.

Conclusion: The re-determination of FOB value was in accordance with the binding remand directions and required no interference.

Issues: (i) Whether service tax could be levied on a builder's construction of residential complex or works contract services before 1 July 2010; (ii) Whether service tax was payable on such services rendered from 1 July 2010.

Issue (i): Whether service tax could be levied on a builder's construction of residential complex or works contract services before 1 July 2010.

Analysis: The Explanation inserted in Section 65(105)(zzzzh) and Section 65(105)(zzzzq) by the Finance Act, 2010 treated specified construction intended for sale as a deemed service. The applicable circular treated a builder's pre-1 July 2010 construction as self-service. The deeming fiction widened the tax net and operated prospectively, applying equally to construction-of-complex and works-contract classifications.

Conclusion: No service tax was leviable under either classification for the period before 1 July 2010; the related demands and penalties were set aside, in favour of the assessee.

Issue (ii): Whether service tax was payable on such services rendered from 1 July 2010.

Analysis: From 1 July 2010, the amended statutory scheme brought covered builder services within taxability. The surviving demand related to the period from July 2010 to March 2011.

Conclusion: The service-tax demand of Rs. 9,96,156 with interest for July 2010 to March 2011 was confirmed, against the assessee.

Final Conclusion: The amendment governs builder services prospectively: pre-1 July 2010 demands under the two service categories do not survive, whereas tax liability arising after that date remains enforceable.

Ratio Decidendi: A statutory deeming provision bringing a builder's pre-completion construction for sale within the service-tax net applies prospectively from its stated effective date; before that date, the activity is self-service and cannot be taxed as either construction-of-complex or works-contract service.

Issues: (i) Whether the denial of an opportunity to rebut the verification report breached the principles of natural justice; (ii) Whether non-disclosure of gross receipts justified invocation of the extended period of limitation and imposition of penalties; (iii) Whether the composite maintenance-and-repair contracts were chargeable before 1 June 2007 and, thereafter, the applicable method for valuing the works-contract service.

Issue (i): Whether the denial of an opportunity to rebut the verification report breached the principles of natural justice.

Analysis: The remand directions required a reasonable opportunity of hearing and permitted additional evidence. Four hearings were fixed, and the assessee ultimately requested a decision on the existing written record. The verification report relied only on facts and calculations already forming part of the show-cause notice, and no specific inaccuracy in that report was identified.

Conclusion: No breach of the principles of natural justice was established; this issue is against the assessee.

Issue (ii): Whether non-disclosure of gross receipts justified invocation of the extended period of limitation and imposition of penalties.

Analysis: The receipts reflected in the service recipient's tax-deduction records exceeded the values declared in the service-tax returns. Service tax is chargeable on the gross amount charged and cannot be reduced by payments made to subcontractors. The failure to disclose the full consideration amounted to suppression of value.

Conclusion: The extended period of limitation was validly invoked. Penalties under Sections 76 and 77 remain sustainable, while the penalty under Section 78 is to be recomputed with the redetermined tax; this issue is against the assessee.

Issue (iii): Whether the composite maintenance-and-repair contracts were chargeable before 1 June 2007 and, thereafter, the applicable method for valuing the works-contract service.

Analysis: A composite contract involving services and materials is a works contract. Such contracts were not chargeable under the pre-existing taxable-service categories before works contract service was introduced with effect from 1 June 2007; consequently, the claimed pre-introduction abatement is immaterial. For the subsequent period, the composition scheme was unavailable because no option for it was established. As the value of goods transferred in execution of the contracts was not determinable, Rule 2A(ii) applies, under which maintenance and repair works are valued at 70% of the gross amount charged. Free supplies by the service recipient are excluded from the gross amount, while subcontractor payments are not deductible. The resulting amount is to receive cum-tax treatment, with tax already paid adjusted.

Conclusion: The demand for the period before 1 June 2007 is unsustainable. For the subsequent period, tax is payable on 70% of the gross amount charged, excluding free supplies and allowing cum-tax benefit; this issue is partly in favour of the assessee.

Final Conclusion: The enforceable tax liability is confined to the post-1 June 2007 works-contract period and must be recomputed on the prescribed valuation basis, with consequential revision of the Section 78 penalty.

Ratio Decidendi: A composite contract involving service and materials is chargeable as works contract service only from its statutory introduction; where composition was not elected and the goods value is not determinable, the prescribed percentage valuation applies.

Issues: Whether cash refund of service tax erroneously paid on invoices raised for a period in which no service was rendered is barred by the limitation under Section 11B of the Central Excise Act, 1944, or by the absence of a credit note under Rule 6(3) of the Service Tax Rules, 1994.

Analysis: Although invoices were issued and service tax was paid, no service was rendered during the relevant period. Rule 6(3) of the Service Tax Rules, 1994 permitted credit of tax paid where services were not rendered and imposed no time limit for taking that credit. Following the introduction of GST and repeal of the earlier service-tax regime, Section 142(5) of the Central Goods and Services Tax Act, 2017 required the amount otherwise available as credit to be refunded in cash. The limitation under Section 11B could not apply to such a transitional cash refund. A credit note was unnecessary because there was no contract, service, or payment from the service recipient during the period concerned.

Conclusion: The cash refund was admissible and was neither time-barred under Section 11B nor deniable for want of a credit note.

Issues: (i) Validity of the sanction granted under Section 151(i) on 1 April 2022 after expiry of three years, including the temporal operation of the Finance Act 2023 proviso to Section 151; (ii) Whether third-party survey material established a live link between the assessee and alleged unaccounted sale consideration.

Issue (i): Validity of the sanction granted under Section 151(i) on 1 April 2022 after expiry of three years, including the temporal operation of the Finance Act 2023 proviso to Section 151.

Analysis: Sections 149(1)(a), 149(2), and 151 of the Income-tax Act, 1961 prescribe the limitation framework and identify the specified authority competent to approve reassessment. The three-year period for the relevant assessment year ended on 31 March 2022. Approval granted on 1 April 2022 by the authority under Section 151(i) did not meet the requirement applicable after expiry of that period. The time allowed for response under Section 148A(b) could not cure the jurisdictional defect under the unamended Section 151. The proviso inserted in Section 151 with effect from 1 April 2023 altered the computation of the three-year threshold for identifying the approving authority; it was a substantive jurisdictional change and was expressly prospective.

Conclusion: The sanction under Section 151(i) was without jurisdiction, and the Finance Act 2023 proviso to Section 151 did not retrospectively validate it. The issue is decided in favour of the assessee.

Issue (ii): Whether third-party survey material established a live link between the assessee and alleged unaccounted sale consideration.

Analysis: The impounded loose papers from a third-party survey contained neither the assessee's name nor particulars directly connecting her with the alleged on-money. The assessee had not sold the land to the person whose statement was relied upon, and no material established that person as her broker or otherwise connected her to the third-party transaction. The material was impounded nearly two years after the sale, without any demonstrated nexus to the assessee.

Conclusion: The third-party material did not establish a live link with the assessee or provide a sustainable basis for reassessment. The issue is decided in favour of the assessee.

Final Conclusion: The statutory safeguard governing approval for reassessment remained applicable under the law in force on the relevant date, and the evidentiary foundation for reopening was independently insufficient.

Ratio Decidendi: A statutory amendment altering the computation for identifying the competent reassessment-sanctioning authority cannot retrospectively cure a jurisdictionally invalid sanction unless the legislature clearly provides for retrospective operation.

Issues: (i) Whether software imported and supplied to educational institutions was customized software eligible for exemption or packaged software; (ii) Whether RSP/MRP assessment applied to such software despite the institutional or industrial consumer claim; (iii) Whether RSP could be determined from downstream invoices under the valuation rules; (iv) Whether extended limitation, confiscation, and penalties were justified.

Issue (i): Whether software imported and supplied to educational institutions was customized software eligible for exemption or packaged software.

Analysis: The material from software suppliers, educational institutions, and the importer's personnel established that the products were standard electronic-design and simulation tools with common functionality, supplied to varied users. Customer consultations, installation, training, and technical support did not establish client-specific development or alteration of the software. The products consequently met the definition of packaged or canned software under the applicable exemption notification.

Conclusion: The educational software was packaged software, not customized software, and was ineligible for the customized-software exemption; against the assessee.

Issue (ii): Whether RSP/MRP assessment applied to such software despite the institutional or industrial consumer claim.

Analysis: Retail sale under the Legal Metrology framework includes distribution or delivery through agencies or other instrumentalities for consumption by a group of individuals; it is not confined to sales through retail shops. The software was delivered as such to varied customers and was capable of off-the-shelf sale. After the relevant amendment, institutional or industrial consumer treatment additionally required a "not for retail sale" declaration on the package, which was absent. RSP-based assessment was therefore attracted under Section 4A of the Central Excise Act, 1944, read with Section 3(2) of the Customs Tariff Act, 1975.

Conclusion: RSP/MRP-based assessment validly applied to the imported packaged software; against the assessee.

Issue (iii): Whether RSP could be determined from downstream invoices under the valuation rules.

Analysis: Sales invoices of distributors and sub-resellers supplied contemporaneous market evidence of the maximum price at which the software was sold. The invoices did not segregate alleged support-service charges, while customer confirmations indicated that installation and training were provided without separate charge. Those invoices could consequently be used for RSP determination under Rule 6, with the prescribed abatement.

Conclusion: The RSP re-determination based on downstream sales invoices was valid; against the assessee.

Issue (iv): Whether extended limitation, confiscation, and penalties were justified.

Analysis: The absence of the mandatory "not for retail sale" declaration, coupled with commencement of MRP declarations after departmental objection and the established nature of the software as packaged software, supported an intention to evade duty. These circumstances sustained invocation of the extended period and the consequential confiscation and penalties.

Conclusion: The extended period, confiscation, and penalties were rightly sustained; against the assessee.

Final Conclusion: The RSP-based CVD re-determination and the related fiscal liabilities remain legally sustainable.

Ratio Decidendi: Standard software developed for varied users does not become customized software merely because customer consultations, installation, training, or technical support are provided; where it is capable of off-the-shelf sale and statutory retail-package requirements apply, it is assessable on the RSP basis.

Issues: Whether the service-tax demand on unaccounted cash receipts from flat purchasers was sustainable on the basis of recovered pen-drive data, signed printouts, and statements of the accounts manager and director.

Analysis: The pen drives were recovered under panchnama from the accounts manager, who explained their contents and signed the printouts. His statement was reaffirmed after eleven months and was also confirmed by the company director. Under Section 106 of the Indian Evidence Act, the burden of proof concerning facts within their exclusive knowledge rested on persons maintaining the records. The statements recorded under Section 14 of the Central Excise Act, 1944 were voluntary statements and remained usable evidence; their retraction only in the reply to the show-cause notice was a delayed retraction and an afterthought. The recovered electronic records and signed printouts provided corroborative documentary evidence of cash receipts, notwithstanding the absence of bank entries or buyer statements.

Conclusion: The unaccounted cash receipts and consequent service-tax liability were established; the order setting aside the demand was erroneous, and the original order confirming the demand, interest, and penalties was restored.

Issues: (i) Whether supplying food from premises provided by a hospital constituted taxable outdoor catering service notwithstanding payment of VAT; (ii) Whether the extended limitation period and penalties were sustainable.

Issue (i): Whether supplying food from premises provided by a hospital constituted taxable outdoor catering service notwithstanding payment of VAT.

Analysis: Under Sections 65(24), 65(76a), and 65(105)(zzt) of the Finance Act, 1994, a person supplying food in connection with catering from premises provided by the recipient falls within outdoor catering service. The food was supplied from hospital premises, bringing the activity within the expanded definition applicable from 16.06.2005. Payment of VAT established taxation of the goods component alone; statutory abatements had already excluded the permissible goods value from the taxable value. The earlier exemption for outdoor caterers in medical establishments had also been rescinded with effect from 01.03.2006.

Conclusion: The supply constituted taxable outdoor catering service, and payment of VAT did not displace service-tax liability on the service component. The finding is against the assessee.

Issue (ii): Whether the extended limitation period and penalties were sustainable.

Analysis: The demand was founded on records maintained by the assessee. Mere failure to declare facts did not establish wilful suppression; invocation of the extended period required deliberate conduct intended to evade tax. The existence of reasonable cause under Section 80 of the Finance Act, 1994 also precluded penalties for the relevant period.

Conclusion: The demand for the extended period and all penalties were unsustainable. The finding is in favour of the assessee.

Final Conclusion: Service-tax liability remains confined to the normal limitation period with applicable interest, while penalties do not survive.

Ratio Decidendi: Food supplied under an institutional arrangement from premises provided by the recipient falls within outdoor catering service, and VAT paid on the goods component does not preclude service tax on the separately taxable service component.

Issues: (i) Whether an application for refund filed on 04.06.2024 was within limitation where the appellate order was physically communicated on 08.03.2022 but its summary in FORM GST APL-04 was uploaded on 03.06.2024; (ii) Whether interest is payable on the directed refund.

Issue (i): Whether an application for refund filed on 04.06.2024 was within limitation where the appellate order was physically communicated on 08.03.2022 but its summary in FORM GST APL-04 was uploaded on 03.06.2024.

Analysis: Section 54(1), read with Explanation 2(d), ordinarily makes the date of communication of the appellate order the relevant date for a refund arising from that order. Rule 113(1) treats FORM GST APL-04 as a summary of the appellate order, while Rule 89(1) and FORM GST RFD-01 permit a refund application based on an order received physically; consequently, the physical communication on 08.03.2022 would ordinarily govern limitation.

Analysis: The appellate order had set aside the demand and specifically directed refund. The departmental delay in uploading the statutory summary, followed by the refund application on the next day, made it inappropriate to allow a procedural limitation to defeat that substantive relief. Continued retention of an amount unsupported by a subsisting demand would offend the constitutional safeguards against collection without authority of law and deprivation of property without authority of law.

Conclusion: In the peculiar circumstances, 03.06.2024 was treated as the relevant date; the refund application was timely and the assessee is entitled to the directed refund. This is in favour of the assessee.

Issue (ii): Whether interest is payable on the directed refund.

Analysis: Section 56 provides for interest where a refund consequent upon a final appellate order remains unpaid beyond sixty days from the refund application. The refund claim was treated as having been validly made on 04.06.2024, and the interest direction balanced the delayed claim process with the subsisting appellate direction for refund.

Conclusion: The assessee is entitled to interest at 6% per annum on the refundable amount from 15.08.2024 until payment, with 9% per annum applicable upon non-compliance beyond the stipulated implementation period. This is in favour of the assessee.

Final Conclusion: The appellate direction granting refund remains enforceable, and belated administrative uploading of its statutory summary cannot result in continued retention of an amount no longer supported by a valid demand.

Ratio Decidendi: A belated departmental upload of the statutory appellate-order summary may exceptionally be treated as the relevant date for a refund claim where necessary to give effect to a final refund direction and prevent retention of tax without legal authority.

Issues: Whether the audit report for financial years 2017-18 to 2019-20 was completed within the three-month statutory period for audit.

Analysis: The three-month period runs from the commencement of audit, which is determined by the later of the date on which the called-for records are made available and the date on which the audit is actually instituted at the registered person's place of business. Since the completeness of the documents supplied was disputed, actual institution of the audit at the place of business on 19 June 2024 was a valid alternative commencement date. The audit report issued on 2 August 2024 was therefore within three months. The failure to specifically intimate outstanding documents within a reasonable time did not invalidate the audit.

Conclusion: The audit report was issued within the prescribed period and was not time-barred.

Issues: (i) Whether the DGAP's methodology of comparing pre-GST credit and post-GST ITC against corresponding purchase values is legally and factually sustainable? (ii) Whether the Commencement Certificate dated 04.09.2017 precludes consideration of pre-GST purchase and credit data for determining additional ITC benefit? (iii) Whether the revised computation of profiteering based on the total project area, eligible sold area and per-square-foot benefit is factually and legally sustainable? (iv) Whether penalty under Section 171(3A) of the Central Goods and Services Tax Act, 2017 is attracted?

Issue (i): Whether the DGAP's methodology of comparing pre-GST credit and post-GST ITC against corresponding purchase values is legally and factually sustainable?

Analysis: Section 171 requires the benefit of additional input tax credit to be passed on through a commensurate reduction in price. A turnover-based methodology is unsuitable for real-estate projects because buyer receipts, construction activity and ITC accrual do not necessarily correspond during a project's life cycle. The purchase-value methodology instead used actual pre-GST Service Tax and VAT credit and actual post-GST ITC against the corresponding project expenditure, quantified the project-level savings, and distributed it as a per-square-foot benefit. This project-specific methodology had a rational nexus with the credit benefit to be quantified. The 1.70% incremental ITC benefit was derived from the assessee's own credit and purchase-value data.

Conclusion: The methodology and the 1.70% additional ITC benefit were accepted. Against the assessee.

Issue (ii): Whether the Commencement Certificate dated 04.09.2017 precludes consideration of pre-GST purchase and credit data for determining additional ITC benefit?

Analysis: The Commencement Certificate established the date of formal authorisation to commence construction, but did not by itself establish that no project-related goods or services were procured before GST. The pre-GST credit and purchase figures were drawn from certified statutory returns and records supplied by the assessee. No material established that those transactions lacked project nexus or related to another project.

Conclusion: The post-GST commencement date did not render the pre-GST purchase and credit data inadmissible or irrelevant for the Section 171 determination. Against the assessee.

Issue (iii): Whether the revised computation of profiteering based on the total project area, eligible sold area and per-square-foot benefit is factually and legally sustainable?

Analysis: The revised exercise was undertaken to address the discrepancy between the earlier project area and the area reflected in the Occupancy Certificate. Although the total built-up area included common facilities and could not automatically be equated with saleable area, the assessee did not furnish the directed detailed reconciliation. The revised computation consistently adopted total project area of 5,36,891 sq. ft. and eligible sold area of 3,34,570 sq. ft., yielding a per-square-foot benefit of Rs. 43.56 and a base profiteered amount of Rs. 1,45,73,861. GST collected on the excess realisation formed part of the profiteered amount.

Conclusion: The revised computation of Rs. 1,63,22,724 inclusive of GST was accepted. Against the assessee.

Issue (iv): Whether penalty under Section 171(3A) of the Central Goods and Services Tax Act, 2017 is attracted?

Analysis: The penalty provision came into force on 01.01.2020, and the investigation period extended beyond that date until 31.03.2023.

Conclusion: Penalty liability under Section 171(3A) arises, subject to the statutory exemption where the profiteered amount is deposited within thirty days. Against the assessee.

Final Conclusion: The project-specific additional ITC benefit is enforceable through commensurate price reduction and proportionate passing on to eligible homebuyers, together with applicable interest; GST collected on the excess realisation forms part of that benefit.

Ratio Decidendi: In a real-estate anti-profiteering determination, actual pre-GST credit and post-GST ITC may be compared against corresponding purchase values, rather than turnover, to quantify project-level savings and derive a per-square-foot benefit, provided the underlying transactions have a project nexus.

Issues: (i) Whether penalty under Section 271(1)(c) of the Income-tax Act, 1961 is sustainable where income is determined at 5% on an estimated basis after the Section 69C addition is deleted; and (ii) Whether penalty under Section 271(1)(c) of the Income-tax Act, 1961 is sustainable in respect of an addition relating to income from house property.

Issue (i): Whether penalty under Section 271(1)(c) of the Income-tax Act, 1961 is sustainable where income is determined at 5% on an estimated basis after the Section 69C addition is deleted.

Analysis: The original addition under Section 69C was deleted and income was directed to be computed by applying a 5% estimated profit rate. Penalty was thereafter imposed on the estimated income. An estimated addition, without a clear finding of concealment of income or furnishing of inaccurate particulars, does not establish the conditions for penalty.

Conclusion: Penalty on the estimated addition is unsustainable and must be deleted, in favour of the assessee.

Issue (ii): Whether penalty under Section 271(1)(c) of the Income-tax Act, 1961 is sustainable in respect of an addition relating to income from house property.

Analysis: The legal position adopted in the cited coordinate-bench decisions was applied to the penalty attributable to the addition under the head income from house property.

Conclusion: Penalty relating to the income-from-house-property addition is unsustainable and must be deleted, in favour of the assessee.

Final Conclusion: The requirements for concealment penalty were not met in respect of the estimated additions and the house-property addition.

Ratio Decidendi: Penalty for concealment cannot be sustained merely because income is assessed on an estimated basis, absent proof of concealment or furnishing of inaccurate particulars.

Issues: Whether the applicant was entitled to bail pending trial for alleged offences under the Central Goods and Services Tax Act, 2017.

Analysis: Article 21 of the Constitution of India protects personal liberty through a just, fair and reasonable procedure. Presumption of innocence operates at the pre-conviction stage, and pre-trial detention is not punitive; bail is the rule where custody is unnecessary to secure attendance at trial. The investigation had concluded, the complaint had been filed, the prosecution was substantially documentary, the applicant had no criminal antecedents, the maximum punishment was five years, and no material indicated risk of absconding, witness intimidation, evidence tampering, or other exceptional circumstances. Continued custody despite the likely delay in conclusion of trial would be inconsistent with the right to speedy trial.

Conclusion: The applicant was entitled to bail pending trial on appropriate conditions.

Issues: (i) Validity of the reassessment proceedings for assessment years 2014-15 to 2019-20; (ii) Availability of exemption under sections 10(20), 10(46) and 10(46A) of the Income-tax Act, 1961 and tax immunity under Article 289 of the Constitution of India; (iii) Eligibility for exemption under sections 11 and 12 of the Income-tax Act, 1961; (iv) Whether non-identification of a specific head of income invalidated the assessments; and (v) Computation of the assessee's taxable income.

Issue (i): Validity of the reassessment proceedings for assessment years 2014-15 to 2019-20.

Analysis: For assessment years 2014-15 to 2018-19, no returns had been filed despite surpluses exceeding the taxable threshold. This constituted deemed escapement of income under Explanation 2(a) to section 147, and the notices were within limitation and supported by the prescribed approvals. The second proviso to section 12A(2) did not bar reopening because the action was not only on account of non-registration. For assessment year 2019-20, the procedure under section 148A was followed, a return was filed in response to notice, and no procedural infirmity was established.

Conclusion: The reassessments are valid, and the jurisdictional challenge fails against the assessee.

Issue (ii): Availability of exemption under sections 10(20), 10(46) and 10(46A) of the Income-tax Act, 1961 and tax immunity under Article 289 of the Constitution of India.

Analysis: Section 10(20) did not cover an urban improvement trust constituted under the Rajasthan Urban Improvement Act, 1959. Exemption under sections 10(46) and 10(46A) required a Central Government notification; the notification issued under section 10(46A) operated only from assessment year 2026-27. Article 289(1) protects the income of a State, whereas a statutory body corporate with its own assets, funds, liabilities, and capacity to sue and be sued has a separate legal personality and its income is not the income of the State. Public functions, State control, or status as an instrumentality for Article 12 purposes do not establish constitutional immunity from Union taxation.

Conclusion: No exemption under sections 10(20), 10(46) or 10(46A), and no immunity under Article 289, is available; this issue is decided against the assessee.

Issue (iii): Eligibility for exemption under sections 11 and 12 of the Income-tax Act, 1961.

Analysis: The retrospective application of trust registration under the first proviso to section 12A(2) required pending assessment proceedings before the Assessing Officer on the date of registration. No such pending assessment proceedings existed for assessment years 2014-15 to 2018-19; an inquiry under section 133(6) was not an assessment proceeding, and reassessment proceedings commenced later. For assessment year 2019-20, registration was in force, but the claimed application and accumulation of income had not been verified. The direction for verification and recomputation was not challenged by the Revenue.

Conclusion: Exemption under sections 11 and 12 is unavailable for assessment years 2014-15 to 2018-19; for assessment year 2019-20, verification and recomputation of the claim is maintained, without an immediate allowance of exemption.

Issue (iv): Whether non-identification of a specific head of income invalidated the assessments.

Analysis: Section 4 charges total income, while the heads under section 14 operate for computation. The taxable subject was identifiable as the surplus disclosed in the income and expenditure accounts. The omission to specify a head of income for two assessment years did not invalidate the assessments, particularly when the head remains open for determination in the fresh computation.

Conclusion: The assessments are not invalid for want of a stated head of income, and the additional ground fails against the assessee.

Issue (v): Computation of the assessee's taxable income.

Analysis: Registration status did not determine whether particular receipts constituted real income. The claims concerning State shares of premium and lease receipts, fees, and refunded advances require factual determination of diversion of income by overriding title or of liabilities rather than income, on the basis of statutory instruments, accounting treatment, and evidence of remittance or refund. These matters had not been examined on merits.

Conclusion: Computation for assessment years 2014-15 to 2018-19 is restored for fresh determination, including the head of income, while the rejected exemption and constitutional-immunity claims cannot be reopened.

Final Conclusion: The statutory and constitutional exemption claims stand rejected, while fresh quantification of taxable income remains necessary for assessment years 2014-15 to 2018-19; the verification framework for assessment year 2019-20 remains intact.

Ratio Decidendi: A statutory authority possessing a separate corporate personality and its own assets, funds, and liabilities cannot treat its income as the income of the State for immunity under Article 289(1) merely because it performs public functions or is subject to State control.

Issues: (i) Whether royalty paid pursuant to a demand raised during the relevant year for rejection/waste dumps sold in preceding financial years was deductible in that year; (ii) Whether interest paid for delayed payment of royalty was a deductible business expenditure.

Issue (i): Whether royalty paid pursuant to a demand raised during the relevant year for rejection/waste dumps sold in preceding financial years was deductible in that year.

Analysis: Under the mercantile system of accounting, a liability that remained unasserted and was first demanded and quantified during the relevant year crystallises in that year. In the absence of earlier demands and given the bona fide belief regarding royalty on rejection/waste dumps, the payment was not disallowable merely as prior-period expenditure; the matching concept did not defeat the deduction.

Conclusion: The royalty payment was deductible in the year in which the liability crystallised, in favour of the assessee.

Issue (ii): Whether interest paid for delayed payment of royalty was a deductible business expenditure.

Analysis: Section 37(1) of the Income-tax Act, 1961 permits expenditure incurred wholly and exclusively for business purposes. Interest arising from delayed payment of royalty following the demand was compensatory, not penal, and was incurred as a matter of business expediency without breach or infraction of law.

Conclusion: The interest on delayed royalty payment was compensatory and deductible as business expenditure, in favour of the assessee.

Final Conclusion: The royalty and consequential compensatory interest constituted deductible business outgoings for the relevant assessment year.

Ratio Decidendi: A statutory liability and consequential compensatory interest first demanded and crystallised in a relevant year are deductible business outgoings in that year, notwithstanding that the underlying transactions relate to earlier periods.