Territorial jurisdiction in cheque dishonour cases may arise where any part of the composite offence occurred; quashing was refused.

Territorial jurisdiction in a Section 138 NI Act prosecution is determined by the composite set of acts completing the offence, including drawing, presentation, dishonour, notice, and failure to pay, so jurisdiction may lie where any constituent act occurred under Sections 177 to 179 CrPC. On the materials cited, negotiations, invoicing, receipt of payments, and cheque presentation were alleged in Delhi, creating factual that could not be conclusively rejected at the threshold. Inherent power under Section 482 CrPC is exercised sparingly and not to resolve disputed facts at inception; because the jurisdictional controversy required evidence, quashing of the summoning order was declined and the issue was left for trial.

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Issues: (i) Whether the criminal courts in Delhi had territorial jurisdiction to entertain the complaint under Section 138 of the Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881. (ii) Whether the summoning order should be quashed in exercise of inherent powers under Section 482 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 at the initial stage despite disputed questions of fact.

Issue (i): Whether the criminal courts in Delhi had territorial jurisdiction to entertain the complaint under Section 138 of the Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881.

Analysis: Territorial jurisdiction in a prosecution under Section 138 is determined by the composite sequence of acts that complete the offence. The relevant components include drawing of the cheque, presentation, dishonour, service of demand notice, and failure to pay within the stipulated period. Under Sections 177 to 179 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973, the offence may be tried where the acts constituting it occurred, and where the offence consists of several acts done in different local areas, jurisdiction may lie in any such area. On the materials placed, there were assertions that negotiations took place in Delhi, invoices were issued from Delhi, payments were credited in Delhi, and the cheque was presented through banking channels in Delhi. These matters involved factual controversy and could not be conclusively negated at the threshold.

Conclusion: Delhi courts could not be held to lack territorial jurisdiction at the threshold.

Issue (ii): Whether the summoning order should be quashed in exercise of inherent powers under Section 482 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 at the initial stage despite disputed questions of fact.

Analysis: Inherent jurisdiction under Section 482 is exercised sparingly and only where the complaint on its face discloses a legal bar or does not make out an offence. Here, the jurisdictional controversy depended on disputed facts relating to negotiations, accrual of liability, and delivery of the cheque, all of which required evidence and cross-examination. The material did not justify characterising the complaint as an abuse of process at the inception, and the trial court was entitled to examine the issue on evidence. A prima facie view of jurisdiction was sufficient to decline interference at this stage.

Conclusion: The summoning order was not liable to be quashed under Section 482 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 at the initial stage.

Final Conclusion: The petition failed, and the challenge to the criminal proceedings was declined, leaving the territorial jurisdiction issue open for determination on evidence by the trial court.

Ratio Decidendi: In a prosecution under Section 138 of the Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881, territorial jurisdiction may lie in any local area where a component of the composite offence occurred, and disputed jurisdictional facts ordinarily should not be resolved by quashing proceedings under Section 482 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 at the threshold.

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