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Issues: (i) Whether the industrial tribunal's refusal to examine the conciliation officer denied the petitioner a real and effective opportunity to prove the existence and terms of the alleged agreement, thereby vitiating the finding on the method of evaluation of loss. (ii) Whether the refusal of leave to appeal by the Supreme Court under Article 136 should be taken into account in the exercise of discretion under Article 226 for issuing certiorari.
Issue (i): Whether the industrial tribunal's refusal to examine the conciliation officer denied the petitioner a real and effective opportunity to prove the existence and terms of the alleged agreement, thereby vitiating the finding on the method of evaluation of loss.
Analysis: The alleged agreement was not a formal settlement satisfying Section 12(3) of the Industrial Disputes Act, and its existence and scope had to be gathered from correspondence and surrounding circumstances. The question whether the method of evaluation had been agreed upon was a question of fact. The tribunal shut out evidence that was relevant to that issue by declining to examine the conciliation officer. The refusal deprived the petitioner of a fair opportunity to establish its case on a material factual question, and the finding that there was no agreement on the method of evaluation was therefore vitiated.
Conclusion: The petitioner succeeded on this issue, and the tribunal's finding on the agreement was held to be unsustainable for want of a fair opportunity to adduce evidence.
Issue (ii): Whether the refusal of leave to appeal by the Supreme Court under Article 136 should be taken into account in the exercise of discretion under Article 226 for issuing certiorari.
Analysis: The refusal of leave under Article 136 meant that there was no appeal and no merger of the award with any appellate order. It also did not bar the High Court's jurisdiction under Article 226. However, the earlier refusal of leave was a relevant factor in deciding whether the discretionary writ jurisdiction should be exercised, especially when the same award had already been unsuccessfully challenged before the Supreme Court. In the circumstances, the Court held that it would not be a proper exercise of discretion to interfere despite the earlier finding of procedural unfairness.
Conclusion: The petitioner failed on this issue, and certiorari was declined in the exercise of discretion.
Final Conclusion: Although the tribunal's refusal to permit the examination of the conciliation officer was found to be procedurally unfair, the writ jurisdiction under Article 226 was not exercised because the earlier refusal of leave by the Supreme Court weighed against interference. The petition was therefore dismissed.
Ratio Decidendi: A High Court may refuse certiorari in the exercise of its discretion even where a tribunal's finding is vitiated by denial of a fair opportunity, if the same challenge has already been unsuccessfully pursued before the Supreme Court and that prior refusal is treated as a relevant factor against interference.
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