Set-off for pre-trial custody applies to life imprisonment and operates alongside special law absent a contrary provision.

A beneficial set-off provision under the Criminal Procedure Code applies to life imprisonment, because the phrase "imprisonment for a term" is wide enough to include a life sentence and the period spent in pre-trial custody must be credited against the remaining sentence. The benefit also extends where the conviction was recorded before insertion of the corresponding special provision in the Border Security Force Act, as the amendment operates prospectively on the sentence still to be served and does not unsettle the conviction already imposed. In the absence of a contrary provision in the special statute, the general criminal procedure rule on set-off continues to apply, and denial of credit for pre-conviction custody is invalid.

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Issues: (i) whether a prisoner sentenced to life imprisonment is entitled to set off the period of pre-trial detention against the sentence under the Criminal Procedure Code; (ii) whether the benefit of the set-off provision is available in relation to a conviction recorded before the introduction of Section 121A of the Border Security Force Act, 1968; and (iii) whether the general set-off provision can operate alongside the special law in the absence of a contrary provision.

Issue (i): whether a prisoner sentenced to life imprisonment is entitled to set off the period of pre-trial detention against the sentence under the Criminal Procedure Code.

Analysis: The provision for set-off is intended to reduce the sentence yet to be undergone by crediting the period spent in custody during investigation, inquiry, or trial. The expression "imprisonment for a term" is not confined to a fixed or ascertainable period and includes life imprisonment. The beneficial object of the provision would be frustrated if persons sentenced to imprisonment for life were excluded from its operation.

Conclusion: The prisoner sentenced to life imprisonment is entitled to the benefit of set-off.

Issue (ii): whether the benefit of the set-off provision is available in relation to a conviction recorded before the introduction of Section 121A of the Border Security Force Act, 1968.

Analysis: The later amendment introduced a corresponding set-off provision but did not operate retrospectively to unsettle the conviction or sentence already imposed. It operates prospectively on the remaining sentence and merely reduces the portion still to be served by crediting pre-trial detention. The absence of the provision at the time of conviction does not defeat the claim where the sentence is still undergoing execution.

Conclusion: The benefit of set-off is available notwithstanding that the conviction preceded the amendment.

Issue (iii): whether the general set-off provision can operate alongside the special law in the absence of a contrary provision.

Analysis: A special law prevails only to the extent it contains a specific provision to the contrary. In the absence of such a contrary provision in the Border Security Force Act as it then stood, the general criminal procedure provision concerning set-off continues to apply. The later introduction of the corresponding special provision also supports the same result.

Conclusion: The general set-off provision applies to sentences imposed under the Border Security Force Act in the absence of a contrary provision.

Final Conclusion: The petitioner was entitled to credit for the period of custody undergone before conviction, and the impugned denial of set-off was invalid.

Ratio Decidendi: A beneficial set-off provision applies to life sentences and operates prospectively on the remaining sentence, and in the absence of a contrary special provision, the general criminal procedure rule on set-off extends to sentences imposed under a special statute.

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