Jurisdiction acquired later can validate certification proceedings; prior notification not saved where inconsistent with re-enacted law.

A proceeding initially filed before the Certifying Officer lacked jurisdiction can still be validly decided once jurisdiction is later acquired, because the application is tested at the time of certification. On the facts stated, the officer had acquired jurisdiction before the certification order, so the certification was not void. The earlier State-law notification also could not be preserved under the general savings provision after repeal and re-enactment, because the new statutory scheme did not continue to apply to the Bhilai Steel Industry. The appellate order of the Industrial Court was set aside and the matter remitted for consideration of the remaining objections on merits.

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Issues: (i) Whether the Certifying Officer under the Central Standing Orders Act had acquired jurisdiction to certify the standing orders before the date of certification. (ii) Whether the notification issued under the earlier law could be saved by the general savings provision after repeal and re-enactment of the State standing orders legislation.

Issue (i): Whether the Certifying Officer under the Central Standing Orders Act had acquired jurisdiction to certify the standing orders before the date of certification.

Analysis: The draft standing orders were initially submitted when the Certifying Officer lacked jurisdiction, but the governing law changed before the certification order was made. The State standing orders legislation ceased to apply to the Bhilai Steel Industry, and the field became open to the Central Standing Orders Act. An application made when the officer lacked jurisdiction could become effective once jurisdiction was subsequently acquired and continue as a valid matter for decision at the time of certification.

Conclusion: The Certifying Officer had acquired jurisdiction before the certification order was passed, so the certification was not void for want of jurisdiction.

Issue (ii): Whether the notification issued under the earlier law could be saved by the general savings provision after repeal and re-enactment of the State standing orders legislation.

Analysis: The earlier notification could not survive once the 1947 Act was repealed and replaced by the 1959 Act, because the re-enacted legislation, by reason of its proviso, did not apply to the Bhilai Steel Industry. A notification under the repealed enactment was inconsistent with the new statutory scheme and therefore could not be preserved by the general clauses provision.

Conclusion: The notification was not saved by the general clauses provision and could not keep the State Act applicable to the Bhilai Steel Industry.

Final Conclusion: The appellate order of the Industrial Court was set aside, and the matter was sent back for consideration of the remaining objections on merits.

Ratio Decidendi: Where a legal proceeding is before a statutory authority that later acquires jurisdiction, the proceeding may become valid and be decided on the merits existing at the time of decision; a prior notification cannot be saved by a general saving clause if it is inconsistent with the later re-enacted statute.

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