Issues: Whether penalties under Section 114 of the Customs Act, 1962 could be sustained against a customs house agent and its partner for alleged procedural lapses in export documentation, without evidence of knowing involvement in the attempted fraudulent export.

Analysis: Section 114 requires evidence of an act or omission that knowingly caused, abetted or otherwise facilitated the conduct rendering export goods liable to confiscation. Failures to verify exporters' credentials, signatures and authorisation documents may amount to breaches of obligations under the Customs House Agents Licensing Regulations, 2004, but do not by themselves establish conscious abetment of misdeclaration, overvaluation or wrongful drawback claims. The record disclosed no cogent evidence of knowledge of the nature of the goods, participation in false documentation, involvement in procurement, transport or stuffing, receipt of undue drawback, conspiracy, or any intentional act facilitating the alleged fraud. Separate licensing proceedings arising from the same factual matrix had also resulted in revocation of the licence and forfeiture of security.

Conclusion: The requisite penal connection and conscious abetment under Section 114 of the Customs Act, 1962 were not established; the penalties were therefore unsustainable.

Issues: Whether drawback for the three air-export shipping bills could be denied on the ground that their conversion from the Advance Authorisation Scheme to the Drawback Scheme was not sought before the jurisdictional Air Commissionerate within the three-month period stipulated by the Circular.

Analysis: The conversion request dated 26.03.2012 covered the disputed shipping bills, and the supporting documents were supplied on 24.04.2012; the earlier request dated 10.11.2011 concerned different bills. The approved conversion order and subsequent brand-rate fixation remained unchallenged. Section 149 of the Customs Act, 1962 permitted post-export amendment on the basis of contemporaneous documentary evidence and did not impose a three-month limitation. An administrative circular could not introduce a statutory time bar absent from the governing provision. The conversion approval could not be reopened at the drawback-sanction stage without being dealt with in accordance with law.

Conclusion: The drawback claim could not be rejected on the jurisdictional and circular-based limitation grounds and was required to be processed in accordance with law.

Issues: (i) Whether penalties under Sections 114(i) and 114AA of the Customs Act, 1962 were sustainable against the exporting company and its director in the absence of evidence of their knowledge, connivance, or involvement in the attempted export of prohibited goods; (ii) Whether the declared steel wire was liable to confiscation and consequential redemption fine; (iii) Whether penalties under Section 114(i) of the Customs Act, 1962 were sustainable against the intermediaries who facilitated export clearance in the absence of evidence of knowing participation in the smuggling attempt.

Issue (i): Whether penalties under Sections 114(i) and 114AA of the Customs Act, 1962 were sustainable against the exporting company and its director in the absence of evidence of their knowledge, connivance, or involvement in the attempted export of prohibited goods.

Analysis: The declared steel wire was loaded under the supervision of Central Excise officers and the container was sealed at the factory. The prohibited wood logs were substituted during transit after the container left the factory. No evidence established the company's or its director's connivance in that substitution, use of false documents with knowledge, or participation in the smuggling arrangement. Their reliance on an intermediary for export arrangements, though imprudent, did not establish abetment or knowing involvement.

Conclusion: The penalties under Sections 114(i) and 114AA were unsustainable and were set aside in favour of the assessee.

Issue (ii): Whether the declared steel wire was liable to confiscation and consequential redemption fine.

Analysis: The steel wire was manufactured by the exporter, loaded under official supervision, and sealed by Central Excise officers. As the subsequent replacement of part of the wire with prohibited goods was not attributable to the exporter, the declared steel wire could not be treated as goods liable to confiscation.

Conclusion: The declared steel wire was not liable to confiscation, and the redemption fine was unsustainable, in favour of the assessee.

Issue (iii): Whether penalties under Section 114(i) of the Customs Act, 1962 were sustainable against the intermediaries who facilitated export clearance in the absence of evidence of knowing participation in the smuggling attempt.

Analysis: The evidence established only that the intermediaries acted in connection with the export of the declared goods. There was no evidence that they knowingly participated in the attempted smuggling, belonged to the smuggling syndicate, or facilitated the export of prohibited goods with the requisite knowledge.

Conclusion: The penalties under Section 114(i) were unsustainable and were set aside in favour of the assessee.

Final Conclusion: The penal and confiscatory consequences lacked an evidentiary basis because neither the exporter, its director, nor the intermediaries were shown to have knowingly participated in or abetted the substitution and attempted export of prohibited goods.

Ratio Decidendi: Penal liability for attempted export smuggling and confiscation of declared goods cannot rest on commercial negligence or intermediary status alone; it requires evidence of knowing involvement, abetment, or a legally attributable act connected with the smuggling attempt.

Issues: Whether printed cotton knitted fabric is classifiable under CTH 6006 2400 and consequently falls outside the minimum import price restriction under Notification No. 33/2024-25 dated 01.10.2024.

Analysis: The Customs laboratory report, though initially obtained for testing hazardous azo dyes, was a detailed official electronic record that recorded the fabric as printed. Its authenticity could not be rejected without verification, clarification, or re-test. The importer's original tariff declaration and failure to seek its amendment were not conclusive where the classification dispute and test results were placed before the adjudicating authority. Classification had to be based on the tariff entries and the established characteristics of the goods.

Conclusion: The 100% cotton printed knitted fabric is classifiable under CTH 6006 2400. It is outside Notification No. 33/2024-25 dated 01.10.2024, is not prohibited on account of the stated minimum import price condition, and is eligible for clearance for home consumption upon completion of assessment and payment of applicable duty.

Issues: Whether a domestic purchaser of imported machinery is liable to penalty for the importer's alleged misdeclaration and wrongful claim of customs exemption, absent proof of the purchaser's knowledge, reason to believe, or participation in the contravention.

Analysis: The machinery was acquired through domestic invoices for the invoiced consideration and taxes, without any customs-exemption claim by the purchaser. The alleged fabrication of documents and misdeclaration related to the import transaction, and no material established collusion, participation, knowledge, or reason to believe that the goods were liable to confiscation. Caveat emptor does not displace the Department's burden to prove the statutory ingredients for penal liability; knowledge that goods are imported does not by itself establish knowledge that they are liable to confiscation.

Conclusion: Penalty under Section 112(b) of the Customs Act, 1962 cannot be sustained against the domestic purchaser in the absence of proof of the requisite knowledge, reason to believe, or participation.

Issues: (i) Whether written acceptance of reassessment and enhanced customs value waives the importer's statutory right to challenge it; (ii) Whether the declared transaction value can be rejected and reassessed solely on unparticularised contemporaneous-import data and an acceptance letter without compliance with the statutory valuation requirements.

Issue (i): Whether written acceptance of reassessment and enhanced customs value waives the importer's statutory right to challenge it.

Analysis: Written acceptance under Section 17(5) relieves the proper officer only of the obligation to issue a speaking order. It does not amount to waiver of the statutory right to challenge reassessment on the validity of the formation of opinion or on merits. The acceptance communications did not establish a voluntary abandonment of that statutory right.

Conclusion: Written acceptance of enhanced value does not bar the importer from challenging the reassessment; in favour of the assessee.

Issue (ii): Whether the declared transaction value can be rejected and reassessed solely on unparticularised contemporaneous-import data and an acceptance letter without compliance with the statutory valuation requirements.

Analysis: Rejection of transaction value requires compliance with Section 14 and Rule 12(2), including formation and communication of reasonable doubt regarding the truth or accuracy of the declared value. A valuation addition based merely on NIDB or contemporaneous-import data requires independent and cogent supporting material. The acceptance letters did not identify the alleged comparable import data or supply substantiated grounds for rejecting the declared value.

Conclusion: The rejection of declared value and the enhanced reassessment were unsustainable; in favour of the assessee.

Final Conclusion: Statutory valuation safeguards remain applicable notwithstanding an importer's written acceptance, and reassessment must rest on communicated grounds and substantiated material.

Ratio Decidendi: An importer's written acceptance under Section 17(5) waives only the requirement of a speaking order and does not waive the statutory right to challenge reassessment, while rejection of transaction value requires Rule 12(2)-compliant grounds supported by tangible material.

Issues: (i) Whether invocation of the extended period of limitation for the subsequent demands was justified; (ii) Whether the demand under Construction of Residential Complex Service was sustainable.

Issue (i): Whether invocation of the extended period of limitation for the subsequent demands was justified.

Analysis: The subsequent demands were founded on the earlier notice, whose resulting demand had already been set aside. No independent material established suppression, fraud, or intent to evade tax for the later periods. The extended period, being foundational to the demands, was therefore unavailable.

Conclusion: Invocation of the extended period of limitation was unjustified, in favour of the assessee.

Issue (ii): Whether the demand under Construction of Residential Complex Service was sustainable.

Analysis: The prior demand on the same basis had been set aside on the ground that the activity was a composite works contract after the assessee opted for the works contract composition scheme. No distinguishing material supported the subsequent demands under Construction of Residential Complex Service.

Conclusion: The demand under Construction of Residential Complex Service was unsustainable, in favour of the assessee.

Final Conclusion: The impugned tax demands fail for want of a valid basis to invoke the extended limitation period and for absence of sustainable liability under the stated taxable category.

Ratio Decidendi: A subsequent demand founded on the same allegations as an earlier notice cannot invoke the extended limitation period without fresh material establishing suppression, fraud, or intent to evade tax.

Issues: Whether the relevant date for the one-year limitation for a rebate claim on exported services is the export-invoice date or the date of full realisation of export proceeds.

Analysis: Receipt of consideration in convertible foreign exchange was a condition for treating the services as exported under Rule 3(2)(b) of the Export of Services Rules, 2005. Notification No. 11/2005-ST also required receipt of such payment and documentary proof. The framework applicable to exported services therefore made full realisation of export proceeds material for computing limitation. The rule concerning goods exported out of India did not govern this determination for export of services.

Conclusion: The relevant date is the date of full realisation of export proceeds; the rebate claim was within limitation, in favour of the assessee.

Issues: Whether the alleged clandestine manufacture and removal of TMT rods/bars without payment of central excise duty was established on the basis of private records and statements.

Analysis: Clandestine removal must be established by positive evidence, with the burden resting on the Revenue. The Executive Diary, made-up file and statements indicated short accounting of MS ingots, which were captively consumed, but did not independently establish their conversion into unaccounted finished TMT rods/bars or their removal. There was no corroboration through electricity consumption, transport or dispatch records, or evidence identifying purchasers of the alleged clandestinely cleared goods. Conjecture arising from private records and uncorroborated statements was insufficient to prove clandestine removal.

Conclusion: The alleged clandestine removal was not proved; the excise-duty demand and the associated penalties were unsustainable.

Issues: Whether the concurrent conviction and sentence for commercial-tax evasion under the Bihar Finance Act warranted revisional interference.

Analysis: The documentary material disclosed deliberate discrepancies in the description and value of goods, indicating suppression of transactions to evade commercial tax. The appellate findings had specifically addressed the discrepancies. Revisional jurisdiction under Section 397 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 is confined to patent jurisdictional or legal error, findings based on no evidence, disregard of material evidence, or arbitrary or perverse exercise of discretion; it does not permit routine reappraisal of concurrent findings.

Conclusion: The concurrent conviction and sentences under the Bihar Finance Act warranted no revisional interference.

Issues: (i) Whether retrospective cancellation of GST registration precludes an audit under Section 65 for the entire notified period, including the period after the effective cancellation date; (ii) Whether non-disclosure of a pending audit notice in earlier cancellation proceedings disentitles the taxpayer to discretionary writ relief.

Issue (i): Whether retrospective cancellation of GST registration precludes an audit under Section 65 for the entire notified period, including the period after the effective cancellation date.

Analysis: Section 2(13) defines audit as examination of records, returns and documents to verify past compliance, while Section 65(1), read with Rule 101, authorises audit for a specified period. Pending determination of a cancellation application, registration is deemed suspended under Rule 21A but is not brought to an end, and the person continues to be described as a registered person.

Analysis: The expression "registered person" requires contextual interpretation in light of the retrospective and record-based nature of an audit. A registration granted and subsisting during the proposed audit period provides the necessary factual nexus for scrutiny of records and conduct under that registration, notwithstanding its later retrospective cancellation. Section 29(3) preserves pre-cancellation liabilities and obligations, but the authority to audit arises from Sections 2(13) and 65 read with Rule 101. Audit neither determines tax liability nor validates post-cancellation returns or assumes post-cancellation taxable supplies.

Conclusion: Retrospective cancellation did not deprive the authority of jurisdiction to audit the full notified period, including the period after the effective cancellation date. The issue is decided in favour of Revenue.

Issue (ii): Whether non-disclosure of a pending audit notice in earlier cancellation proceedings disentitles the taxpayer to discretionary writ relief.

Analysis: The audit notice was material to the relief sought in the earlier cancellation proceedings and was known to the taxpayer, but was not disclosed. Delay by the department in processing the cancellation application did not excuse that material non-disclosure. Reliance on directions obtained without disclosing the pending audit proceedings was inconsistent with the clean hands requirement for equitable writ relief.

Conclusion: The material non-disclosure independently disentitled the taxpayer to discretionary writ relief. The issue is decided against the assessee.

Final Conclusion: Statutory audit jurisdiction survives retrospective cancellation in respect of records and conduct referable to the notified period, and material non-disclosure independently bars equitable intervention.

Ratio Decidendi: For purposes of statutory audit, a person registered during the period under scrutiny remains amenable to examination of records and compliance referable to that registration despite its subsequent retrospective cancellation.

Issues: Whether the Appellate Authority could dismiss the rectification appeal on the ground of multiplicity without addressing its principal grounds or disposing of the connected appeal against the original demand.

Analysis: Section 107 requires an appellate order confirming, modifying or annulling the decision appealed against. Although both appeals had been taken up together, the order addressed only the rectification appeal and contained no findings on its principal grounds or on the connected appeal against the demand. In the absence of appellate findings on the demand, its merits could not be determined in the present appeal.

Conclusion: No. The principal grounds in both appeals must be addressed, with a reasonable opportunity of personal hearing.

Ratio Decidendi: Where appeals against an original demand and rejection of its rectification are taken up together, the appellate authority must dispose of both and address their principal grounds; it cannot dismiss the rectification appeal solely on the ground of multiplicity.

Issues: (i) Whether input tax credit was reversible under Section 17(2) where cattle-feed supplies were exempt and no input tax credit had been availed on their purchase, subject to any common input or input-services credit; and (ii) Whether differential tax based on a disparity between GSTR-1 and GSTR-9 could be determined without considering the claimed corrections and explanations in the annual return.

Issue (i): Whether input tax credit was reversible under Section 17(2) where cattle-feed supplies were exempt and no input tax credit had been availed on their purchase, subject to any common input or input-services credit.

Analysis: Section 17(2) restricts credit where goods or services are used partly for taxable supplies and partly for exempt supplies, while Rules 42 and 43 prescribe the mechanism for reversal of common credit. Credit reversal can arise only where input tax credit has actually been availed on inputs, input services, or capital goods used for both taxable and exempt supplies. No reversal is warranted in respect of exempt traded goods on which no input tax credit was taken; however, common input-services credit, if any, requires verification and proportionate computation.

Conclusion: Reversal is confined to actual common input tax credit, if any, and its existence and quantum require verification.

Issue (ii): Whether differential tax based on a disparity between GSTR-1 and GSTR-9 could be determined without considering the claimed corrections and explanations in the annual return.

Analysis: The annual return under Section 44 permits correction of figures declared in periodic returns. The asserted clerical explanation for the difference between GSTR-1 and GSTR-9 requires consideration along with the relevant records before determining whether any differential tax remains payable.

Conclusion: The claimed corrections and explanation for the return difference must be considered before determining any differential tax liability.

Final Conclusion: The tax, interest, and penalty demands require fresh merits determination after verification of actual common input tax credit and consideration of the annual-return reconciliation, with an effective opportunity to produce evidence and be heard.

Ratio Decidendi: Credit reversal under Section 17(2) is limited to input tax credit actually availed on common inputs or input services attributable to exempt supplies.

Issues: Whether GST can be demanded from a job worker solely on the value shown in e-way bills without evidence that the job worker made undisclosed taxable supplies.

Analysis: Section 143 of the Central Goods and Services Tax Act, 2017 recognises movement of a principal's goods for job work. Under Rule 138 of the Central Goods and Services Tax Rules, 2017, an e-way bill may be generated by the registered person causing movement of goods; in an inter-State job-work movement, it may be generated by either the principal or the registered job worker. The identity of the person generating the e-way bill is therefore not determinative of taxable supply. The supporting records established that the goods belonged to the principal, moved under delivery challans for job work, and were returned after processing, while the job-work charges were separately invoiced and disclosed. A mismatch between return data and e-way-bill values, without investigation or independent evidence of supply of goods, receipt of consideration, or tax evasion, does not establish undisclosed taxable turnover.

Conclusion: GST cannot be demanded merely from the value declared in e-way bills in the absence of independent evidence establishing an undisclosed taxable supply. The tax demand and consequential interest and penalty are unsustainable.

Issues: (i) Whether B2B supplies were erroneously reported as B2C supplies in Form GSTR-1 and re-reported in March 2020, resulting in duplicate reporting and artificial inflation of turnover and tax liability; (ii) Whether rectification of the erroneous classification in Form GSTR-1 for March 2020 in respect of preceding months of the same financial year was permissible under Section 39(9) of the Act.

Issue (i): Whether B2B supplies were erroneously reported as B2C supplies in Form GSTR-1 and re-reported in March 2020, resulting in duplicate reporting and artificial inflation of turnover and tax liability.

Analysis: Verification of the Form GSTR-1 returns, recipient GSTINs, tax invoices and tabulated supply details established that supplies shown as B2C were actually made to registered recipients. Tax on the supplies made from June 2019 to February 2020 had already been discharged through the corresponding Form GSTR-3B returns. Their re-reporting as B2B supplies in the March 2020 Form GSTR-1, together with the March 2020 supplies, duplicated the entries and artificially increased the turnover and liability reflected in Form GSTR-1.

Conclusion: Yes. The actual supplies were B2B supplies, and duplicate reporting in Form GSTR-1 caused the apparent mismatch and inflated liability. This finding is in favour of the assessee.

Issue (ii): Whether rectification of the erroneous classification in Form GSTR-1 for March 2020 in respect of preceding months of the same financial year was permissible under Section 39(9) of the Act.

Analysis: Section 39(9) permitted rectification of omissions or incorrect particulars in the return for the month or quarter in which the error was noticed, subject to the prescribed outer deadline and to the rectification not arising from scrutiny, audit, inspection or enforcement activity. The provision did not require rectification only in returns of the subsequent financial year. The correction was made voluntarily within the statutory outer time limit, while the tax on the underlying outward supplies had already been paid; the reporting errors were consequently revenue-neutral.

Conclusion: Yes. Rectification in the March 2020 Form GSTR-1 for errors in returns of preceding months of the same financial year was legally permissible under Section 39(9) of the Act. This finding is in favour of the assessee.

Final Conclusion: The variance between Form GSTR-1 and Form GSTR-3B arose from a timely permissible correction of supply classification and duplicate reporting, and did not establish an enforceable additional tax liability.

Ratio Decidendi: Section 39(9) permits a registered person to rectify omissions or incorrect particulars in a subsequent return of the same financial year when the error is noticed, provided the statutory conditions and outer time limit are satisfied; it does not confine rectification to returns of the following financial year.

Issues: (i) Whether trademark licence utilisation fees are deductible as revenue expenditure; (ii) whether employees' welfare fund contributions deposited after the statutory due dates are deductible when paid before the return-filing due date.

Issue (i): Whether trademark licence utilisation fees are deductible as revenue expenditure.

Analysis: Section 37 governs the deduction of business expenditure, while Section 32 concerns depreciation on qualifying assets. The fees were periodic payments for a limited, terminable right to use the trademark and formula in day-to-day operations. Ownership remained with the proprietor, and no permanent or residual rights accrued to the assessee. Consistent treatment had been applied to a similar licensing arrangement.

Conclusion: The licence fees are deductible as revenue expenditure, in favour of the assessee.

Issue (ii): Whether employees' welfare fund contributions deposited after the statutory due dates are deductible when paid before the return-filing due date.

Analysis: Section 36 governs deduction of employees' contributions. The Supreme Court's binding interpretation excludes those contributions from the operation of Section 43B's non-obstante clause. The applicable due dates are those prescribed by the welfare statutes, rather than the return-filing deadline.

Conclusion: The delayed contributions are not deductible, and the disallowance is restored, in favour of Revenue.

Final Conclusion: The licence-fee deductions remain available for all three assessment years, while the employees' contribution disallowance is restored for the first year.

Ratio Decidendi: Periodic fees for a limited, terminable right to use a trademark in business, without acquisition of ownership or an enduring capital asset, are revenue expenditure.

Issues: (i) Whether revision based on the holding period and consequential disallowance of the capital gains exemption was justified; (ii) whether revision based on non-verification of the source of investment in the new property was justified.

Issue (i): Whether revision based on the holding period and consequential disallowance of the capital gains exemption was justified.

Analysis: Revision under section 263 requires an assessment that is erroneous and prejudicial to Revenue. The assessment record showed enquiry into the earlier allotment, acquisition arrangement and payments. That enquiry did not automatically establish examination of every aspect of the capital gains computation or exemption claim. Nevertheless, rights acquired through allotment and payments may be relevant to the holding period; later registration or possession cannot invariably be treated as its starting point. The applicable holding-period threshold for the assessment year was 36 months, not the 24 months applied in the revisional order. The exemption disallowance substantially followed the short-term gain conclusion, and no independent breach of its statutory conditions was identified.

Conclusion: The revision on the holding-period and consequential exemption grounds was not justified, in favour of the assessee.

Issue (ii): Whether revision based on non-verification of the source of investment in the new property was justified.

Analysis: Verification of the original purchase payments did not establish verification of the separate investment in the new property. Nor did the furnishing of accounts and bank statements alone establish that its source had been specifically checked. The revisional order did not identify an unexplained payment, inconsistency in the accounts, deficiency in the bank material or other factual basis for the alleged error and prejudice. Revision does not require the authority to quantify an addition, but the omitted verification and its material basis must be identified.

Conclusion: The source-verification ground did not independently justify revision, in favour of the assessee.

Final Conclusion: The reassessment remains in force; the capital gains computation and exemption eligibility were not independently determined.

Ratio Decidendi: Revision of an assessment requires a record-based identification of error and prejudice; it cannot rest on an unsupported legal premise or a general assertion that further enquiry was needed.

Issues: Whether FOS-95 powder and syrup are classifiable under customs tariff heading 2940 or heading 1702.

Analysis: Heading 2940 covers chemically pure sugars, including oligosaccharides, subject to the applicable Chapter 29 notes. A separate chemically defined compound ordinarily consists of one molecular species; the distinct FOS constituents were intended components rather than impurities of a single compound. An aggregate FOS content exceeding 95% did not itself establish chemical purity or automatically determine classification. Under the interpretative rules, a mixture of oligosaccharides was not excluded from consideration under heading 2940 solely because it contained multiple molecular species. The tested powder had 95.8% aggregate FOS on a dry basis, while a separate report recorded total sugars of 3.4 g/100 g; the FOS fraction imparted its essential character. The syrup assessment rested on its declared identity as the same ingredient in aqueous form, without a syrup-specific test report. Chapter 17 excludes goods properly covered by heading 2940.

Conclusion: FOS-95 powder and syrup, when imported in conformity with the description and composition examined, are classifiable under tariff item 2940 00 00, not heading 1702, in favour of the assessee.

Ratio Decidendi: A mixture of distinct oligosaccharides is not excluded from heading 2940 solely because it contains multiple molecular species; classification depends on its composition and the applicable tariff notes and interpretative rules.

Issues: Whether galacto-oligosaccharide powder is classifiable under tariff heading 2940 as chemically pure sugar or heading 1702 as other sugar.

Analysis: Classification is governed by the tariff headings and relevant Chapter Notes. Chapter 29 generally covers separately defined organic compounds, while the explanatory notes to heading 2940 include oligosaccharides among sugars. The Authority described the product as a heterogeneous mixture and stated that its residual carbohydrate fraction could not merely be treated as insignificant impurities. Elsewhere, it treated unreacted lactose and glucose produced during manufacture as permissible impurities that did not alter the product's essential character.

Conclusion: The product is classifiable under tariff item 2940 00 00, not heading 1702.

Ratio Decidendi: Oligosaccharides may be classified under heading 2940 despite residual unreacted starting material and manufacturing by-products treated as permissible impurities.

Issues: Whether Aquamin Mg TG is classifiable as magnesium hydroxide under Tariff Item 28161010.

Analysis: General Interpretative Rule 1 requires classification by the terms of the headings and relevant chapter notes. Chapter 28 covers separate chemically defined compounds with permissible impurities and allows necessary anti-caking agents subject to specified conditions. Magnesium hydroxide is a separate chemically defined compound. The trace minerals originate in the seawater-derived starting material, while corn starch functions as a binder and anti-caking agent. The applicable conditions require that permitted additions do not alter the basic product's character or render it particularly suitable for a specific use rather than general use.

Conclusion: Aquamin Mg TG is classifiable under Tariff Item 28161010, subject to the imported product conforming to the stated composition, manufacturing process and functions of its constituents.

Ratio Decidendi: Manufacturing-derived impurities and a necessary anti-caking agent do not exclude a separate chemically defined compound from Chapter 28 where the applicable conditions are satisfied.