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Issues: (i) Whether the confession of a co-accused could be relied upon under section 15 of the Terrorist and Disruptive Activities (Prevention) Act, 1987 when the maker had died before completion of trial. (ii) Whether the evidence established the appellant's liability under section 4 of the Terrorist and Disruptive Activities (Prevention) Act, 1987. (iii) Whether the acquittal of the remaining accused on the charges of criminal conspiracy and murder called for interference, including the maintainability of the private appeal.
Issue (i): Whether the confession of a co-accused could be relied upon under section 15 of the Terrorist and Disruptive Activities (Prevention) Act, 1987 when the maker had died before completion of trial.
Analysis: The expression "charged and tried" in section 15 was held to be cumulative. The provision permits use of a confession against a co-accused only when the maker and the co-accused are charged in the same case and tried together. Since the maker of the confession had died before completion of trial, the confession could not be treated as admissible against the other accused. Section 30 of the Indian Evidence Act, 1872 did not enlarge the statutory requirement under section 15.
Conclusion: The confession was not admissible against the co-accused in the absence of a completed joint trial.
Issue (ii): Whether the evidence established the appellant's liability under section 4 of the Terrorist and Disruptive Activities (Prevention) Act, 1987.
Analysis: Section 4 was interpreted as covering not only disruptive acts but also conspiracy, attempt, abetment, advocacy, advice, facilitation and preparatory acts. On the evidence of the witnesses, the appellant's speeches and propaganda were found to advocate and incite Khalistan-related disruptive activity. The Court held that demand for Khalistan fell within the statutory definition of disruptive activity, including conduct by speech intended to support secession.
Conclusion: The ingredients of section 4 were proved against the appellant, and the conviction was upheld.
Issue (iii): Whether the acquittal of the remaining accused on the charges of criminal conspiracy and murder called for interference, including the maintainability of the private appeal.
Analysis: A private party was held competent to invoke jurisdiction under Article 136 of the Constitution of India in an appropriate case. On merits, however, the Court found that the prosecution had not established the required agreement or chain of circumstances to prove criminal conspiracy under section 120B of the Indian Penal Code, 1860, or the offences of murder and allied TADA and Arms Act charges against the acquitted respondents. The evidence did not show that the remaining accused had been proved guilty beyond reasonable doubt.
Conclusion: The acquittal of the remaining accused did not warrant interference and the private appeal was maintainable but unsuccessful.
Final Conclusion: The conviction of the appellant under section 4 of TADA was sustained, while the acquittal of the other accused on the conspiracy, murder, TADA and Arms Act charges remained undisturbed, resulting in dismissal of all three appeals.
Ratio Decidendi: Under section 15 of TADA, a co-accused's confession is usable only when both accused are charged and tried together, and a conviction for disruptive activity under section 4 may rest on evidence showing advocacy or incitement of secessionist activity even without proof of direct participation in violence.