Interlocutory order test and exempting personal appearance in summons cases under cheque dishonour procedure

An order is not interlocutory for Section 397(2) CrPC if, on acceptance of the objection, the criminal proceeding would come to an end; on that principle, revisional scrutiny is not barred merely because the order is passed at an interim stage. In summons-case proceedings under Section 138 of the Negotiable Instruments Act, the magistrate may, in the interests of justice, dispense with the accused's personal attendance and permit appearance through counsel, subject to safeguards such as identity assurance and continued power to require attendance later. The challenge to the revisional order succeeded and the impugned order was set aside.

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Issues: (i) Whether the order challenged in revision was an interlocutory order within the meaning of Section 397(2) of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973. (ii) Whether, in a summons case under Section 138 of the Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881, the magistrate can dispense with the personal appearance of the accused and permit appearance through counsel.

Issue (i): Whether the order challenged in revision was an interlocutory order within the meaning of Section 397(2) of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973.

Analysis: The revisional bar in Section 397(2) does not depend merely on whether an order is passed at an interim stage. The relevant test is whether, if the objection succeeds, the criminal proceedings as a whole would culminate. An order rejecting a plea which, if accepted, would terminate the proceedings is not interlocutory.

Conclusion: The order was not shown to be purely interlocutory so as to exclude revisional scrutiny; the objection to maintainability was left undecided in the final disposal.

Issue (ii): Whether, in a summons case under Section 138 of the Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881, the magistrate can dispense with the personal appearance of the accused and permit appearance through counsel.

Analysis: Sections 205, 251, 273 and 317 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 recognise that personal attendance need not invariably be insisted upon. Where the accused is represented by counsel and the magistrate is satisfied that attendance is not necessary in the interests of justice, exemption may be granted. Such dispensation is especially relevant where insisting on personal presence would cause undue hardship, provided the accused undertakes not to dispute identity and ensures representation by counsel. The magistrate retains power to direct personal attendance later if needed.

Conclusion: The magistrate has judicial discretion to dispense with the personal attendance of an accused in appropriate summons-case proceedings, subject to safeguards.

Final Conclusion: The challenge to the Sessions Judge's order succeeded, the impugned revisional order was set aside, and the accused was left free to seek appropriate relief before the magistrate under the governing procedure.

Ratio Decidendi: An order is not interlocutory if, on acceptance of the objection, the criminal proceeding would terminate; and in a summons case the magistrate may, in the interests of justice, dispense with the accused's personal attendance and permit representation through counsel subject to suitable safeguards.

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