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Issues: (i) Whether the appropriate authority under Chapter XX-C of the Income-tax Act, 1961 could refuse to issue a no-objection certificate and declare the agreement for transfer of development rights non est on the ground that the transfer allegedly offended the Urban Land (Ceiling and Regulation) Act, 1976; (ii) Whether the matter could be remanded to the appropriate authority for exercise of rectification power under section 269UJ of the Income-tax Act, 1961.
Issue (i): Whether the appropriate authority under Chapter XX-C of the Income-tax Act, 1961 could refuse to issue a no-objection certificate and declare the agreement for transfer of development rights non est on the ground that the transfer allegedly offended the Urban Land (Ceiling and Regulation) Act, 1976.
Analysis: The authority under Chapter XX-C has a confined function: it must decide whether to make an order of purchase for the Central Government or to issue a no-objection certificate. It has no jurisdiction to go behind the transaction and pronounce upon the validity of the agreement, title, or transferability of the property in a manner extraneous to the scheme of the Income-tax Act, 1961. The conditions attached to exemption under section 20(1) of the Urban Land (Ceiling and Regulation) Act, 1976 did not create a blanket prohibition on transfer; they only required prior governmental permission. Whether such permission was needed or whether the transfer could ultimately be effected was not a matter for the appropriate authority to decide while exercising power under section 269UD. The finding that the agreement was void ab initio and the application was non est was therefore beyond jurisdiction.
Conclusion: The declaration that the agreement was non est was invalid and the petitioners succeeded on this issue.
Issue (ii): Whether the matter could be remanded to the appropriate authority for exercise of rectification power under section 269UJ of the Income-tax Act, 1961.
Analysis: Section 269UJ confers only a power to rectify a mistake apparent from the record and does not authorise the authority to pass a fresh order after the statutory time limit for action under Chapter XX-C has expired. A remand would defeat the time-bound structure of Chapter XX-C and would unlawfully revive a jurisdiction that had already lapsed. The requested course was therefore inconsistent with the statutory scheme.
Conclusion: Remand for rectification was refused and the petitioners succeeded on this issue as well.
Final Conclusion: The impugned order was quashed, and the petitioners were held entitled to the relief sought under the writ petition.
Ratio Decidendi: An authority exercising a limited statutory power cannot declare a transaction non est or adjudicate issues outside its jurisdiction, and a time-bound fiscal scheme cannot be reopened by remand once the statutory period has expired.