TaxTMI Login
AI OCR ✕Convert scanned orders, printed notices, PDFs and images into clean, searchable, editable text within seconds. Starting at 2 Credits/page
Try Now →Just a moment...
AI OCR ✕Convert scanned orders, printed notices, PDFs and images into clean, searchable, editable text within seconds. Starting at 2 Credits/page
Try Now →
Press 'Enter' to add multiple search terms. Rules for Better Search
Use comma for multiple locations.
---------------- For section wise search only -----------------
Accuracy Level ~ 90%
of 
Press 'Enter' after typing page number.
of Press 'Enter' after typing page number.
No Folders have been created
Are you sure you want to delete "My most important" ?
NOTE:
of Press 'Enter' after typing page number.
of Press 'Enter' after typing page number.
All Case Laws
of Press 'Enter' after typing page number.
of Press 'Enter' after typing page number.
All Case Laws
Note
Bookmark
Share
Don't have an account? Register Here
of Press 'Enter' after typing page number.
Issues: (i) Whether an order refusing to summon additional accused under Section 319 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 is an interlocutory order so as to bar revision under Section 397 of that Code and permit recourse to Section 482; (ii) Whether the High Court could set aside such an order prejudicially without giving notice and hearing to the proposed accused.
Issue (i): Whether an order refusing to summon additional accused under Section 319 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 is an interlocutory order so as to bar revision under Section 397 of that Code and permit recourse to Section 482.
Analysis: An order under Section 319 that decides whether a person is to be summoned as an accused directly affects rights and liabilities in relation to trial. Such an order is not a mere step in aid of proceedings or a purely temporary direction. The bar in Section 397(2) applies only to interlocutory orders, while the Code preserves revisional scrutiny of orders that are substantive or of moment. Where a specific revisional remedy exists, the inherent power under Section 482 cannot be used to bypass that remedy.
Conclusion: The refusal to summon the appellants was not an interlocutory order, and the complainant ought to have pursued revision rather than Section 482; the point is answered in favour of the appellants.
Issue (ii): Whether the High Court could set aside such an order prejudicially without giving notice and hearing to the proposed accused.
Analysis: Once the trial court rejected the summoning request, a valuable right accrued to the proposed accused not to be put on trial unless a proper order was made. Section 401(2) requires that no revisional order be made to the prejudice of an accused or other person without an opportunity of being heard, and the same principle applies when the High Court acts in a manner that effectively reverses such an order under Section 482. A prejudicial order affecting an accrued right cannot be passed behind the back of the person affected.
Conclusion: Notice and hearing were required before the High Court could interfere to the prejudice of the appellants; this issue is also decided in their favour.
Final Conclusion: The impugned order could not stand because the High Court entertained the matter under an inappropriate procedural route and interfered without hearing the affected persons. The matter was sent back for fresh consideration after affording them an opportunity of hearing.
Ratio Decidendi: An order under Section 319 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 that determines whether a person should be summoned as an accused is not an interlocutory order, and a prejudicial interference with such an order cannot be made without notice and opportunity of hearing to the person affected.
TaxTMI 
TaxTMI 
