Inherent criminal jurisdiction cannot justify reinvestigation or prosecution of non-parties without notice, hearing, and a strong prima facie basis.

A High Court's appellate powers under Section 386 CrPC do not, by themselves, authorise directions for reinvestigation or prosecution of persons not before it. Any resort to inherent or supervisory jurisdiction must be exceptional, sparing, and grounded on a strong prima facie basis to secure the ends of justice. Where such directions adversely affect non-parties, fairness requires notice and an opportunity of hearing. The Supreme Court held that, on the facts, the appellate order directing reinvestigation and prosecution was unsustainable because it was passed without hearing the affected persons and without adequate justification in a stale matter where ordinary procedural remedies had already been available.

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Issues: (i) Whether the High Court, while hearing a criminal appeal, could direct further investigation and prosecution of persons not before the appellate court by invoking its appellate, revisional, inherent or supervisory powers. (ii) Whether the High Court could order such investigation and prosecution without hearing the persons adversely affected. (iii) Whether the impugned directions were sustainable in law in the circumstances of the case.

Issue (i): Whether the High Court, while hearing a criminal appeal, could direct further investigation and prosecution of persons not before the appellate court by invoking its appellate, revisional, inherent or supervisory powers.

Analysis: The appellate power under Section 386 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 is confined to the appeal before the court and does not, by itself, authorise a direction that a person be put on trial or that the police undertake reinvestigation from a particular angle. The Code, however, recognises that the High Court retains inherent jurisdiction under Section 482 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973, and supervisory jurisdiction under Article 227 of the Constitution of India and Section 483 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973, which may be exercised even suo motu in appropriate cases to secure the ends of justice. That power is exceptional and must be used sparingly, especially where the statutory machinery already provides structured remedies at the stages of investigation, committal, trial, appeal and revision.

Conclusion: The High Court could not, in the facts of this case, validly direct prosecution and reinvestigation as part of its appellate order.

Issue (ii): Whether the High Court could order such investigation and prosecution without hearing the persons adversely affected.

Analysis: Although an accused does not ordinarily have a right of audience at stages such as further investigation or summoning under Section 319 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973, the present matter was exceptional because the appellate court, after a long lapse of time, made directions adversely affecting persons who had not been before it. Before exercising extraordinary jurisdiction in that setting, fairness required notice and an opportunity of hearing, particularly since the order could alter the investigative and prosecutorial position of the affected persons. The absence of such hearing was therefore a material defect in the exercise of discretion.

Conclusion: The impugned directions were unsustainable for want of hearing to the affected persons.

Issue (iii): Whether the impugned directions were sustainable in law in the circumstances of the case.

Analysis: The Court noted that the Magistrate had accepted the final form, no protest petition had been filed, no application for summoning had been made during trial, and the appeal was being decided after about ten years. In such a situation, any extraordinary order for further investigation had to rest on a strong prima facie foundation and a careful consideration of whether any useful purpose would be served. The High Court failed to proceed on that basis and exceeded the limits of permissible judicial intervention by directing reinvestigation and prosecution of the appellant.

Conclusion: The impugned judgment was legally unsustainable and was set aside.

Final Conclusion: The appellate order was interfered with, the adverse directions were annulled, and the matter was sent back to the High Court for fresh consideration after notice to the affected parties and the State.

Ratio Decidendi: While the High Court may invoke its inherent powers even in an appellate proceeding to prevent abuse of process or secure the ends of justice, such powers cannot be used to direct prosecution or reinvestigation of non-party persons without notice and a proper prima facie basis, especially where the Code provides specific procedural remedies and the matter is stale.

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