Specific performance and adverse findings: respondents may challenge findings without cross-objection, and land reform bars do not defeat the suit.

Order 41 Rules 22 and 33 CPC allow a respondent to challenge adverse findings without filing a cross-objection or separate appeal when doing so supports the decree. An agreement to sell is not displaced by admitted receipt extensions or later communications that do not create a new contract, so specific performance remains available where the bargain is identifiable on its original terms. Readiness and willingness under Section 16(c) of the Specific Relief Act must be pleaded and proved, and documentary payments, timely notice, and financial capacity may establish it. Sections 79B and 80 of the Karnataka Land Reforms Act do not by themselves bar specific performance, because civil courts need not decide the validity of a proposed transfer before completion.

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Issues: (i) whether respondents could challenge adverse findings without filing a cross-objection or separate appeal; (ii) whether the pleadings and evidence altered the contract so as to defeat specific performance; (iii) whether the appellant proved readiness and willingness to perform the contract; (iv) whether Sections 79B and 80 of the Karnataka Land Reforms Act barred a decree for specific performance in respect of agricultural land.

Issue (i): Whether respondents could challenge adverse findings without filing a cross-objection or separate appeal.

Analysis: Order 41 Rules 22 and 33 of the Code of Civil Procedure permit a respondent to support the decree and also attack findings adverse to it for sustaining the decree, even without filing cross-objections, where the challenge is confined to findings on issues connected with the relief granted or refused. The appellate power is wide enough to examine such adverse findings in order to do complete justice between the parties.

Conclusion: The respondents could challenge the adverse findings without filing a cross-objection or separate appeal.

Issue (ii): Whether the pleadings and evidence altered the contract so as to defeat specific performance.

Analysis: The agreement to sell and the subsequent receipt extending time were admitted, and the later communications did not create a new or different contract. The evidence of additional payments and the offer of further consideration did not alter the original bargain or introduce a material variance between pleading and proof. The contract remained identifiable and enforceable on the same essential terms.

Conclusion: The pleadings and evidence did not alter the contract or disentitle the appellant from seeking specific performance.

Issue (iii): Whether the appellant proved readiness and willingness to perform the contract.

Analysis: Readiness and willingness under Section 16(c) of the Specific Relief Act, 1963 required both pleading and proof. The appellant pleaded continuous readiness, produced documentary proof of substantial part-payments, issued a timely notice seeking completion, and showed financial capacity by offering even higher consideration. The respondents led no evidence to disprove this and their own conduct showed postponement of execution and insistence on enhanced price. The trial court's finding was contrary to the evidence on record.

Conclusion: The appellant proved readiness and willingness to perform the contract.

Issue (iv): Whether Sections 79B and 80 of the Karnataka Land Reforms Act barred a decree for specific performance in respect of agricultural land.

Analysis: The statutory bar under Sections 79B and 80 operates against prohibited holding or transfer, but the questions whether a transaction is illegal or invalid under the Act are reserved for the prescribed authority under Sections 83 and 132. A civil court dealing with a suit for specific performance is not required to decide the legality of a proposed transfer under those provisions, because no concluded transfer has yet taken place. Therefore, those provisions do not prevent the civil court from decreeing specific performance.

Conclusion: Sections 79B and 80 did not bar the grant of specific performance.

Final Conclusion: The appellant was entitled to enforcement of the agreement, and the dismissal of the suit by the trial court was unsustainable.

Ratio Decidendi: A respondent may attack adverse findings without cross-objection to support the decree, and a suit for specific performance cannot be denied merely because the proposed transfer may later attract scrutiny under land reform restrictions, since the civil court need not decide the validity of a transfer that has not yet been completed.

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